【作者】 杨敏；

【导师】 马子红；

【作者基本信息】 云南大学 ， 金融（专业学位）， 2021， 硕士

【摘要】 自从2010年3月31日起,中国证监会正式开始融资融券交易试点工作,卖空机制在我国资本市场中得以运用,意味着投资者可对特定试点股票进行卖空,我国资本市场交易模式转为了双边交易。在卖空管制逐步放松的进程中,对证券市场以及上市公司都带来了一定的影响。同时,伴随着并购浪潮,并购在企业资源整合与战略扩张方面的作用更加显著,但也存在许多因并购决策失误导致股东价值受损的案例,因此,展开改善并购绩效的相关研究具有重要意义。现有的成果主要围绕卖空管制放松对企业短期行为的治理效应来展开研究,而卖空管制放松作为外部治理机制,长期来看,对于上市公司的影响其实是深远的。基于此,本文深入分析了卖空管制放松与企业并购绩效二者间的联系以及相应的影响机制,并揭示了分析师关注度以及融资约束程度对影响效果的约束作用。由于我国卖空管制放松分批确定上市公司试点名单,自然地将样本上市公司进行分类,形成了干净的准自然实验情境,在此条件下,考虑到卖空管制放松实行的时间,本文利用双重差分模型(DID)的实证研究方法,以我国A股上市公司2007年至2018年并购事件的数据为研究样本,对卖空管制放松下的企业并购绩效影响进行分析,并探究了其作用渠道的假设验证和附加测试,避免了内生性问题影响结果的准确性。最终,本文得到以下研究结论:(1)卖空管制放松给企业并购绩效带来了激励作用。说明卖空管制放松在并购活动过程中发挥了外部治理机制作用,对试点公司管理层的行为造成了压力,促进改善上市公司的并购绩效。(2)分析师关注度对卖空管制放松的效应具有约束作用。由于分析师效应的存在,有助于减少价值损毁型并购行为,因此,卖空管制放松下,在分析师关注度较低时,可以更显著地改善上市公司并购绩效。(3)公司自身特征层面对卖空管制放松的效应具有约束作用。处于融资约束程度低的公司环境时,管理层执行与并购初衷相悖的行为也会增加。此时,卖空管制放松对上市公司并购绩效的作用效果更强。经过倾向得分匹配法(PSM)控制了样本选择偏误后,回归结果仍表现出很好的显著性,因此,可证明结果具有一定的稳健性。基于此结果,本文围绕监管机构、上市公司与投资者三个角度提出相关对策建议。本文对于企业并购影响因素方面的研究,是一种补充与突破,对我国资本市场卖空管制放松政策的完善和实施具有一定的参考价值。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since March 31,2010,the CSRC has officially started the pilot work of margin trading in some parts,and the short selling mechanism has been used in China’s capital market,investors can be short pilot for a particular stock,stock market trading patterns to the bilateral trade in our country,in the short controls the process of gradually relaxing,of the securities market and listed companies has brought certain influence.At the same time,along with the M&A wave,M&A plays a more significant role in enterprise resource integration and strategic expansion,but there are also many cases of shareholder value damage caused by the wrong M&A decisions.Therefore,It is important to study how to improve M & A performance.The existing research mainly focused on the analysis of deregulation in short to the company the governance effect of short-term behavior,and shorting deregulation as an external governance mechanism,in the long run,it has a certain significance for listed companies.In this light,this paper explains in-depth the relationship between the deregulation of short selling and M&A performance and the corresponding influence mechanism,and reveals the restrictive effect of analyst attention and financing constraint degree on the impact effect.Because our country short deregulation partial determine the pilot list of listed companies,naturally will classify the sample company,formed the clean natural experiment situation,on this condition,considering the deregulation in short time,Using the empirical research method of double difference model(DID),this paper takes the data of M & A events of A listed companies in China from 2007 to 2018 as the research sample to analyze the impact of M & A performance under the relaxation of short selling control.And explore its role channel hypothesis verification and additional testing,avoid the problem of endogenous affect the accuracy of the results.Finally,the conclusions of this paper are as follows :(1)Relaxation of short-selling regulation brings an incentive effect on M&A performance.It shows that the loosening of short selling control plays the role of external governance mechanism in the process of merger and acquisition activities,which causes pressure on the management behavior of pilot companies and promotes the improvement of the M&A performance of listed companies.(2)Analysts’ attention to the governance of short selling deregulation has a restrictive effect.The existence of analyst effect helps to reduce value-destroying mergers and acquisitions.Therefore,under the loosening of short-selling control,the M&A performance of listed companies can be improved more significantly when the attention of analysts is low.(3)The characteristics of the company itself have a restrictive effect on the governance of short selling control relaxation.When the pilot companies are faced with low degree of financing constraints,that is,and the behavior of management that is contrary to the original intention of merger and acquisition will also increase.At this time,the loosening of short-selling control will have a stronger effect on the merger and acquisition performance of listed companies.By using the PSM method,this paper controls the sample selection bias.It is found that the regression results are significant.Therefore,the result that the loosening of short-selling regulation has an incentive effect on the M&A performance is robust to a certain extent.Based on the results,this paper offer proposals from the perspectives of regulators,listed companies and investors.The research on the influencing factors of enterprise M&A in this paper is a supplement and breakthrough.It provides empirical evidence of the causal relationship between the deregulation of short selling and the performance of enterprise M&A,and brings some reference significance for the improvement and implementation of the deregulation policy of short selling in China’s capital market.更多还原