【作者】 于静；

【导师】 庄新田；

【作者基本信息】 东北大学 ， 金融学， 2019， 硕士

【摘要】 近些年来互联网信息技术发展迅速,传统的供应链融资模式已经不能满足中小企业的资金需求,融资困难仍然是阻碍中小企业发展的一个重要因素。而随着B2B平台的迅猛发展,其掌握了平台上中小企业在交易、资金、信用等方面的信息,B2B电商平台可以作为中介帮助银行授信审核,从而增加企业的融资机会,因此基于B2B平台的银行供应链金融应运而生。现阶段银行和B2B平台以战略合作为主,然而在合作的过程中B2B平台存在道德风险问题,银行如何在基于B2B平台的供应链金融模式下,在提供贷款业务的同时保障自身收益、进行有效的风险控制、对B2B平台进行激励约束,具有重要的研究价值。首先,本文总结归纳了供应链金融的模式和演变路径;然后,以电子订单买方融资为例,运用委托代理理论和交易成本理论研究委托授信下银行对B2B平台的激励策略问题,通过构建单向道德危害模型得到银行的最优收益分配比例,以规避B2B电商平台行为隐匿的道德风险;其次,运用博弈论方法通过构建二者的博弈收益矩阵研究了不考虑惩罚变量和考虑惩罚变量的情况下银行对B2B平台的激励策略,以规避B2B平台信息隐匿的道德风险;最后借助MATLAB软件对相关结论验证,并对银行提出了在与B2B平台合作过程中的几点建议。研究发现:①银行的收益分配比例、支付系数会对B2B平台的努力水平产生激励作用;②最优收益分配比例的大小受质押物处置渠道畅通性、质押率取值的影响敏感;③当B2B平台获得企业的回扣收益小于隐匿成本时,B2B平台会选择推荐“高信用”企业且“不隐瞒”,银行通过权衡自身收益决定是否复核;④当B2B平台获得企业的回扣收益大于隐匿成本时,银行应该控制收益分配比例上限、与核心企业签订回购合约、控制质押率上限、与B2B平台签订惩罚合约来约束B2B平台的信息隐匿行为,以确保自身收益。更多还原

【Abstract】 Internet information technology is developing rapidly in recent years,the traditional pattern of supply chain finance has been unable to meet the demand of small and medium-sized enterprises financing,the financing difficult problem is still one of the key factors hindering the development of the small and medium-sized enterprises.But with the rapid development of B2B electric business platforms,B2B platforms have mastered the aspects of trade,capital,credit information and so on about small and medium-sized enterprises.B2B electronic business platforms can be used as an intermediary to help Banks credit audit,thus increasing financing opportunities of small and medium-sized enterprise,so bank financial supply chain based on B2B electric business platform arises at the historic moment.Banks choose to have a strategic cooperation with B2B platforms at the present stage,however,B2B platforms have moral hazard problems in the process of cooperation.So it has important research value for the bank to provide the loan business while guaranteeing its own income,carrying out effective risk control and incenting and restraining to the B2B platform under the supply chain finance mode based on B2B platforms.First of all,this paper summarizes the operation modes and evolution paths of supply chain finance.Secondly,taking the buyer financing of electronic order as an example,using the principal-agent theory and transaction cost theory to research the incentive strategy of bank to a B2B platform,by constructing a one-way moral hazard model,the optimal income distribution ratio of Banks is obtained,so as to prevent the moral hazard of behavior hiding of B2B platform.And then,using the game theory method to construct a pay-off matrix of Banks and B2B platform,by constructing a dynamic game pay-off matrix of Banks and B2B platform don’t consider punishment was studied under the condition of variables and consider to punish Banks incentive strategies of B2B platform,to prevent moral hazard of the B2B platform of information hiding,this paper study the incentive strategy of the bank against B2B platform without considering the penalty variable and considering the penalty variable,so as to prevent the moral hazard of information hiding of B2B platform.Finally,the relevant conclusions are verified by MATLAB software,and some suggestions are put forward to banks in the process of cooperation with B2B platforms.It is found that:the ratio of income distribution and payment coefficient of Banks can stimulate the efforts of B2B platforms;The proportion of the optimal income distribution is sensitive to the influence of the smoothness of pledge disposal channels and the pledge rate;When the B2B platform gets the kickback less than its hidden cost,the B2B platform will choose to recommend the "high credit" enterprises and "do not hide".Banks will decide whether to review by weighing its own earnings;On the contrary,in order to ensure their benefits,banks can control income distribution proportion limit,sign buy-back contract with core enterprises,control the limit of pledge rate,or sign a penalty contract to restrain B2B platform.更多还原