【作者】 何毅；

【导师】 江立华；

【作者基本信息】 华中师范大学 ， 社会学， 2019， 硕士

【摘要】 伴随脱贫攻坚进入决胜阶段,“十三五”期间通过产业带动3000万以上贫困人口脱贫的任务目标开始进入“倒计时”。产业扶贫政策在基层执行的重难点在于“将扶贫项目资源给谁开发”的问题,这一问题的解决将直接影响产业开发的扶贫实践效果。本文从项目资源分配的结果上,将产业扶贫资源在村庄间分配上偏向非贫困村称之为村庄向度的“俘获”精英,在村庄内部分配时偏向非贫困户则称为个人向度的精英“俘获”。以往的经验研究大多聚焦在后者,倾向于将精英俘获看成是精英在产业扶贫资源传递和分配过程中的“主动俘获”。这一视角从制度、权力和社会结构出发,将精英的行动逻辑预设为追求产业项目效益的利益设定。这类研究大多采用国家——社会/精英——民众二元对立的解释框架,从静态的维度进行考察,认为精英在面对资源下乡时容易形成权力共谋关系主动俘获面向贫困户的项目资源。这一视角看到了精英俘获背后社会力量的利益博弈,但缺乏在具体情境中对与此相关社会过程的分析和解释。本文在贫困治理情境下构建了组织能力——精英俘获的分析框架,通过场域视角关注产业扶贫的政府资源配置中的行动/结构关系。重点展现在互动过程中,不同受益主体的组织能力怎样影响了产业扶贫资源的最终分配结果,从而回应一个基本问题,即产业扶贫场域中“俘获”精英和精英“俘获”何以可能。研究发现,村庄间产业项目的资源分配实质上是乡镇政权选择性分配的结果,而村庄内部的项目分配则是个体化的小农与组织化的精英博弈互动的结果。前者遵循的是自上而下的行政控制逻辑,后者则表现为村庄社会自下而上“因地制宜”的乡土实践逻辑。具体来说,村庄向度的“俘获”精英产生机制为:在运动式治理与资金条块管理的约束条件下,事后补助的资金拨付机制使得产业项目有管理方便和资金规模的偏好,给精英俘获提供了制度基础。同时村级组织权威分化和宗族组织派系冲突,导致贫困村的产业项目迟迟不能推动,为乡镇政权选择组织力更强的富裕村提供了组织基础;个人向度精英“俘获”的产生机制为:经济社会分化和乡村公共性消解导致扶贫主体的“缺位”,在扶贫项目到村时个体化的小农无法满足承接项目必须依托的契约关系基础。同时在产业项目的分级治理逻辑下,精英的自利化推动其形成组织化的利益联盟主动俘获产业项目资源。这种农民个体化和精英组织化为产业项目在村庄内部的精英“俘获”提供了社会基础。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the fight against poverty and the entry into the final stage,the task of driving more than 30 million poverty-stricken people out of poverty through the industry during the 13th Five-Year Plan period began to enter the "countdown".The difficulty in implementing the poverty alleviation policy at the grassroots level lies in the question of"who will develop the resources for poverty alleviation projects".The solution of this problem will directly affect the effect of poverty alleviation practice in industrial development.From the results of project resource allocation,this paper allocates the industrial poverty alleviation resources to the "captured" elites in the non-poverty villages,which are called villages in the villages.The distribution to the non-poor households in the villages is called the individual dimension.The elite "captured." Most of the previous empirical research focused on the latter,and it tends to regard elite capture as the“active capture”of elites in the process of industrial poverty alleviation and resource allocation.Starting from the system,power and social structure,this perspective presupposes the elite’s action logic as the interest setting for pursuing the benefits of industrial projects.Most of these studies use the interpretation framework of the state-society/elite-people dual opposition.They examine the static dimension and think that the elites are easy to form power collusion in the face of resources going to the countryside to actively capture projects for poor households.Resources.This perspective sees the interest game of social forces behind elite capture,but lacks analysis and interpretation of social processes related to this in specific situations.In the context of poverty governance,this paper constructs an organizational capacity-analytical framework for elite capture,and focuses on the action/structural relationship in the allocation of government resources for industr:ial poverty alleviation through a field perspective.The focus is on how the organizational capabilities of different beneficiaries influence the final distribution of industrial poverty alleviation resources in response to a basic question:how can“capture”elites and elites“capture”in the industrial poverty alleviation field?The study found that the resource allocation of inter-village industrial projects is essentially the result of the selective distribution of township government power,and the project allocation within the village is the result of the interaction between the farmers and the elite after the organization.The former follows the top-down administrative control logic,while the latter manifests itself in the rural practice logic of the village society from the bottom up.Specifically,the mechanism of the "capture" elite of the village is;under the constraints of sports governance and fund management,the fund allocation mechanism for ex post subsidies makes the industrial project have the convenience of management and the preference of the fund scale,giving the elite Capture provides the institutional basis.At the same time,the authoritative division of village-level organizations and the clan conflicts of clan organizations have led to delays in the industrial projects of poor villages,and provided an organizational basis for the wealthy villages where the township government chose to be stronger.The mechanism for the "capture" of individual elites was:Economic and social differentiation and rural public dissolving lead to the "absence" of poverty alleviation subjects.Individualized small farmers can not meet the contractual relationship foundation that must be relied upon to undertake projects when poverty alleviation projects arrive at villages.At the same time,under the hierarchical management logic of industrial projects,the self-interest of elites promotes the formation of organized interest alliances to actively capture industrial project resources.This kind of peasant "de-organization" and elite self-interest provide a social foundation for the"capture" of industrial projects within the village.更多还原