【作者】 王宁；

【导师】 郭建强；

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 ， 金融（专业学位）， 2021， 硕士

【摘要】 粗放型经济增长越来越不可持续,我国必须要为经济发展寻找新的动能。习近平总书记说创新是引领发展的第一动力,2020年10月29日,《中国共产党第十九届中央委员会第五次全体会议公报》提出,坚持创新在我国现代化建设全局中的核心地位,到2035年我国要在关键核心技术方面实现重大突破,进入创新型国家前列。在我国经济由高速增长向高质量增长转变的时代背景下,作为微观活动主体,企业的创新能力不仅关系到自身存亡,对国家经济发展同样有极其重要的意义。而企业的创新活动需要资金支持,在信贷融资困难的情况下,股权质押为股东们提供了一条便利的新渠道。如今,股权质押已成为控股股东最常用的融资方式之一。在股权质押背景下,控股股东的特殊行为倾向和风险承担能力变化将对公司的创新活动产生重要影响。因此,本文从控股股东股权质押出发,研究其对企业创新效率的影响,并探究股权集中度的调节作用。经过对相关文献的梳理总结和对基础理论的分析推理,本文认为,股权质押后,若上市公司股价下跌,控股股东将面临控制权转移风险,而对上市公司的控制权是控股股东极其珍视的权力。因此,为降低公司股价波动、防范控制权转移,控股股东倾向于减少高风险的研发投入。但创新能力是公司保持长期竞争力的关键,是公司长期价值提升的源泉,控股股东作为上市公司的第一决策人和最大受益者,“竭泽而渔”并不是他们的理性选择。鉴于创新能力是创新投入和创新效率的联合函数,本文认为,在创新投入减少的情况下,控股股东有强烈动机提高上市公司的创新效率,且由于持股比例越大,控股股东能够享受到的创新带来的收益份额越大,因而更有动机促进上市公司提升创新效率。为验证本文的两个研究假设,本文以2011-2018年中国创业板上市公司数据为研究样本,在确定相关变量并构建回归模型之后,本文首先对研究变量进行了描述性统计分析和相关性分析,然后利用固定效应模型进行多元回归,最后对回归结果进行稳健性检验,以保证结论的有效性。经过实证分析后,本文得出以下结论:(1)控股股东股权质押与企业创新效率显著正相关。(2)股权集中度在控股股东股权质押与企业创新效率的关系中起到正向调节作用。本文为外部投资者提供了一个审视控股股东股权质押行为的新视角,并建议监管部门完善控股股东股权质押信息披露机制。本文的创新之处主要有两点:一方面,已有文献主要研究股权质押对公司价值、现金水平、创新投入等方面的影响,本文则通过理论与实证相结合的方式,探究了控股股东股权质押对企业创新效率的影响,并创新性地引入股权集中度作为调节变量,探究股权集中度在控股股东股权质押与企业创新效率关系中的调节作用,丰富了股权质押与公司治理等方面的研究内容。另一方面,本文以高科技中小企业更集中、融资需求更强、股权质押更活跃的创业板上市公司为研究对象,弥补了过往文献对特定板块上市公司控股股东股权质押关注度不足的缺陷。更多还原

【Abstract】 Extensive economic growth is becoming increasingly unsustainable,and our country must find new momentum for economic development.General Secretary Xi Jinping said that innovation is the first driving force for development.On October 29,2020,the Communique of the Fifth Plenary Session of the Nineteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China proposed that innovation is at the core of the overall modernization drive in our country.By 2035,our country will achieve major breakthroughs in key core technologies and enter the forefront of innovative countries In the context of the economic transition from high-speed growth to high-quality growth in our country,as the main body of micro-activity,the innovation ability of an enterprise is not only related to its own survival,but also extremely important to the country’s economic development.But,the innovative activities of enterprises need financial support.In the case of credit financing difficulties,equity pledge provides shareholders with a convenient channel.Nowadays,equity pledge has become one of the most commonly used financing method for controlling shareholders.In the context of equity pledge,the controlling shareholder’s special behavior tendencies and changes in risk tolerance will have an important impact on the company’s innovation activities.Therefore,this article starts from the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge,studies its influence on the innovation efficiency of enterprises,and explores the moderating effect of equity concentration.After analyzing and summarizing the relevant literatures and theories in detail,this article believes that if the stock price of a listed company falls after the equity pledge,the controlling shareholder will face the risk of control transfer,and the control of the listed company is extremely cherished.Therefore,in order to reduce the company’s stock price fluctuations and prevent the transfer of control rights,controlling shareholders tend to reduce high-risk R&D investment.However,innovation ability is the key to the company’s long-term competitiveness and the source of the company’s long-term value.As the first decision maker and the biggest beneficiary of a listed company,"fish out from the wind" is not controlling shareholders’ rational choice.In view of the fact that innovation capability is a joint function of innovation input and innovation efficiency,this article believes that under the circumstance of reduced innovation input,controlling shareholders have a strong incentive to improve the innovation efficiency of listed companies.And since the greater the shareholding ratio,the greater the share of income brought by innovation that the controlling shareholders can enjoy,they have more motivation to promote listed companies to improve innovation efficiency of enterprises.In order to verify the two research hypotheses,this article uses the data of listed companies on China Growth Enterprise Market from 2011 to 2018 as the research sample.After determining the relevant variables and constructing the regression model,this article first conducts descriptive statistical analysis and correlation analysis on the research variables,and then use the fixed-effects model to perform multiple regression,and finally perform a robustness test on the regression results to ensure the validity of the conclusions.After empirical analysis,this article draws the following conclusions:(1)The pledge of controlling shareholders’ equity is significantly positively correlated with corporate innovation efficiency.(2)Equity concentration plays a positive role in regulating the relationship between controlling shareholders’ equity pledge and corporate innovation efficiency.The research conclusions of this article provide a new perspective for external investors to examine the controlling shareholders’ equity pledge behavior,and suggest that the regulatory authorities should improve the controlling shareholders’ equity pledge information disclosure mechanism.There are two main innovations in this article.On the one hand,the existing literatures mainly study the impact of equity pledge on company value,cash level,and innovation input.This article explores the impact of controlling shareholder’s equity pledge on corporate innovation efficiency through a combination of theory and empirical research.And innovatively introducing equity concentration as a moderating variable,explore the role of equity concentration in the relationship between controlling shareholder’s equity pledge and corporate innovation efficiency.This article enrichs the research on equity pledge and corporate governance.On the other hand,this article uses GEM listed companies as a research sample,which have more concentrated high-tech SMEs,stronger financing needs,and more active equity pledges,to make up for the lack of attention paid to the impact of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge of listed companies in specific sectors in the past.更多还原