【作者】 陈宁；

【导师】 曲创；

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 ， 产业经济学， 2020， 硕士

【摘要】 互联网通讯技术,特别是与个人关联的移动互联网技术的普及应用,极大地改变了生产和消费的方式,给很多传统行业带来了颠覆式的冲击,用户行为特征也随之分化。本文通过分析中国媒体行业变迁的特征事实归纳出平台转型两方面的典型问题:(1)新技术的应用给很多传统平台型行业带来的巨大冲击,这不仅表现为新平台对老平台用户规模的竞争,还体现为新平台的出现导致用户群体发生分化,改变了老平台用户的交叉网络外部性这一关键属性。双边平台竞争的焦点是用户需求弹性较大的一边,这一边用户规模的变动在交叉网络外部性的加持下决定了平台生存与发展的关键。因此,本文首先重点考察了新平台竞争冲击对老平台用户交叉网络外部性的作用,并以报业市场为例进行了实证检验。(2)数字信息技术的进步、移动端的发展以及支付方式的便捷多样化,使得平台型企业在技术上有能力向用户收费。本文以近年来媒体行业中商业模式由“纯付费”和“纯广告”向“付费+广告”转型的现实为背景,探讨了三种商业模式下平台定价机制的差别。针对双边平台交叉网络外部性、非对称定价等特征,同时考虑用户对价格的敏感程度,构建了“付费+广告”模式下平台定价决策的理论模型,探讨用户对广告的厌恶程度,对价格的敏感程度以及广告商的投放广告效果三种因素对平台定价的影响,进一步考察平台达到内部平衡的定价机制。纵观全文,本文得出以下结论:(1)新媒体平台作为新技术冲击进入市场后,用户产生分化,这一效应导致报业市场上广告端对读者端的负向交叉网络外部性强度在减小,读者端对广告端的正向交叉网络外部性强度在增大。进一步的研究显示,老平台的用户出现分化后,留存的用户交叉网络外部性更为趋同集中。(2)本文实证测度了中国报业市场的交叉网络外部性强度。发展期,读者对广告商、广告商对读者的交叉网络外部性强度分别为7、-0.938;中期,分别为7.063、-0.417;成熟期,分别为:8.399、-0.685。(3)“付费+广告模式”下平台在观众端定价与观众对广告的厌恶程度和对价格的敏感程度都为“U”型关系,与广告投放效果正相关;在广告商端定价与观众对广告的厌恶程度负相关,与观众对价格的敏感程度和广告投放效果正相关。(4)与其他两种模式相比,“付费+广告”模式下,平台营收扩展为两个途径,这既带来了内部平衡问题,也赋予了平台调节式定价机制,增强了平台定价能力。而这种定价机制与经典双边市场非对称定价理论存在不同。上述研究结论肯定了交叉网络外部性在平台竞争中的重要性,传统平台在基于新技术的外部冲击下要想不被淘汰,必须基于留存用户的群体特征及时转型,从大众普适性平台转为小众专业型平台。其次,“付费+广告”模式带来了更优的定价机制,媒体平台可以基于用户特征构建价格和广告数量结构。更多还原

【Abstract】 The popularization and application of Internet communication technology,especially mobile Internet technology associated with individuals,has greatly changed the way of production and consumption,brought subversive impact to many traditional industries,and changed user preference.This article summarizes the typical problems in two aspects of platform transformation by analyzing the characteristic facts in the changes of the Chinese media industry:(1)The application of new technology has brought the huge impact to many traditional platforms.This is not only reflected in the new platform’s competition with the user scale of the old platform,but also the emergence of the new platform has led to the stratification of user groups and changed the cross-group network externality of the old platform.The focus of bilateral platform competition is on the side where user demand is more flexible.The change in user size on the side of cross-group network externality determines the key to the survival and development of the platform.Therefore,this article first focuses on the impact of new platform competition on the cross-group network externality of the old platform,and uses the Chinese newspaper market as an example to conduct an empirical test.(2)The advancement of digital information technology,the development of mobile terminals and the convenient and diversified payment methods have made platform-based enterprises technically capable of charging users.Based on the reality of the business model transition from "Pure Payment" and " Pure Advertising" to"Payment+Advertising”in the media industry in recent years,this article explores the differences in platform pricing mechanisms under the three business models.Aiming at the characteristics of bilateral platform cross-group network externality,asymmetric pricing,and considering the sensitivity of users to prices,a theoretical model for platform pricing decisions under the model of "Payment+Advertising"was constructed to explore the degree of user aversion to advertising and the impact of price sensitivity and the effect of advertisers’ advertising effects on the pricing of the platform.Further examine the pricing mechanism of the platform to achieve internal balance.Throughout the text,this article draws the following conclusions:(1)After the new media platform enters the market as the new technology shock,users are sorted.This effect has led to a decrease in the externality of the negative cross-group network externality of the advertising side to the reader side in the newspaper market,and the positive cross-group network externality between the reader side to the advertising side is increasing.Further research shows that after the stratification of users on the old platform,the cross-group network externality of remaining users becomes more concentrated.(2)This paper measures the strength of cross-group network externality in the Chinese newspaper market.In the development period,the cross-group network externality of the reader side to the advertiser side were 7 and the cross-group network externality of the advertiser side to the reader side were-0.938;in the middle period,they were 7.063 and-0.417;in the mature period,they were 8.399 and-0.685.(3)Under the model of "Payment+advertising",the platform’s pricing on the audience side is related to the degree of aversion to the advertisement and the sensitivity of the price to the "U" relationship,which is positively related to the effectiveness of advertising;on the advertiser side,there is a negative correlation with the degree of aversion to advertising.It is directly related to the sensitivity of the audience to the price and the effectiveness of advertising.(4)Compared with the other two models,under the model of "Payment+advertising",platform revenue is expanded into two ways,which not only brings internal balance problems,but also gives the platform a regulated pricing mechanism,which enhances platform pricing ability.This pricing mechanism is different from the classic asymmetric pricing theory of the bilateral market.The above research conclusions affirm the importance of cross-group network externality in platform competition.If traditional platforms are not to be eliminated under the external impact of new technology,they must be transformed in a timely manner based on the characteristics of the group of retaining users for the niche professional platform.Secondly,the model of "Payment+Advertising" brings a better pricing mechanism,and the media platform can build a price and advertising quantity structure based on user characteristics.更多还原