【作者】 王晶；

【导师】 赵健梅；

【作者基本信息】 北京交通大学 ， 会计硕士（专业学位）， 2018， 硕士

【摘要】 股东治理是公司治理的基础,大股东对公司业绩的影响更是公司治理领域研究的热点问题、,现有关于单一大股东对公司业绩影响的文献虽较多,但尚未达成统一结论,本文认为当公司存在单一大股东时,其发挥隧道效应与管理层合谋侵害小股东利益还是与小股东利益保持一致对管理层进行有效监督可能受其持股份额是否足够大的影响。不同的存在单一大股东的公司,大股东发挥的作用有显著不同。而现有文献均将存在单一大股东公司作为一个整体进行研究,存在不妥之处。因此,本文相较于现有文献的特色在于本文将存在单一大股东的公司区分为存在单一控制性大股东的公司与单一非控制性大股东的公司,研究其对公司业绩的影响,期望可对上市公司股权结构的设置及对代理成本的治理、对公司业绩的提升得出一个更有意义的结论。本文使用2007—2016年中国A股上市公司的数据,将样本限定于拥有单一控制性大股东的公司、拥有单一非控制性大股东的公司、多个非控制性大股东并存的公司,以公司业绩为被解释变量,以股权结构为解释变量,进行多元回归分析,对单一控制性大股东、单一非控制性大股东与多个非控制性大股东对公司业绩提升作用进行比较,并考察产权性质及市场化进程对代理成本最低的单一控制性大股东治理作用的影响。实证检验的结果表明:(1)相比于拥有多个非控制性大股东,公司中拥有单一控制性大股东时其对公司业绩提升的作用较好;(2)相比于拥有多个非控制性大股东,公司中拥有单一非控制性大股东时其对公司业绩提升的作用较差;(3)相比于国有企业,民营企业中单一控制性大股东对公司业绩提升的作用较好;(4)民营企业中,相比于市场化进程较低的地区,市场化进程较高的地区中单一控制性大股东对公司业绩提升的作用较好。本文补充了有关大股东对公司业绩影响的相关文献,有利于优化上市公司股权结构,也有利于改善公司委托代理问题、提升公司价值。更多还原

【Abstract】 Shareholder governance is the basis of corporate governance,the impact of single shareholder on company performance is a hot issue in corporate governance research.Although there are many existing literatures on the impact of single shareholder on company performance,it has not yet reached a consensus conclusion.This paper believes that when a company has a single controlling shareholder,it will damage minority shareholders’ interests or keep in line with the interests of minority shareholders may be affected by whether the amount of shares held by them is large enough.There are significant differences in the roles of major shareholders in different companies with a single controlling shareholder.However,the existing literature study the existence of a single controlling shareholder company as a whole,and there are inadequacies.Therefore,compared with the existing literature,this article has the feature that the company that has a single controlling shareholder is divided into a company with a single controlling major shareholder and a single non-controlling large shareholder.The major shareholder of the company compares the governance effects of the company’s performance and expects that a more meaningful conclusion can be drawn on the establishment of the equity structure of the listed company and the governance of agency costs and the improvement of the company’s performance.This paper uses the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2016 to limit the sample to companies that have a single controlling major shareholder,multiple non-controlling large-shareholder companies,and companies that have a single non-controlling shareholder.To compare the effect of a single controlling major shareholder,a single non-controlling major shareholder,and multiple non-controlling major shareholders on the performance improvement of the company,and to examine the role of the nature of property rights and the process of marketization in the governance of a single controlling shareholder with the lowest agency cost.The empirical test results show that:(1)Compared with having multiple non-controlling large shareholders,when the company has a single controlling large shareholder,its role in corporate governance is better,and the company’s performance is higher;(2)Compared to having multiple non-controlling large shareholders,when the company has a single non-controlling large shareholder,has poor corporate governance and lower corporate performance;(3)Compared with state-owned enterprises,the single controlling large shareholder in private enterprises have better governance,higher performance;(4)In the private enterprises,compared with the less market-oriented areas,the single controlling large shareholder in the higher marketization process has better corporate governance performance ’and higher performance.This article supplements the relevant literature on the impact of shareholder structure on company performance,which is conducive to optimizing the shareholder structure of listed companies,and also helps improve the company’s entrusted agency issues to enhance the company’s performence.更多还原