【作者】 刘爽；

【导师】 史永东；

【作者基本信息】 东北财经大学 ， 金融学， 2018， 硕士

【摘要】 改革开放之后,我国债券市场逐渐开始发展,1981年国债发行开始启动,标志着我国债券市场的开端。在随后的发展中,由于我国债券市场的制度基础不完善、功能发挥欠缺及运行质量差等一系列原因,公司债券市场作为债券市场的重要分支,发展陷入困境,停滞不前。直到2007年8月,中国证监会正式颁布实施《公司债券发行试点办法》,标志着我国公司债券发行工作正式启动,打破了我国公司债券市场的发展瓶颈,拓展了我国公司制企业的融资渠道,同时也为投资者提供了更多选择。然而,我国公司债券市场相对于股票市场来说起步较晚,制度设施不够完善,对于投资者保护方面也远远不足。金融理论表明,债券条款的基本原理是控制代理冲突和分配控制权,Smith and Warner(1979)认为,条款是用来控制债权人与股东之间的信息不对称,限制公司行为,保护债券投资者。近些年来,国内外学者对于债券条款的研究多集中在其对公司投资、资本结构及股价表现等方面的影响,鲜有学者对于债券条款的使用本身进行研究。资金是企业发展的源泉,根据啄食理论,当企业需要外源融资时,债务融资成为首选。现代公司制企业所有权与经营权分离的特点,导致代理问题成为公司治理中不可回避的问题。我国公司制企业的股权结构较为集中,大股东与债权人由于在公司中担任不同的角色,其之间也存在着较为严重的信息不对称。大股东对于公司决策的参与权,会对管理层的经营活动造成影响,债权人则希望通过增加债券条款来缓解信息不对称,保护自身的利益。20世纪下半叶开始,机构投资者持股比例迅速增长,机构投资者以其专业优势、信息优势、资金优势、选择优势逐渐成为投资领域最重要的力量,通常机构投资者持股较多,在一定程度上可以影响公司决策,在制定债券条款的过程中,机构投资者在主观意愿上不愿使用过多的限制性条款来制约公司发展,因此,机构投资者往往会干预公司决策来减少限制性债券条款的使用。同时,由于机构投资者可以采取“用脚投票”的方式参与公司持股,公司为了吸引机构投资者成为稳定的资金来源通常具有较好的公司治理机制,因此,机构投资者本身的存在有效缓解了股东与债权人之间的信息不对称,无形中与债权人的利益一致。在共同利益的假设下,由于信号理论的存在,机构持股越多,会给债券投资者传递公司资质较好的信号,因此机构投资者的存在可以降低债权人对于债券条款的内在需求。基于以上理论背景,本文以2007年至2016年发行的953只上市公司债券作为样本,采用实证研究方法,探究机构持股对于限制性债券条款使用的影响。本文通过手工归纳和整理上市公司债券的限制性条款,构造债券条款使用指数,通过实证回归发现,机构持股对于债券条款使用指数有着显著的负向影响,即机构持股越多,债券在使用条款时采用的限制性条款越少。验证了机构投资者和债权人之间的共同利益假设,机构投资者可以通过干预公司治理,促使管理层采取增加公司价值的行为,保护债权人的利益,从主观和客观两个角度减少限制性债券条款的使用。随后,本文在不同的子样本进行回归,通过区分债券发行人是否为国有企业进一步探究机构投资者对于限制性债券条款使用的影响,实证结果表明,在国有企业中,机构投资者对于限制性债券条款的影响更加显著,而在非国有企业中,机构投资者对于限制性债券条款使用并没有明显的影响;通过区分债券发行人上市板块探究机构投资者对于限制性债券条款使用的影响途径,结果表明,在主板上市的公司中,机构投资者对于限制性债券条款的影响更加显著,而在非主板市场上市的公司中,机构投资者对于限制性债券条款使用的影响并不显著。此外,本文更进一步根据国际学术研究中常用的方法对限制性债券条款进行分类,划分为限制投资类债券条款、限制转移支付类债券条款、限制融资类债券条款以及事件驱动类债券条款四大类。实证结果表明,机构持股对于限制投资类和限制转移支付类债券条款负显著,且显著性有所加强,而对限制融资类和事件驱动类债券条款的影响不显著。最后,我们通过工具变量法解决了机构持股与债券条款之间内生性问题,结果依然显著。此外,通过增加相关解释变量、改变被解释变量度量方法,用机构投资者持股比例对限制性债券条款使用进行回归,结果依然显著,具有稳健性。更多还原

【Abstract】 After the reform and opening up,China’s bond market began to develop gradually.In 1981,the issuance of treasury bonds started,marking the beginning of our bond market.In the subsequent development,due to a series of reasons,the development of the corporate bond market has been in a predicament and stagnated.Until August 2007,China Securities Regulatory Commission officially promulgated and implemented the "Corporate Bond Issuance Pilot Measures",which marked the official start of corporate bond issuance in China,broke the bottleneck of the development of China’s corporate bond market,expanded the financing channels of China’s corporate enterprises,and also provided investors with more choices.However,compared with the stock market,Chinese corporate bond market started relatively late,the institutional facilities are not perfect,and the protection of investors is far from enough.Financial contract theory shows that the basic principle of bond covenants is to control agency conflicts and allocate control rights.Smith and Warner(1979)argues that the covenants are used to control conflicts between bondholders and shareholders,limit corporate behavior and protect bond investors.In recent years,scholars in China and at abroad mostly focus on the impact of bond covenants on corporate investment,capital structure and stock price performance.Few scholars have studied the design of bond covenants.Capital is the source of enterprise development,according to Pecking Theory,when the enterprise needs external financing,debt financing becomes the first choice.The separation of ownership and management rights in modern corporations leads to the agency problem becoming an unavoidable problem in corporate governance.Owing to the different roles of the major shareholders and bondholders in the company,there is also a serious information asymmetry between them.The right of block holdings may participate in corporate decision-making and have an impact on the management’s business activities.And bondholders hope to protect their own interests by adding bond covenants.Since the second half of the 20th century,the proportion of institutional investors has increased rapidly.Institutional investors,with their professional advantages,information advantages,capital advantages and selection advantages,have gradually become the most important force in the investment field.Usually institutional investors hold more shares,which can affect the company’s decision-making to a certain extent.In the process of formulating bond covenants,institutional investors are reluctant to use too many restrictive covenants to restrict the development of companies.Therefore,institutional investors often interfere in corporate decision-making to reduce the use of restrictive bond clauses.At the same time,because institutional investors can participate in the company’s shareholding by "voting with feet",companies usually have better corporate governance mechanism in order to attract institutional investors to become a stable source of capital.Therefore,the existence of institutional investors itself effectively alleviates the information asymmetry between shareholders and bondholders,and invisibly in line with the interests of bondholders.So,under the assumption of common interest,due to the existence of Signaling Theory,the more institutional shareholdings,the better qualifications of the company will be transmitted to bond investors.So the existence of institutional investors can reduce the internal demand of creditors for bond covenants.Based on the above theoretical background,this paper takes 953 bonds issued by listed companies from 2007 to 2016 as a sample,using empirical research methods to explore the impact of institutional ownership on the design of restrictive bond covenants.This paper constructs the bond covenants usage index by manually summarizing and sorting out the restrictive covenants of listed company bonds.Through empirical regression,it is found that institutional ownership has a significant negative impact on the bond covenants usage index,that is,the more institutional ownership,the less restrictive covenants are used in the design of bond contracts.It verifies the common interest hypothesis between institutional investors and bondholders.Institutional investors can intervene in corporate governance to encourage management to take actions to increase corporate value,protect bondholders’ interests and reduce the use of restrictive bond covenants from both subjective and objective perspectives.In addition,this paper makes regression on different.sub-samples,and further explores the impact of institutional investors on restrictive bond covenants using by distinguishing whether bond issuers are state-owned enterprises.The empirical results show that institutional investors have a more significant impact on restrictive bond covenants in state-owned enterprises,while institutional investors have no significant impact on restrictive bond covenants in non-state-owned enterprises.We also explore the impact of institutional investors on the design of restrictive bond covenants by distinguishing the issuers’ listed plates.The results show that institutional investors have a more significant impact on the restrictive bond covenants in the companies listed on the mainboard,while institutional investors have no significant impact on the restrictive bond covenants design in the companies listed on the non-mainboard.What’s more,this paper further classifies the restrictive bond covenants according to the commonly used methods in international academic research,which can be divided into four categories:Investment restrictive bond covenants,Payment restrictive bond covenants,Financing restrictive bond covenants and Event-driven bond covenants.Empirical results show that institutional ownership has a negative effect on the terms of Investment and Payment restrictive bond covenants,and its significance has been strengthened,but it has no significant effect on the terms of Financing and Event-driven bond covenants.Finally,we use the instrumental variable method to solve the endogenous problem between institutional ownership and bond covenants,and the results are still significant.In addition,by adding relevant explanatory variables or changing the measure of the interpreted variable,using the proportion of institutional investors to regression the use of restrictive bond covenants,the results are still significant and robust.更多还原