【作者】 刘月；

【导师】 王海连；

【作者基本信息】 东北财经大学 ， 会计学， 2018， 硕士

【摘要】 投资效率对上市公司来说至关重要。众所周知,公司的三大财务决策为投资、融资和利润分配,投资决策的正确与否直接影响到企业的成长,对企业的成长有深远影响。为了保证公司的长远发展,需要关注对投资效率产生影响的要素,尽可能提高公司的投资效率。会计信息质量是对投资效率产生重要影响的要素,但随着所有权与经营权的分离,产生委托代理问题。管理层通过进行盈余管理操纵会计信息,降低了会计信息质量,由于管理层和股东信息不对称,会对公司的投资效率产生影响。股权激励是专门为解决委托代理问题和信息不对称问题设计的政策,研究股权激励政策在中国的可行性具有重要意义。本文分别从理论和实证两方面进行研究。首先对相关文献进行梳理,然后通过分析委托代理理论、信息不对称理论和激励理论,构建出股权激励、盈余管理、投资效率三者关系的理论分析框架,并提出研究假设。其次选取沪深两市上市公司2012-2016年共5年的财务数据为样本,构建模型,研究盈余管理、对投资效率的影响,并研究股权激励在盈余管理对投资效率影响中的调节作用。再通过STATA13对数据进行处理,进行描述性统计、相关性分析、多元回归分析和稳健性检验。最后通过分析实证结果得出研究结论、提出政策建议并说明本文的局限性。实证研究发现,公司盈余管理程度越高,投资效率越低。在分析股权激励在盈余管理对投资效率影响中的调节作用时,发现股权激励在盈余管理对投资效率影响中发挥调节作用,股权激励可以降低盈余管理对投资效率的不利影响,本文以管理层持股比例作为衡量股权激励程度的调节变量,得出管理层持股比例越大,越会降低盈余管理对投资效率的不利影响。本文的创新及贡献主要为:本文在研究盈余管理与投资效率的关系时,创造性的将股权激励作为调节变量加入其中,分析股权激励对盈余管理和投资效率关系的影响,并采用中国的数据进行实证研究,得出股权激励对盈余管理与投资效率关系的调节作用,既丰富了盈余管理、投资效率方面文献,也丰富了股权激励方面的文献。更多还原

【Abstract】 Investment efficiency is critical for listed companies.As we all know,the company’s three major financial decisions are investment,financing and profit distribution.The correctness of investment decisions directly affects the growth of the company and has a profound impact on the growth of the company.In order to ensure the long-term development of the company,it is necessary to pay attention to the factors that have an impact on investment efficiency and maximize the investment efficiency of the company.The quality of accounting information is an important factor that affects investment efficiency.However,with the separation of ownership and management rights,the problem of principal-agent is generated.Management manages accounting information by conducting earnings management,which reduces the quality of accounting information.Due to the asymmetry of management and shareholder information,it will have an impact on the company’s investment efficiency.Equity incentives are policies designed to solve the problem of principal-agent problems and information asymmetry.It is of great significance to study the feasibility of equity incentive policies in China.This paper studies both theoretical and empirical aspects.Firstly,the relevant literatures are sorted out,and then through the analysis of principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory and incentive theory,the theoretical analysis framework of the relationship between equity incentives,earnings management and investment efficiency is constructed,and research hypotheses are proposed.Secondly,the financial data of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges for 2012-2016 are selected as samples,and the model is constructed to study the impact of earnings management on investment efficiency,and to study the adjustment effect of equity incentives on the impact of earnings management on investment efficiency.The data was processed by STATA13 for descriptive statistics,correlation analysis,multiple regression analysis and robustness test.Finally,through the analysis of the empirical results,the research conclusions,policy recommendations and the limitations of this paper are presented.Empirical studies have found that the higher the company’s earnings management,the lower the investment efficiency.In the analysis of the adjustment effect of equity incentives on the impact of earnings management on investment efficiency,it is found that equity incentives play a regulatory role in the impact of earnings management on investment efficiency.Equity incentives can reduce the adverse impact of earnings management on investment efficiency.As a moderator of measuring the degree of equity incentives,the proportion of shares is higher,which will reduce the adverse impact of earnings management on investment efficiency.The innovation and contribution of this paper are mainly as follows:In the study of the relationship between earnings management and investment efficiency,this paper creatively adds equity incentives as adjustment variables,analyzes the impact of equity incentives on the relationship between earnings management and investment efficiency,and uses Chinese data.Empirical research can be used to determine the adjustment effect of equity incentives on earnings management and investment efficiency,which not only enriches the literature on earnings management and investment efficiency,but also enriches the literature on equity incentives.更多还原