【作者】 陈红；

【导师】 唐雪松；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 财务管理， 2019， 硕士

【摘要】 2017年,中国西部的一个边陲小镇霍尔果斯因为一系列税收优惠政策使得企业趋之若鹜,特别受到影视文化公司的青睐,一年时间增加1000多家。不乏企业设立空壳公司转移利润,当地税务部门估算,仅一年时间就造成税收流失40亿元。2018年,国家税务总局对影视从业人员偷税漏税的情况进行调查,依法查处。2018年是税制改革大年,全年减税降费规模约1.3万亿元,营业税改征增值税已全面完成减少重复征税的问题,为企业减税降费。据国家税务总局报道,增值税减税约2700亿元;统一小规模纳税人标准惠及50万户纳税人,减税约80亿元;办理留抵退税1148亿元,减轻企业负担、激发市场活力。个人所得税减税约1000亿元,增加员工获得感,提升人民幸福感。合并国税地税机构,社会保险费和非税收入将由税务部门统一征管。对政府而言,能提高征管效率,进一步缩小法定税率和实际税率之间的差距。在政府降低税负的背景下,企业避税的问题再次引起各界的关注。本文研究从企业高管和税收监督部门出发(高管是税收规避政策制定者和执行者,而政府因为强制税收,既是企业的隐形股东又是避税行为的监管者),控制变量为公司治理衡量指标,研究高管激励、税收监督和企业避税之间的联系。与以前研究不同的是,本文使用避税分布的条件均值和中位数,我们发现各种公司治理机制和企业避税之间没有关系。但是使用分位数回归,发现了高管激励、税收监督与企业避税水平的关系:企业实际税负与法定税负相差较小时,高管激励会促使管理层采取激进型避税行为;而企业实际税负与法定税负相差较大则会增大管理层对总风险的预估,从而减少避税行为。在税收监督的外部治理下,监管强的地区,惩罚的威慑效果大得多,薪酬激励更多的只能减少企业避税行为。研究还发现,税收征管部门存在职能作用发挥不足,反而促进国企的避税行为,国企的避税程度也确实显著小于民企。进一步研究中,董事会的专业背景在税收规避决策中起到决定性作用,高管如果有财务或者复合背景会减少企业避税程度,且高管会从避税活动中减少在职消费作为反馈,当国企变为民企后,避税程度也会上升。企业避税动机究其原因,可能还是我国较高的企业税负,再加上企业各项成本压力。所以“简税制、宽税基、低税率、严征管”的税改原则依然适用,才能真正让利于企业,藏富于民。本文创新体现在:1、本文运用分位数回归模型来研究企业避税行为的问题,放眼整个避税分布,着重关注相对极端的避税部分尾巴,研究不同避税程度下,高管激励、税收征管如何影响企业避税行为的决策。2、深入研究管理层、治理层的专业背景对企业税收规避的影响,区分管理层、董事会、监事会,并对管理层避税行为的回报进行研究,丰富管理层避税动机。3、研究不同治理水平、不同产权性质、不同经济周期下,高管激励和税收征管对企业避税行为的影响。尤其是在不同产权性质的考察中,特别考虑了产权性质变化的情况,考虑税务部门针对不同产权性质企业的执法力度,有助于丰富企业避税影响因素的研究。更多还原

【Abstract】 In 2017,Horgos,a small border town in Western China,was favored by the film and television industry because of a series of preferential tax policies,which increased more than 1000 companies a year.Many enterprises set up shell companies to transfer profits.Local tax authorities estimate that in only one year,tax revenue will be lost by 4 billion yuan.In 2018,the State Taxation Administration conducted an investigation into tax evasion among film and television practitioners,and investigated and dealt with them according to law.2018 is an important year of tax reform.The scale of tax reduction in the whole year is about 1.3 trillion yuan.The issue of double taxation has been fully reduced in the conversion of business tax to VAT,so as to reduce taxes and fees for enterprises.According to the State Administration of Taxation,the value-added tax reduction is about 270 billion yuan;the unification of small-scale taxpayer standards benefits 500,000 taxpayers,with a tax reduction of about 8 billion yuan;and the handling of withholding and refund of 114.8 billion yuan,which reduces the burden of enterprises and stimulates market vitality.Individual income tax is reduced by about 100 billion yuan,which increases employees’ sense of access and people’s sense of well-being.The social insurance premium and non-tax revenue will be levied and managed by the tax authorities when the state tax and local tax institutions are merged.For the government,it can improve the efficiency of collection and management,and further narrow the gap between the statutory tax rate and the actual tax rate.In the context of the government’s reduction of tax burden,the problem of tax avoidance of enterprises once again attracts the attention of us.This paper studies the relationship between executive incentives,tax supervision and tax avoidance from the perspective of corporate governance(executives are tax evasion policy makers and executors,while the government is not only the invisible shareholders of enterprises but also the regulators of tax avoidance).Unlike previous studies,this paper uses conditional mean and median of tax avoidance distribution,and finds that there is no relationship between various corporate governance mechanisms and corporate tax avoidance.However,using quantile regression,we find the relationship between executive incentives,tax supervision and tax avoidance: When the difference between the actual tax burden of enterprises and the statutory tax burden is small,incentives will prompt executives to take radical tax avoidance behavior;otherwise it will increase the management’s estimate of total risk,thus take less tax avoidance behavior.Under the external governance of tax supervision,the deterrent effect of punishment is much greater in areas with strong supervision,and more incentives from executives can only reduce the tax avoidance behavior of enterprises.The study also finds that the tax collection and management departments not only have insufficient functions,but also promote the tax avoidance of state-owned enterprises,and the degree of tax avoidance of state-owned enterprises is significantly less than that of private enterprises.In further research,the professional background of the board of directors plays a decisive role in tax avoidance decision-making and executives with financial or composite backgrounds will reduce tax avoidance.Executives can reduce expense in-office in tax avoidance activities as a return.When state-owned enterprises become private enterprises,the degree of tax avoidance will also increase.The reason for the motivation of tax avoidance of enterprises may be the higher tax burden of enterprises in China and the pressure of various costs of enterprises.Therefore,the tax reform principle of "simple tax system,broad tax base,low tax rate,strict collection and management" is still applicable,so as to truly benefit enterprises and enrich the people.The innovations of this paper are as follows: First,this paper uses the quantile regression model to study the problem of tax avoidance behavior of enterprises,looking at the whole distribution of tax avoidance,focusing on the relatively extreme part of the tail of tax avoidance,and studying how executive incentives and tax collection and management affect the decision-making of tax avoidance behavior of enterprises under different levels of tax avoidance.Second,deeply study the impact of professional background of management on tax avoidance of enterprises,distinguish management,board of directors and board of supervisors,and study the return of tax avoidance behavior of management,enrich the motivation of tax avoidance of management.Third,to study the impact of executive incentives and tax collection and management on corporate tax avoidance under different levels of governance,different attributes of enterprises and different economic cycles.Especially in the investigation of different enterprise attributes,especially considering the change of enterprise attributes,and considering the enforcement of law by tax authorities for different enterprises with different attributes,it helps to enrich the research on the influencing factors of enterprise tax avoidance.更多还原