【作者】 周丹；

【导师】 刘星；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， 工商管理， 2019， 硕士

【摘要】 继“乐视网”股价爆仓、股权质押“新规”正式实施等一系列重大事件发生以来,股权质押受到实务界和学术界的共同关注。控股股东因对公司享有重大经营决策权,其股权质押将直接或间接地对上市公司产生影响。股权质押后控股股东面临质押股票价值下跌的风险,如果股价跌破平仓价,控股股东可能丧失控制权。因此,控股股东很有可能为了维护股价而进行盈余管理。财务信息是投资者识别和判断投资项目的重要依据,盈余管理将使得企业财务信息失真,由此可能影响投资者的决策,导致企业投资非效率。本文以2003-2017年沪深A股上市公司为观测样本,以真实和应计盈余管理为视角,探讨了控股股东股权质押下的盈余管理行为对企业投资效率的影响。研究发现,控股股东股权质押的公司可能同时实施向上操纵盈余的真实和应计盈余管理,两类盈余管理的幅度对企业的投资效率有显著的负面影响。中介效应检验表明,真实和应计盈余管理为正值的样本中,盈余管理对控股股东股权质押和投资效率的关系都起到显著的中介作用。此外,真实盈余管理中生产操控起到显著的中介效应,酌量性费用操控起到显著的“遮掩”效应。更多还原

【Abstract】 Following a series of major events,such as the stock price bursting of Le TV Network and the formal implementation of the new rules on equity pledge,equity pledge has become a topic of concern in both practical and academic circles.Controlling shareholders will directly or indirectly influence listed companies because they have significant decision-making power in operation.After the pledge of shares,controlling shareholders face the risk of the value of pledged shares falling.If the share price falls below the closing price,controlling shareholders may lose control power.Therefore,controlling shareholders are likely to manage earnings in order to uphold stock prices.Financial information is an important basis for investors to identify and judge investment projects.Earnings management will lead to direct reduction of the quality of financial information in enterprises,which may affect investors’ decision to lead to inefficiency of investment.This paper use data of A-share Listed Companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen of 2003-2017.From the perspective of real earnings management and accrued earnings management,this paper discusses the influence of earnings management behavior under the pledge of controlling shareholders’ equity on the investment efficiency of enterprises.It is found that the level of upward real earnings management and upward accrued earnings management of companies with pledge of controlling shareholders’ equity has increased significantly.The magnitude of two types of earnings management has a significant negative impact on the investment efficiency of enterprises.The intermediary effect test shows that in the positive samples of real and accrued earnings management,earnings management play a significant intermediary role in the relationship between controlling shareholders’ equity pledge and investment efficiency.Besides,in real earnings management,production manipulation has a significant mediating effect,and discretionary cost manipulation has a significant "cover-up" effect.更多还原