【作者】 刘冬梅；

【导师】 王昌锐；

【作者基本信息】 中南财经政法大学 ， 会计学， 2020， 硕士

【摘要】 目前我国的经济正处在逐步调整和优化实体经济增长结构、转换实体经济发展增长方式和增强创新动力的重要攻坚期,并购重组已经成为满足国家战略发展需求和促进实体经济增长最主要的资源配置方式,企业增强竞争力的重要手段之一也是并购重组。我国并购重组市场截止到2018年末,涉及的交易金额已经达到了24 682.66亿元,和2009年的2 257.33亿元的交易金额相比,增速已经超过了10倍。那么日趋活跃的并购重组市场在促进行业整合、提升配置效率、推动实体经济发展的同时,是否影响了公司固有的内部问题——由两权分离引起的委托代理问题,其中控股股东掏空问题在近年来愈演愈烈,常常与并购重组的话题共生。目前已有很多学者对此进行研究,本文主要探究在被并购重组的前期,控股股东是否会为了自身利益先对公司进行一番掏空呢?如果该公司在此之前经历过并购重组而且担任主并方的角色,则在账面上可能会有商誉的存在,近几年各界人士也总是把商誉、商誉减值和”掏空“联系到一起,那么公司的商誉与控股股东在被并购重组前期的掏空行为是否有联系?本文将针对上述问题展开分析。本文首先根据公司控股股东掏空行为与被并购重组的概念及文献综述、委托代理理论、信息不对称理论和并购重组理论,理论分析并探究了公司控股股东掏空行为与被并购重组的关系,以上述理论基础为指导,推导出本文的研究假设,然后通过实证研究的方法,以2009-2018年所有A股上市公司为样本,以倾向评分匹配和双重差分法作为研究方法,聚焦于企业被并购重组的前期,研究公司控股股东的掏空行为以及公司的商誉所透露出的信息。本文得出的主要结论如下:第一,在被并购重组前期,公司的控股股东会加重掏空行为。首先从控股股东自身利益的角度出发,被并购重组这一事项可能会改变了公司的股权结构或者变动公司现有资产,那么会直接导致原控股股东控制范围受到影响甚至失去控制权,基于对自身未来的不利预期,控股股东将采取“未雨绸缪”的措施,即忽视掏空行为对企业的不利影响,在并购重组前期从公司攫取更多的利益的。此外在并购重组前期,面对巨大的筹备和整合工作量,公司治理能力会减弱。虽然在并购重组活动前期公司已经引起外界关注,但是由于信息不对称,这种相对混乱的公司内部环境仍然会有利于原控股股东在被并购重组前期加重对公司的掏空行为。第二,相比于没有商誉的公司,具有商誉的公司其控股股东在被并购重组前期掏空行为会更加严重。首先因为现行会计准则对商誉的构成没有详细的披露和解析,商誉对于绝大多数的外部投资者来说都是一个“黑匣子”的存在,外部投资者无法从已披露的信息中准确地确认商誉地价值或者准确地判断其代表的收益。商誉的这种“神秘性”为控股股东将其掏空行为“合理化”提供了便利,即控股股东可以通过操纵商誉达到暗度陈仓的目的。其次因为公司的控股股东作为内部投资者,天然享有“黑匣子”的信息优势,即公司商誉的存在增加了其控股股东与外部投资者之间的信息不对称性,这种信息不对称有利于公司控股股东掏空行为的进行。更多还原

【Abstract】 At present,China’s economy is in an important period of gradual adjustment and optimization of the growth structure of the real economy,transformation of the growth mode of the real economy and enhancement of innovation power.M &A has become the most important resource allocation mode to meet the national strategic development needs and promote the growth of the real economy.One of the important means for enterprises to enhance their competitiveness is M & A.By the end of 2018,the transaction amount involved in China’s M & A and restructuring market has reached 2 468.266 billion yuan.Compared with the transaction amount of 225.733 billion yuan in 2009,the growth rate has exceeded 10 times.Then whether the increasingly active M &a market has affected the inherent internal problems of the company,namely the principal-agent problem caused by the separation of two rights,while promoting the industry integration,improving the allocation efficiency and promoting the development of the real economy,among which the problem of controlling shareholders’ tunneling has become more and more intense in recent years,often coexisting with the topic of M & A and restructuring.At present,many scholars have studied this issue.This paper mainly explores whether the controlling shareholders will empty the company for their own interests in the early stage of the merger and reorganization? If the company has experienced M & A and played the role of the main merging party before,there may be goodwill on the book.In recent years,people from all walks of life always associate goodwill,goodwill impairment and "hollowing out".Is there any relationship between the goodwill of the company and the hollowing out behavior of the controlling shareholders in the early stage of M & A and restructuring? This paper will analyze the above problems.Firstly,according to the concepts and literature review,principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory and M & A theory,this paper theoretically analyzes and explores the relationship between the tunneling and M & A of the controlling shareholders of the company.Guided by the above theoretical basis,the research hypothesis of this paper is derived,and then through empirical research methods,From 2009 to 2018,all A-share listed companies were taken as samples,using the method of propensity score matching and double difference as research methods,focusing on the early stage of the merger and reorganization of enterprises,studying the hollowing out behavior of the company’s controlling shareholders and the information revealed by the company’s goodwill.The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: first,in the early stage of M & A,the controlling shareholders will aggravate the tunneling behavior.First of all,from the perspective of the controlling shareholder’s own interests,the merger and reorganization may change the company’s equity structure or change the company’s existing assets,whichwill directly affect the control scope of the original controlling shareholder or even lose the control right.Based on the adverse expectation of their own future,the controlling shareholder will take the measures of "preparing for the future",that is,ignoring the hollowing out behavior The adverse effect of enterprises is to grab more benefits from the company in the early stage of M & A.In addition,in the early stage of M & A,in the face of huge preparation and integration workload,corporate governance will be weakened.Although the company has attracted the attention of the outside world in the early stage of M &A activities,due to the information asymmetry,this relatively chaotic internal environment of the company will still be conducive to the original controlling shareholders in the early stage of M & A activities to increase the hollowing out behavior of the company.Second,compared with the company without goodwill,the behavior of hollowing out of the controlling shareholders of the company with goodwill in the early stage of M & A will be more serious.First of all,because the current accounting standards do not disclose and analyze the composition of goodwill in detail,goodwill is a "black box" for the vast majority of external investors.External investors can not accurately confirm the value of goodwill or accurately judge the income they represent from the disclosed information.This "mystery" of goodwill provides convenience for the controlling shareholders to "rationalize" their hollowing out behavior,that is,the controlling shareholders can achieve the purpose of hiding their positions by manipulating goodwill.Secondly,as an internal investor,the controlling shareholder of the company naturally enjoys the information advantage of "black box",that is,the existence of the company’s goodwill increases the information asymmetry between its controlling shareholder and the external investor,which is conducive to the hollowing out of the company’s controlling shareholders.更多还原