【作者】 赵洋；

【导师】 程书萍；

【作者基本信息】 南京大学 ， 工业工程（专业学位）， 2017， 硕士

【摘要】 随着PPP合作模式的广泛实施,政府希望引进更多的社会投资者参与公共建设,以缓解财政压力,提高社会影响力等。但该类项目往往资金需求大、投资周期长,社会投资(联合体)仅仅依据预测现金流价值不足以确定投资行为,因而讨论PPP项目是否存在隐藏投资价值具有实践意义。查阅诸多项目案例发现,普遍存在柔性激励条款,不同项目类型对应激励措施有所不同。因而本文以此为切入点,引入契约理论、激励理论、项目价值评估模型。首先,构建概念模型,分为PPP项目典型案例分析和概念模型两个部分。第一,从实践中的PPP项目案例出发,对现有PPP合作模式和涉及的柔性激励进行归类,一方面整理案例进行应用性分析便于后期研究案例的选取,一方面通过梳理理论联系筛选具有代表性的条款,以便于证明柔性激励的普适性价值。第二,柔性激励机制即赋予社会投资方在未来拥有一定的收益保障权利,面对不同的市场环境或经营水平能够获得不同的利润分配,保障自身投资的有效性。类比期权的设想对柔性激励条款进行分析:一方面研究条款隐藏的选择权特点,从理论层面解释是否可解释为期权;一方面深入分析条款权利的定量化表达形式,将其归类为不同类型的期权,以便于后期定价的计算。其次,构建价值评估模型,即对概念模型进行求解。基于概念模型的研究成果发现,柔性激励条款为实物资产且具有类期权的属性,参考大量学者的评估研究,实物期权定价适用且普遍。引入实物期权定价方法:应用期权定价对未来选择权进行价值衡量,识别不同期权种类,选取定价公式、讨论参数取值等,计算柔性激励的期权价值,因而得到NPV和期权价值两部分构成的项目总价值。最后,选用典型案例进行理论验证:整理项目数据,套用理论模型的研究成果,计算实际应用中的价值。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the widespread implementation of Public-Private Partnership(PPP)cooperation pattern,the government hopes to introduce more social investors to participate in public constructions.Through this way,they can ease financial pressure and increase social influence.However,these projects tend to have large capital requirements and long investment cycles.Social investors(consortium)cannot determine the investment behaviors just on the base of predicting cash flow value.Therefore,it has practical significance to discuss whether the PPP project has hidden investment value.Through looking up a number of project cases,we found that flexible incentive terms are ubiquitous and different types of projects have different incentive measures.Therefore,this paper uses this as a starting point,and introduces contract theory,incentive theory,project value assessment model.We use literature research,empirical summary,qualitative and quantitative analysis to do our research.On the beginning,we constructs conceptual model,which is divided into two parts:typical case analysis and conceptual model of PPP project.First,from the case of PPP projects in practice,we classify the existing PPP cooperation patterns and the involving flexible incentives.On the one hand,we clear up the cases and do practical analysis to facilitate the selection of the later research cases.On the other hand,by combing the linking theories,we select the representative terms in order to prove the universal value of flexible incentives.Second,a flexible incentive mechanism means giving social investors a certain income security right in the future.With this right,the social investors can get a different profit distribution when facing different market environment or business level,so they can protect the effectiveness of their investment.We analyze the flexible incentive clause by the analogy of option.On the one hand,we analyze the characteristics of hidden options,and explains whether it can be interpreted as an option from the theoretical level.On the other hand,we analyze the quantitative expression of the right of the clause,and classifies it into different types of options in order to facilitate the calculation of the later pricing.Then we construct the value evaluation model to solve the conceptual model.Based on the research results of the conceptual model,we find that the flexible incentive clause is physical asset and has the analogous attribute of the options.After referencing a large number of scholars,we find the real option is applicable and general.Based on this cognition,we use the option pricing method to evaluate the value of the future option,identify the different option types,select the pricing formula,and discuss the parameters,etc.So we can calculate the option value of flexible incentive and finally obtain the total value of the project which is constitute by two parts:the NPV and the option value.Finally,we use typical cases to do theoretical verification:compiling the project data,applying the research results of the theoretical model and calculating the value in practical application.更多还原