【作者】 王颖；

【导师】 周泽将；

【作者基本信息】 安徽大学 ， 会计学， 2019， 硕士

【摘要】 财务分析师行业伴随着资本市场建立而产生并不断发展,关于财务分析师行为所产生的经济后果,以及在资本市场中的角色问题一直受到实务界、学术界的广泛关注。20世纪中后期,委托代理理论兴起,该理论的突出贡献者Jensen和Meckling在其撰写的著作中就指出,财务分析师的存在能够减少投资者与经理人的代理冲突,且在公司失范行为的监管中发挥着重要作用。财务分析师发布的盈利预测研究报告,能够使得投资者更深入了解上市公司相关信息,从而对其经营活动产生监管作用,提高公司治理水平的有效性。因此,本文着重分析在中国资本市场中,财务分析师跟踪是否能够显著降低企业违规行为的发生,并减轻违规行为的程度。此外,由于中国制度背景的复杂性、政府在市场资源配置中的重要作用,上市公司具有政治关联的现象普遍存在,从而对生产经营产生重要影响。因此,本文在委托代理理论、信息不对称理论等理论基础上,研究财务分析师跟踪对企业违规产生的影响,并进一步考察上市公司政治关联在二者关系中的调节作用。近年来,管理层盈余管理行为对企业的损害引起了国内外学者的广泛关注,基于此,本文在前述研究的基础上,进一步通过中介效应检验分析了企业违规在财务分析师影响盈余管理行为过程中发挥的中介作用。本文共由五个章节构成。第一章为绪论,主要介绍了研究背景、研究思路、研究方法以及创新之处,并回顾了国内外企业违规行为的影响因素、政治关联和财务分析师行为经济后果的相关文献。第二章为概念界定和理论基础,对财务分析师、企业违规、政治关联等重要概念进行明确定义,在此基础上,进一步对委托代理理论、信息不对称理论等进行详细论述,并将理论与研究内容相结合。第三章是理论分析与研究假设,首先对中国财务分析师行业发展现状和企业违规行为的现状进行描述,其次论述了财务分析师跟踪影响企业违规行为的作用机理,以及上市公司政治关联在二者关系中的调节作用机理,最后推导出本文的研究假设。第四章为实证检验结果及分析,本文选取2007-2016年中国资本市场全部A股上市公司的19940个样本作为本文研究对象,并运用实证分析中Logit和Ordered Logit回归方法检验本文的研究假设,最后在稳健性检验中进一步排除内生性问题,从而提高了本文可信度和说服力。第五章为研究结论、政策建议,同时分析了本文的研究不足和研究展望。研究发现:(1)财务分析师跟踪显著抑制了企业违规行为;(2)上市公司的政治关联显著强化了财务分析师跟踪对企业违规行为抑制作用;(3)企业违规行为在财务分析师影响企业真实盈余管理的过程中发挥了部分中介效应。本文的研究结果具有丰富的理论和现实意义,就理论意义而言拓展了财务分析师行为、企业违规行为的研究范畴,同时为政治关联经济后果的相关研究提供了补充;就现实意义而言为财务分析师跟踪行为影响公司治理水平提供了理论依据,使得上市公司更加重视财务分析师这一外部监督力量。更多还原

【Abstract】 The financial analysts has been produced and developed along with the establishment of the capital market.The economic consequences of the behavior of financial analysts and the role in capital market have been widely concerned by the practical and academic circles.In the mid-to-late 20th century,the theory of principal-agent theory emerged.Jensen and Meckling,prominent contributors to the theory,pointed out in their writings that the existence of financial analysts can reduce the agency conflict between investors and managers,and plays an important role in the regulation of corporate misconduct.The earnings forecast research report released by financial analysts can enable investors to understand the relevant information of listed companies more deeply,thus exerting a supervisory role on the business activities and improving the effectiveness of corporate governance.Therefore,this paper focuses on the analysis of whether financial analysts track forecasts in China’s capital markets can significantly reduce the occurrence of corporate violations and reduce the extent of violations.In addition,due to the complexity of China’s institutional background and the important role of the government in the allocation of market resources,the phenomenon of listed companies with political background is widespread,which has an important impact on production and operation.Therefore,based on the theory of principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory,this paper studies the impact of financial analysts’ tracking prediction on corporate irregularities,and further examines the regulatory role of listed companies,political context in their relationship.In recent years,the damage of earnings management to enterprises has attracted extensive attention from scholars at home and abroad.Based on the above research,this paper further analyzes the process of corporate analysts’ violation of earnings management behavior through financial intermediary analysis.This article consists of five chapters.The first chapter is the introduction.The main contents are the research background,research ideas,research methods and innovations.At the same time,the author reviews the influencing factors of domestic and foreign corporate violations,political connections and the relevant literature on the economic consequences of financial analysts’ behavior.The second chapter is the concept definition and theoretical basis,and clearly defines the important concepts of financial analysts,corporate violations,political connections,etc.On this basis,the principal-agent theory and the information asymmetry theory are further discussed in detail,and the theory and research content are combined.The third chapter is the theoretical analysis and research hypothesis.Firstly,it describes the status of China’s financial analyst industry development and the status of corporate violations.Secondly,it discusses the mechanism of financial analysts’ tracking of the violations of corporate behaviors,and the regulatory mechanism of the listed company’s political context in the relationship,and finally derives the research hypothesis of this paper.The fourth chapter is the empirical test results and analysis,this paper selects the 19940 samples of all A-share listed companies in China’s capital market from 2007 to 2016 as the research object,and uses the Logit and Ordered Logit regression methods in empirical analysis to test the research hypothesis of this paper.Finally,the endogenous problem is further excluded in the robustness test,which has improved the credibility and persuasiveness of this article.The fifth chapter is the research conclusions and policy recommendations,and analyzes the research deficiencies and research prospects of this paper.The study found that:(1)financial analysts tracked forecasts significantly inhibited corporate violations;(2)when listed companies have a politically relevant background,significantly enhanced the financial analysts’ tracking predictions against corporate violations;(3)corporate violations Behavior as a mediator variable plays a part in mediating effects in the process of financial analysts affecting the company’s real earnings management.The research results of this paper have rich theoretical and practical significance.In terms of theoretical significance,it expands the research scope of financial analyst behavior and corporate violation behavior,and supplements the related research on political related economic consequences;in the practical sense,it is Financial analysts’tracking behaviors have a theoretical basis for influencing corporate governance,making listed companies pay more attention to the external supervisory power of financial analysts.更多还原