【作者】 王晓艳；

【导师】 段磊；

【作者基本信息】 华东师范大学 ， 民商法， 2021， 硕士

【摘要】 在实践中,上市公司为了避免大股东离婚导致的不利影响,保持上市公司股权架构稳定,维持大股东对公司的控制权,减少公司的经营管理风险,采取了一系列风险规避措施。本文整理了目前我国上市公司预防大股东离婚机制,并依次进行了研究,具体包括:一、基于婚姻关系双方合意,对股权财产做出特殊安排的婚前协议、折价补偿协议、一致行动人协议;二、通过法律技术手段隔离股权所有权的权益保留型股权信托。在以上四种风险防御中,婚前协议、补偿协议保留了大股东对于股权的所有权,而在一致行动人协议与权利保留型股权信托中,大股东虽然丧失了股权的所有权,但依旧能实际控制公司。上市公司大股东离婚而导致的股权分割,是婚姻家庭生活与商事行为交织而产生的法律问题,亦体现出民法典确立的意思自治原则下,婚姻法与商法不同的价值取向,具体则表现在对离婚双方、公司、中小股东(投资者)之间利益的平衡。本文从上市公司大股东离婚机制着手,探讨了在处理此类婚姻与商事交织而产生的问题中的三个基本立场:1.商事风险不可避免;2.尊重意思自治;3.处理好效率与公平,并具体对围绕着大股东离婚事件,所产生的法律问题:一致行动人协议、大股东离婚信息披露制度的完善,以及夫妻共同财产制下保留股权信托的刺破提出建议。本文除导论与结论之外分为四个部分,第一部分提出了本论文想要解决的问题,即大股东离婚对上市公司产生的不利影响,以及针对此不利影响,上市公司为了维护公司治理体系以及股权结构的稳定,所采取的一系列预防大股东离婚风险机制。并对其中所蕴含的婚姻家庭法律与商事法律的价值冲突和价值平衡作出分析。第二部分至第三部分,本论文具体分析了我国上市公司目前所使用的预防大股东离婚风险机制,探讨了婚姻家庭法律与商事法律的价值冲突。并对于我国目前使用的大股东离婚风险防御机制主要包括婚前协议、折价补偿协议、一致行动人协议、以及股权信托进行了详细论述,并分析了其在实践中产生的问题。在第四部分,本论文利用价值分析以及具体规范分析,围绕着大股东离婚事件,对我国目前的一致行动人协议制度、信息披露制度、以及股权信托的刺破提出了完善建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 In practice,listed companies take a series of risk aversion measures in order to avoid the adverse effects caused by the divorce of major shareholders,maintain the stability of the equity structure of listed companies,maintain the control of major shareholders over the company,and reduce the company’s operation and management risks.This paper sorts out the mechanism of preventing major shareholders from divorce in China’s listed companies,and studies it in turn,including: first,premarital agreement,discount compensation agreement and agreement of persons acting in concert to make special arrangements for equity property based on the agreement of both parties in the marriage relationship;second,equity retention equity trust to isolate equity ownership through legal and technical means.In the above four kinds of risk prevention,the premarital agreement and compensation agreement retain the ownership of the major shareholders,while in the concerted action agreement and right retention equity trust,although the major shareholders lose the ownership of the equity,they can still control the company.The division of stock rights caused by the divorce of the major shareholders of listed companies is a legal problem caused by the interweaving of marriage and family life and commercial behavior.It also reflects the different value orientation of marriage law and commercial law under the principle of autonomy of will established in the civil code.Specifically,it shows the balance of interests between the divorced parties,the company and the minority shareholders(investors).Starting from the divorce mechanism of major shareholders in listed companies,this paper discusses three basic positions in dealing with the problems arising from such marriage and business: 1.Commercial risks are inevitable;2.Respect for autonomy of the will;3.Deal with efficiency and fairness,and specifically deal with the legal problems arising from the divorce of major shareholders: the agreement of persons acting in concert and the divorce information disclosure system of major shareholders Finally,it puts forward some suggestions on how to improve the degree of trust,and how to pierce the reserved equity trust under the joint property system of husband and wife.In addition to the introduction and conclusion,this paper is divided into four parts.The first part puts forward the problems that this paper wants to solve,that is,the adverse impact of major shareholder divorce on listed companies,and a series of mechanisms to prevent major shareholder divorce risk in order to maintain the stability of corporate governance system and equity structure.It also analyzes the value conflict and value balance between marriage and family law and commercial law.From the second part to the third part,this paper analyzes the mechanism of preventing divorce risk of major shareholders used by Listed Companies in China,and discusses the value conflict between marriage and family law and commercial law.It also discusses in detail the major shareholders’ divorce risk defense mechanism currently used in China,including premarital agreement,discount compensation agreement,concerted action agreement,and equity trust,and analyzes the problems in practice.In the fourth part,this paper uses value analysis and specific normative analysis,around the divorce of major shareholders,puts forward some suggestions on the current concerted action agreement system,information disclosure system,and the penetration of equity trust.更多还原