【作者】 李涛；

【导师】 尤华；

【作者基本信息】 西北大学 ， 会计学， 2020， 硕士

【摘要】 融资决策是公司经营管理中的重要决策之一,对企业的发展起着重要的作用。经典的资本结构理论认为,适当的负债能提升企业的价值。然而,在现实生活中,却存在着一批“零杠杆”公司,即没有有息债务的公司,并且其数量在不断增加,以我国为例,每年有10%以上的上市公司都采用零杠杆融资策略,并且学者们的研究证实这是一种国际化现象。目前关于零杠杆的研究,主要集中在其产生的动因以及特征两方面,对于零杠杆政策的经济后果研究较少,尤其是在投资效率方面的研究。基于此,本文致力于研究零杠杆与企业投资效率之间的关系,进一步引入产权性质和外部审计作为调节变量,分别探讨其调节作用。本文以2014-2018年沪深两市A股上市为研究对象,实证检验了零杠杆与企业投资效率之间的关系,并基于产权性质和外部审计的视角,分别研究其在零杠杆与企业非效率投资之间扮演的角色。研究结果表明:(1)零杠杆政策会加重企业的非效率投资,进一步从投资过度和投资不足的角度,发现零杠杆和投资过度与投资不足均显著正相关。(2)与非国有企业相比,零杠杆与非效率投资的正向关系在国企中更显著,进一步发现国有企业中,零杠杆对过度投资以及投资不足的正向作用也更显著。(3)外部审计对于零杠杆与非效率投资的正向关系有一定治理作用,并且更能抑制零杠杆加重过度投资的现象。最后本文根据研究结论提出以下建议:(1)企业应当根据实际情况慎重选择零杠杆的融资政策。(2)零杠杆公司可以通过提高审计质量来发挥其治理作用,如聘请规模更大的事务所等等。(3)要加强对于国有企业管理层的考核,尤其是零杠杆的国有企业,降低“双重缺位”即有息债务债权人和股东同时缺位造成的不利影响。更多还原

【Abstract】 Financing decision is one of the important decisions in the company’s operation and management,and it plays an important role in the development of the company.The classic theory of capital structure holds that proper debt can enhance the value of an enterprise.However,in real life,there are a number of "zero-leverage" companies,that is,companies that do not have interest-bearing debt,and their number is increasing.Take China as an example,more than 10% of listed companies use zero every year.Leveraged financing strategies,and scholars’ research confirmed that this is an international phenomenon.The current research on zero-leverage is mainly focused on the causes and characteristics of it.There are few studies on the economic consequences of zero-leverage policies,especially on investment efficiency.Based on this,this paper is committed to studying the relationship between zero leverage and corporate investment efficiency,further introducing the nature of property rights and external audit as moderating variables,and discussing their moderating effects respectively.This article takes the 2014-2018 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listings as the research object,and empirically tests the relationship between zero leverage and corporate investment efficiency.Based on the nature of property rights and the perspective of external audit,this paper studies its zero leverage and non-The role of efficiency investments.The research results show that:(1)Zero-leverage policy will increase the inefficient investment of enterprises,and further from the perspective of over-investment and under-investment,it is found that zero leverage and over-investment are significantly positively related to under-investment.(2)Compared with non-state-owned enterprises,the positive relationship between zero leverage and inefficient investment is more significant in state-owned enterprises.It is further found that in state-owned enterprises,the positive effect of zero leverage on over-investment and Under-investment is also more significant.(3)External audit has a certain governance effect on the positive relationship between zero-leveraged companies and inefficient investment,and it can more effectively suppress the phenomenon of zero-leverage over-investment.Finally,the research conclusions of this paper put forward the following suggestions:(1)Enterprises should carefully choose zero-leverage financing policies based on actual conditions.(2)Zero-leverage companies can play their governance role by improving audit quality,such as hiring larger firms.(3)It is necessary to strengthen the assessment of the management of state-owned enterprises,especially zero-leverage state-owned enterprises,and alleviate the adverse effects of “double vacancy”,that is,the simultaneous absence of Interest-bearing creditor and shareholders.更多还原