【作者】 刘渤；

【导师】 于莹；

【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 ， 法律硕士（专业学位）， 2021， 硕士

【摘要】 随着市场经济的发展,公司作为市场经济活动的参与主体其重要性不言而喻。而在公司治理结构中,董事作为公司日常事务的经营管理者,对公司的运行起着至关重要的作用。近年来,随着公司经营管理专业化和董事中心主义的出现和增强,完善对董事行为的监管成为大势所趋。作为董事的基本义务,忠实义务和注意义务成为公司法中极富争议与讨论的领域。我国《公司法》第一百四十七条明确规定董事、监事、高级管理人员对公司负有忠实义务和勤勉义务,而英美法系则称为忠实义务和注意义务。相较于忠实义务,注意义务的含义和内容更为模糊,在审查标准的确定上更具难度。因此,针对董事注意义务的研究一直争执不断。我国公司法并未对董事勤勉义务作出明确规定,这一现象造成了学术领域的纷争和司法裁判标准模糊等问题。明确注意义务的内涵和审查标准是我国公司法亟待解决的难题。本文以中美两国董事注意义务的法律规定、司法裁判案例为基础,对注意义务的内涵和审查标准等要素进行了讨论、分析和对比研究,发现我国公司法中的勤勉义务与美国公司法中的注意义务在内涵上基本一致,都是对董事履职行为的认真、勤勉程度以及能力的考察,但我国在对董事勤勉义务的司法审查上存在形式主义、标准不清、概念不明等问题。注意义务这一概念,来源于英美法系。美国是判例法国家,注意义务的理论发展主要来源于法官在案例中对其的不断阐释和辨析。经过百年来的发展,美国董事注意义务在理论和实践中已形成较为完整的标准和体系。而当下,法官在遵循先例的基础上对具体案件如何适用该规定的讨论仍在与时俱进。面对新经济形势,我国董事注意义务的理论和实践亟待发展,学习和借鉴美国等国家的先进经验并结合本国发展情况,落实董事注意义务规则的适用是时代应有之意。我国现有法律法规对上市公司等大型公司规制较多,如《上市公司治理准则》《上市公司章程指引》等,但对有限责任公司等小公司的董事行为主要靠公司法以及公司章程的约束。事实上,我国近年来涉及董监高勤勉义务的案件中多涉及小型的有限责任公司,而由于其股东人数少且直接参与公司的经营管理,在审查董监高的行为时与上市公司存在差异。上市公司和大型公司在治理体系商更加健全和完善,多呈现所有权和经营管理权分离的情况,而有限责任公司等非公众小公司则相反。在不同公司治理模式下对董事注意义务的考察角度有所不同,主要体现在行为性质和审查标准上,但对董事行为的要求却是一致的。加强对董事行为的监管有利于公司治理体系规范化的发展,是公司适应新形势竞争下的良策。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the development of market economy,the company,as the main body of market economic activities,its importance is self-evident.As the managers of the daily affairs of the company,the directors of the company play an important role in the operation of the company.At the same time,with the continuous strengthening of director centrism,improving the supervision of directors’ behavior has become the general trend.As the basic obligations of directors,the duty of loyalty and the duty of care have always been one of the most controversial and discussed areas in the company law.Article 147 of Corporation Law of China clearly stipulates that the directors,supervisors and senior executives have the duty of loyalty and diligence to the company,while the common law system is called the duty of loyalty and duty of care.Compared with the duty of loyalty,the meaning and content of the duty of care is vaguer,and it is more difficult to determine the standard of examination.Therefore,the research on the duty of care of directors has been controversial.The Corporation Law of our country does not stipulate clearly the duty of care of directors,which leads to disputes in the academic field and vague in judicial standards.It is an urgent problem to clarify the connotation and examination standard of duty of care in China’s company law.Based on the legal provisions and judicial cases of directors’ duty of care in China and the United States,this paper discusses the connotation and review standard of the duty of care.It is found that the duty of diligence in China is basically the same as the duty of care in the United States.Both of them are the inspection of directors’ conscientiousness,diligence degree and ability in performing their duties.There are some problems in the judicial review of the duty of diligence in China,such as formalism,unclear standard and unclear concept.The concept of duty of care comes from the common law system.The United States is a case law country,and the theoretical development of duty of care mainly comes from the continuous interpretation and discrimination of judges in cases.After a hundred years of development,the duty of care of directors in the United States has formed a relatively complete standard and system in theory and practice,and the judges’ discussion on how to apply it to specific cases,following the precedent,is still advancing with the times.In the face of the new economic situation,the theory and practice of directors’ duty of care in China need to be developed.Learning from the advanced experience of the United States and other countries,and combining with the development of our country,it is necessary to implement the application of the rules of directors’ duty of care.The existing laws and regulations of China on listed companies and other large companies regulate more,such as Listed Company Governance Standards,Guidelines for the Articles of Association of Listed Companies,but the behavior of directors of small companies such as limited liability companies mainly depends on the company law and the articles of association.In fact,in recent years,most of the cases involving the duty of diligence of directors,supervisors and senior executives in China involve small limited liability companies.However,due to the small number of shareholders and their direct participation in the operation and management of the company,there are differences between them when examining the behavior of directors,supervisors and senior executives.The governance system of listed companies and large-scale companies is more perfect,and the separation of ownership and management is more common,while that of small non-public companies such as limited liability companies are on the contrary.In different corporate governance models,the perspective of directors’ duty of care is different,mainly reflected in the nature of behavior and review standards,but the requirements for directors’ behavior are consistent.Strengthening the supervision of directors’ behavior is conducive to the development of the standardization of corporate governance system,and is a good strategy for the company to adapt to the new situation of competition.更多还原