【作者】 陈庆；

【导师】 王红卫；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 系统工程， 2019， 硕士

【摘要】 质量激励是工程管理实践中提升工程质量的重要手段,表现为业主向承包商提供高水平的质量激励合同后,承包商会选择更高质量水平的施工行为。在重大工程中,参与主体众多,质量管理组织复杂,质量标准要求高于现有国家标准和行业规范,加上新技术、新设备、新工艺的广泛应用,使得异化的质量行为成为可能,给工程质量管理带来了新的挑战。本文将从重大工程实际调研中发现的问题着手,以博弈分析和优化理论为基础,研究重大工程中现行质量激励模式如何产生“搭便车”这种异化的质量行为,以及激励方案需要如何调整才能避免“搭便车”质量行为的出现。本文的主要工作和贡献分为以下几个方面:首先,通过实地调研和文献梳理,总结了我国重大工程质量管理实践经验,以及其中涌现出的异化的质量行为。从国家层面到施工现场,重大工程可分为三大管理组织层次,五级质量验收环节,以及优良质量激励体系。同时,重大工程在各个工程阶段也涌现出了各种异化的质量行为。一方面,在优良质量评价环节,少部分承包商将所负责的单位工程的质量仅施工达到合格水平,却因为合作施工的其他承包商的工程质量达到优良水平而“搭便车”地享受到优良工程的奖励。另一方面,在隐蔽工程工程质量验收环节,少部分承包商偷工减料,以次充好,却因为合作承包商的高质量水平而通过隐蔽工程质量的抽样验收。这两种“搭便车”的质量行为都对工程总体质量带来隐患。其次,对重大工程优良工程评价中的“搭便车”质量行为展开研究。本文基于离散条件下承包商“搭便车”行为选择理论,构建了分段质量激励方案下的承包商最优施工行为选择模型。在分析两个承包商博弈行为选择的基础上,对比三个承包商博弈行为结果,通过不完全归纳法,得出N个承包商的施工行为选择与质量激励方案的关系。通过分析激励强度对博弈行为选择的影响,得出当优良工程奖励额度差大于承包商提升工程质量的难度成本系数时,所有承包商的占优决策行动组合就是将各自负责的单位工程施工达到优良工程标准。此时不仅可以避免“搭便车”这种异化质量行为的出现,团队合作的总体收益也达到最大。在此基础上,通过算例分析验证了优良工程不同等级的奖励额度差,是影响承包商是否选择“搭便车”质量行为的重要外部因素。再者,研究了重大工程隐蔽工程施工过程中的“搭便车”质量行为问题。本文基于连续条件下承包商“搭便车”行为选择理论,以承包商实际投入的工程量为决策变量,建立了线性质量奖惩方案下的承包商最优工程量投入决策模型;通过对比承包商自身收益最大时的工程量投入与团队合作效率最优且无人选择“搭便车”行为时的承包商的工程量投入,得出了影响隐蔽工程中“搭便车”质量行为形成的关键因素是工程质量验收标准和惩罚额度。通过算例分析,一方面验证了这个结论,另一方面分析了线性质量奖惩方案的参数设计对承包商实际的工程量投入的影响。在工程质量管理实践中,业主在设计质量激励合同时,文中的结论能够为业主质量激励方案的设计提供一些借鉴和参考。更多还原

【Abstract】 Quality incentives are an important means of improving project quality in construction management practice.After the owner provides the contractors with highquality level incentive contract,the contractors will choose higher quality level of construction behavior.This is very important to improve the overall quality level of the project.In some major construction projects in China,the number of interest entities involved in the project is large,the quality management organization of the project is complex,the quality standards are higher than the existing standards and industry norms,and new technologies,new equipment and new processes are widely used.This complexity of major construction projects has emerged as an alienated quality behavior,raising new questions for project quality management.This paper starts with the problems found in the actual investigation of major construction projects.Based on the game analysis and optimization theory,this paper studies how the alienated quality behavior of “free-riding” is generated under the current quality incentive mode of major construction projects.How the incentive scheme needs to be adjusted to avoid the emergence of “free-rider” behavior.The main work and contributions of this paper are the following aspects:First of all,through field research and literature review,summed up the experience of China’s major construction project quality management practices,as well as the emerging of alienation quality behaviors.From the national level to the construction site,major construction projects can be divided into three levels of management organization,five levels of quality acceptance,and a good quality incentive system.At the same time,major construction projects have also experienced various kinds of alienated quality behaviors in different engineering stages.In the quality evaluation section,a small number of contractors will only meet the qualified level of the quality of the subunit project,but enjoy the reward of high-quality incentive award by “free rider” behavior,because of the high-level construction quality of other contractors who cooperate with the construction.In the quality inspection and acceptance of concealed engineering projects,a small number of contractors cheating on workmanship and using adulterate materials,but because of the high quality level of cooperative contractors,through the acceptance of the quality of concealed works.The quality behavior of these two “free riders” poses a hidden danger to the overall quality of teamwork construction.Secondly,it studies the quality behavior of “free-riding” in the high-quality construction evaluation of major construction projects.According to the contractor’s "free rider" behavior selection theory under discrete conditions,the contractor’s quality incentive model is established under the situation that the owner has set up a staged quality incentive structure.This paper analyzes the game behavior choices of two contractors,compares the results of the three contractors’ game behaviors,and obtains the relationship between the construction behavior choices of N contractors and the quality incentive structure through incomplete induction.It is concluded that when the difference in the high-quality construction reward amount is greater than the difficulty cost coefficient of the contractor to improve the project quality,all contractor’s dominant decision-making action combination is to achieve the high-quality construction standards for the subunit construction.At this time,not only can the “free-riding” alienation quality behavior be avoided,but the overall benefit of teamwork can also reach the maximum.On this basis,the analysis of the example shows that the difference of the reward level of different grades of high-quality construction award is an important external factor that affects whether the contractor chooses the “free rider” behavior.Finally,the problem of “free-rider” quality behavior in the construction of concealed works of major projects was studied.According to the contractor’s "free rider" behavior selection theory under continuous conditions,the contractor’s actual input construction quantity is taken as the decision variable.Under the condition that the owner chooses the linear quality reward and punishment mechanism,the contractors’ optimal construction quantity input decision model is established.By comparing the contractor’s best input construction quantity to earn most revenue,and the team cooperation efficiency is the best,in which no one chooses the “free-riding” behavior of the contractor’s construction quantity input,and the quality behavior of the “free-rider” in the concealed project is obtained.The key factors for the formation are engineering quality acceptance criteria and penalty limits.Through the analysis of the example,on the one hand,this conclusion is verified,on the other hand,the influence of the parameter design of the linear quality reward and punishment scheme on the contractor’s actual engineering input is analyzed.更多还原