【作者】 黄云；

【导师】 何鹰；

【作者基本信息】 南京大学 ， 法律（非法学）（专业学位）， 2021， 硕士

【摘要】 公司对于税后利润的分配决议属于公司自治事项,司法对介入公司利润分配通常持保守态度。在《公司法》司法解释(四)出台前,如果股东要救济自己的权利,主要通过决议撤销之诉、决议无效之诉、异议股东请求公司回购股份、司法解散公司、进行股东代位诉讼等途径,但通过这些途径进行救济,很难起到保护股东抽象利润分配请求权的效果。随着公司自治和资本多数决缺陷的进一步暴露,大股东侵害小股东利润分配请求权的现象频发。在该司法解释出台之后,第十五条明确对股东抽象利润分配请求权的保护规则,即司法对此进行救济的前提是公司股东滥用权利。但司法解释并没有明确“滥用股东权利”的认定标准,这也造成在司法实践中《公司法》司法解释(四)第十五条适用困难,对“滥用股东权利”认定标准不一,未起到保护股东抽象利润分配请求权的效果。除问题的缘起和结语,本文包括如下五个部分:第一部分“股东抽象利润分配请求权之界定”。本部分梳理了该权利的概念、法律性质以及司法介入的正当性。该请求权是即使在公司没有利润分配决议或做出不分配利润决议的情况下,股东可基于身份请求利润分配的权利。此项权利是固有权和期待权。司法介入主要是由于公司自治、资本多数决原则存在缺陷以及禁止滥用权利原则的要求。第二部分“《公司法》司法解释(四)第十五条原则性规定的评析”。本部分分析了《公司法》司法解释(四)第十五条的原则性规定部分,认为原则上司法一般不介入公司的利润分配事项,如果股东要救济自己的权利,主要通过决议撤销之诉、决议无效之诉、异议股东请求公司回购股份、司法解散公司、进行股东代位诉讼等途径,但是这些救济措施均存在不同程度的缺陷。第三部分“《公司法》司法解释(四)第十五条但书规定的评析”。本部分主要分析了该条的但书规定,该规定虽然为股东利润分配请求权的救济提供了直接依据,但是也存在诸多问题。比如但书部分规定模糊,没有明确“滥用股东权利”的标准,举证责任分配不恰当以及缺乏判决指导性。其中最大的问题是“滥用股东权利”的标准不明确,造成在适用上存在困难。第四部分“股东抽象利润分配请求权之‘滥用股东权利’认定的司法裁判现状”。本部分从司法实践角度出发,对2017-2020年的公司盈余分配案例进行了检索和梳理,发现司法裁判中对《公司法》司法解释(四)第十五条但书部分的适用较为机械,许多法院都以原告无法证明被告滥用股东权利为由,驳回原告利润分配诉讼请求。司法实践中股东存在举证困难的现象。而在极少数支持诉求的案例中,法院对于“滥用股东权利”的认定标准不一致。另外在司法裁判中,《公司法》司法解释(四)第十五条的“滥用股东权利”认定采取实质标准与《公司法》第二十条“滥用股东权利”采取的形式标准存在衔接不当的问题。第五部分“完善我国股东抽象利润分配请求权之‘滥用股东权利’认定标准”。本部分借鉴域外经验,主要包括美国的合理期待原则、控股股东信义义务以及法国法的经验,认为我国《公司法》司法解释(四)第十五条“滥用股东权利”的认定可以采用形式标准和实质标准结合的方法进行认定。在形式标准上,根据该条规定,“违反法律规定”可以作为“滥用股东权利”认定的形式标准,此处的法律应做广义理解。实质标准主要从保护中小股东利益角度、规制大股东或控股股东行为、公司生产经营三个角度出发,提出引入合理期待原则、完善我国股东信义义务规定、判断公司生产经营目的三个标准。更多还原

【Abstract】 The company’s decision on the distribution of after tax profits belongs to the company’s autonomy,and the judiciary is conservative in intervening in the company’s profit distribution.Before the promulgation of the judicial interpretation(4)of the company law,the shareholders mainly took such measures as objecting to the shareholders’ right to request for repurchase,requesting the court to cancel the profit distribution resolution or confirm that the profit distribution resolution is invalid,requesting the judicial dissolution of the company,transferring shares to withdraw from the company,and shareholders’ representative litigation to provide relief,which is difficult to protect the shareholders’ right to request Abstract profit distribution.With the further exposure of the defects of corporate autonomy and capital majority decision,more and more large shareholders or controlling shareholders infringe on the right of other shareholders by manipulating the board of directors and abusing their rights.In this context,the Supreme People’s court passed the judicial interpretation(4)of the company law in 2017,and clarified the direct basis for protecting shareholders’ claim for abstract profit distribution in the proviso of Article 15.The premise of judicial relief is that the company’s shareholders abuse their rights and lead to the company’s non distribution of profits,resulting in the loss of other shareholders.However,the judicial interpretation does not make clear the criteria for determining "abuse of shareholders’ rights",which also makes it difficult to apply Article 15 of the judicial interpretation(4)of the company law in judicial practice.There are different criteria for determining "abuse of shareholders’ rights",and it does not have the effect of protecting shareholders’ claim for abstract profit distribution.In addition to the introduction and conclusion,this paper includes the following five parts:Part I is “the definition of shareholders’ claim for abstract profit distribution”.This part introduces the concept and legal nature of shareholders’ claim for abstract profit distribution,as well as the legitimacy of judicial intervention in the protection of shareholders’ claim for abstract profit distribution.The shareholder’s claim for abstract profit distribution refers to the right to request the company’s profit distribution based on the company’s shareholder qualification without the resolution of the company’s shareholders’ meeting or without a specific distribution plan.The shareholder’s claim for abstract profit distribution is not only the inherent right of the shareholder,but also the expectant right.Judicial intervention in shareholders’ claim for abstract profit distribution is mainly due to the defects of corporate autonomy,capital majority principle and the requirement of the principle of prohibiting abuse of rights.Part Ⅱ is "the comment and Analysis on the principle of Article 15 of judicial interpretation(4)of company law".This part analyzes the Article 15,and holds that in principle,justice generally does not intervene in the company’s profit distribution matters.If shareholders want to remedy their own rights,they can mainly appeal to the court to cancel the profit distribution resolution or confirm the invalidity of the profit distribution resolution,request the judicial dissolution of the company and transfer shares However,there are some defects in these relief measures.Part Ⅲ is "comment and Analysis on the proviso of Article 15 of judicial interpretation(4)of company law".This part analyzes the proviso of judicial interpretation(4)of the company law,and holds that although the proviso provides a direct basis for the relief of shareholders’ claim for profit distribution,there are still many problems.For example,the proviso is vague,there is no clear standard of "abuse of shareholders’ rights",the distribution of burden of proof is inappropriate,and the judgment is lack of guidance.The biggest problem is that the standard of "abuse of shareholders’ rights" is not clear,which makes it difficult to apply.Part Ⅳ is "the status quo of judicial judgment on the identification of’abuse of shareholders’ rights ’of shareholders’ claim for abstract profit distribution".From the perspective of judicial practice,this part searches and combs the company’s earnings distribution cases from 2017 to 2020,and finds that the application of the proviso to Article 15 of the judicial interpretation(4)of the company law in the judicial judgment is relatively mechanical.Many courts reject the plaintiff’s claim on the ground that the plaintiff can not prove that he has abused the rights of shareholders,which makes it difficult for small and medium shareholders to provide evidence.However,in the few cases that support shareholders’ demands for profit distribution,the court’s criteria for "abusing shareholders’ rights" are inconsistent.In addition,in the judicial judgment,the substantive standard adopted in Article 15 of the judicial interpretation(4)of the company law and the formal standard adopted in Article 20 of the company law are not properly connected.Part Ⅴ is "to improve the standard of ’abusing shareholders’ rights’ of shareholders’ claim for abstract profit distribution".This part draws lessons from foreign experience,mainly including the principle of reasonable expectation in the United States,the fiduciary duty of controlling shareholders and the experience of French law,and holds that the identification of Article 15 "abuse of shareholders’ rights" in the judicial interpretation(4)of the company law of our country can adopt the method of combining formal standard and substantive standard.In terms of formal standard,according to Article 15 of judicial interpretation(4),"violation of legal provisions" can be regarded as the formal standard of "abuse of shareholders’ rights",and the law here should be understood in a broad sense.The substantive standard mainly from the perspective of protecting the interests of small and medium shareholders,regulating the behavior of large shareholders or controlling shareholders,and the company’s production and operation,puts forward three standards:introducing the principle of reasonable expectation,improving the provisions of shareholders’ fiduciary duty,and judging the company’s production and operation purpose.更多还原