【作者】 程鹏；

【导师】 陈艳莹；

【作者基本信息】 大连理工大学 ， 产业经济学， 2017， 硕士

【摘要】 随着中国经济的快速发展,我国开始提倡“工匠精神”,进行“精细制造”,更加注重提升产品质量,产品质量升级成为产业升级的一个重要方向。但是当前中国的产品市场上存在着严重的假冒伪劣问题,这些低质量产品给集体声誉行业带来不利的影响。由于集体声誉行业面临着严重的信息不对称问题,会导致逆向选择和道德风险。此外在集体声誉行业中普遍存在着“搭便车”问题,若不能及时有效的解决这些问题就会造成行业集体声誉的劣化,导致高质量产品也遭受“池鱼之殃”,抑制厂商生产高质量产品的动机。解决集体声誉行业的信息不对称问题和“搭便车”问题关系到这些行业能否顺利进行产品质量升级,具有重要的现实意义。本文在系统梳理关于集体声誉、最低质量标准和认证等相关文献的基础上,分析了行业集体声誉的内涵和造成其劣化的原因,以及最低质量标准和认证在解决信息不对称问题中的作用。然后通过运用两阶段博弈模型,在集体声誉的背景下对比分析了最低质量标准和认证这两种规制手段在提高产品质量,改善行业集体声誉以及提升社会福利等方面的效果和差异。考虑到市场上存在着多种类型的消费者,因此本文分析了当市场上的消费者为高端消费者和低端消费者这两种类型时,消费者类型比例的变化会怎样影响均衡时的产品质量和社会福利。虽然最低质量标准和认证是解决市场上信息不对称问题和“搭便车”问题的两种有效手段,但是认证下的市场同时允许高质量和低质量产品的存在,而最低质量标准则严格限制只有那些达到最低质量标准的产品才能存在于市场上。这两种手段会给市场上的消费者和生产者带来不同的产品质量选择,因此当市场上消费者类型的比例发生变动时,最低质量标准和认证规制会产生不同的治理效果。最后,本文结合研究结论给出了关于选择合适的规制手段以及制定恰当的质量标准来提升产品质量和社会福利的相关政策建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the rapid development of China’s economy,our country turns to advocate the "spirit of the craftsman" and "precision manufacturing",pay more attention to improving the quality of products,product quality upgrade becomes an important direction of industrial upgrading.But there is a serious problem of fake and shoddy for the current China’s products market,these low-quality products adversely affect the collective reputation of the industry.The collective reputation industry is facing a serious problem of information asymmetry,which will lead to adverse selection and moral hazard.In addition there are generally "free rider" problem in collective reputation industry,it will cause the deterioration of industry collective reputation if we do not solve these problems,it will inhibit the motivation to make high quality products.Solve the information asymmetry problem and "free rider" problem is related to whether the business can smoothly upgrade product quality,which has important practical significance.Based on the system analysis on related literature,we analyze the connotation of industry collective reputation and the reasons for the deterioration,and the roles of certification and minimum quality standards play in solving the problem of information asymmetry.Then by using two stage game model,under the background of collective reputation we contrast analysis the effect and the difference between the certification and the minimum quality standards in improving the quality of the products,the collective industry reputation and social welfare.There are many types of consumers in the market,so this article analyses when there are two types consumer on the market such as high-end and low-end consumer,changes in consumer type ratio will affect the balance of product quality and social welfare.Although the certification and the minimum quality standards are two kinds of effective means to solve the problem of asymmetric information and the "free-rider" problem,but high quality and low quality products are allowed at the same time under the certification,while minimum quality standards strictly limited only those meet minimum quality standards can be found in the market.These two kinds of means make consumers and producers have different product quality choices,so when the market consumer type ratio changes,the minimum quality standards certification and regulation will have different governance effects.Finally,based on the conclusions of the study,the paper gives some policy recommendations on how to choose the appropriate regulatory measures and develop appropriate quality standards to improve product quality and social welfare.更多还原