【作者】 李敏；

【导师】 郑国洪；

【作者基本信息】 西南政法大学 ， 企业管理， 2021， 硕士

【摘要】 经济的迅速发展、公司规模的不断扩大使得两权分离成为必然趋势,由此导致利益目标不一致甚至相互背离,最终带来了现代公司治理问题。为了缓解委托代理问题,促使所有者和管理者利益目标趋于一致,审计作为一种强有力的外部监督手段应运而生。然而随着昆明机床、欣泰电气、雅百特、康美药业等公司财务造假案的陆续爆出,迫使理论界和实务界将视角转向如何保证信息披露质量这一问题上来,信息披露不合格,外界就无法获得真实有效财务信息,同时也使社会各界人士开始质疑外部独立审计是否能在严格意义上对公司财政财务起到监督作用。2020年10月9日,国务院出台《关于进一步提高上市公司质量的意见》,对财务造假等恶劣行为进行了严厉批评,指出监管部门要压实中介机构责任,对造假、欺诈等行为从重处理。但是相比于拥有公司实际经营权的管理层而言,外部投资者无法掌握完整的经营及财务信息,信息出现缺失或滞后,出现代理问题。而自“超常规发展机构投资者”战略实施以来,机构投资者在国家政策的大力扶持下发展壮大,贯彻落实“股东积极主义”,不仅发展成为资本市场上重要的经济主体,利用资金规模、专业技能、规模效应等方面的优势,在公司治理中发挥的积极作用也可圈可点,作为中小股东的代表,能有效缓解委托代理问题。此外,审计收费作为上市公司与会计师事务所之间联系的经济纽带,既反映了审计师因在鉴证过程中所投入的审计资源或成本所要求的补偿,也体现了内在的审计风险必然影响审计收费这一影响机制。而机构投资者的参与一方面预示着被投资公司有着良好的发展潜力和盈利前景,另一方面持股比例的增加导致它们主观上摒弃采用消极的方式来保护资本价值,而采用踊跃参与公司经营管理活动的方式,更好地利用监督管理权来促进公司治理效率的提高,使会计师事务所面临较低的审计风险,进而降低自己的审计收费。除此之外,随着我国市场化改革的不断推进,由于各地区资源禀赋的不同,形成不均衡的市场化程度成为必然,造成存在地域差异的经济主体很大程度上将面临差异悬殊的制度环境,这种不均衡现象使市场上各主体的经营投资行为也产生巨大差异。机构投资者因其在资本市场上占有重要地位从更深层次上受到制度环境的制约,投资决策、持股偏好、公司治理参与度等行为表现更是与市场化进程有着密不可分的关系。鉴于此进一步探究了不同市场化进程下机构投资者对审计收费的影响差异很有必要。本文实证检验了不同类型机构投资者在不同地区市场化进程下对审计收费的影响差异,研究发现:(1)机构投资者整体持股与审计收费负相关,机构投资者持股比例的增加能够降低会计师事务所的审计收费;(2)与交易型机构投资者相比,稳定型机构投资者对审计收费的抑制作用更强;(3)压力抵抗型机构投资者与审计收费负相关,而压力敏感型机构投资者对会计师事务所收取的审计收费无明显影响;(4)相对于市场化进程较慢的地区,稳定型和压力抵抗型机构投资者在市场化进程较快的地区对审计收费的抑制作用更加明显,而市场化进程对压力敏感型机构投资者与审计收费之间的关系无明显的调节作用。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the rapid development of economy and the continuous expansion of company scale,the separation of ownership and control right has become an inevitable trend.In order to alleviate the problem of Information asymmetry between owners and managers,make the interests of shareholders and managers tend to be the same,and prevent the adverse selection and moral hazard of managers,as a powerful means of external supervision,audit comes into being.However,as the financial fraud cases of companies such as Kunming Machine Tool,xintai Electric,Yabaite and Kangmei pharmaceutical have been uncovered one after another,this leads to a discussion in the theoretical and practical circles on how to realize the goals of authenticity,effectiveness and relevance of corporate information disclosure,it also causes the public to question whether the independent audit has played the role of the Listed Company’s external supervision.On October 9,2020,the state council issued the “opinions on further improving the quality of listed companies,” criticizing listed companies for such egregious acts as financial fraud and pointing out that regulatory authorities should tighten the responsibilities of intermediaries,the Act of forgery,fraud,etc.shall be given a heavier punishment.But the agency problem is compounded by the fact that outside investors are in an information vulnerable position compared to the management that owns the actual rights to operate the company,said Information asymmetry,a senior research fellow at the University of California,Berkeley.Since the implementation of the strategy of “ultra-conventional development of institutional investors”,China’s institutional investors have actively carried out the “Activist shareholder”,not only developing into an important economic subject in the capital market,taking advantage of the advantages of capital scale,professional skills and scale effect,and playing a positive role in corporate governance,as a representative of small and medium-sized shareholders,can effectively alleviate the principal-agent problem caused by the Information asymmetry.In addition,audit fees serve as an economic link between the listed company and the Accounting networks and associations,reflecting the compensation demanded by the auditor for the audit resources or costs involved in the audit process,it also reflects the compensation premium required for potential audit risks.On the one hand,the participation of institutional investors in shares indicates that the investee company has good development potential and profit prospect,on the other hand,the increase of the shareholding ratio leads them to abandon the method of “voting with their feet” subjectively to protect the capital value,and adopt the method of actively participating in the management activities of the company,better use of supervisory power to play an active role in corporate governance,thus avoiding the risk of audit failure to a certain extent,and thus making the Accounting networks and associations reduce its own audit fees.In addition,in the process of China’s market-oriented reform,the imbalance of inter-regional market-oriented process may lead to the market entities in different regions may face a huge difference in the institutional environment,which has a profound impact on the behavior of the market entities.As an important subject of the capital market,institutional investors are more restricted by the system,and their behavior is closely related to the system environment.Therefore,it is necessary to explore the influence of institutional investors on audit fees under different market processes.By empirically examines the results show that:(1)the overall ownership of institutional investors is negatively related to audit fees;The increase of institutional investors’ ownership can reduce the audit fees;(2)compared with the transaction-type institutional investors,the stable institutional investors more able to curb audit fees;(3)Re-inv can reduce the possibility of accounting firms charging higher audit fees,there is a negative correlation between them,while Se-inv will not have a significant impact on audit fees;(4)compared with the regions with slower marketization process,stable and pressure-resistant institutional investors are more effective in restraining audit fees in the regions with faster marketization process,however,the process of marketization does not influence the relationship between Se-inv and audit fees.更多还原