【作者】 张浩；

【导师】 戴大双；

【作者基本信息】 大连理工大学 ， 项目管理， 2017， 硕士

【摘要】 随着我国政府投资体制改革和各省市代建制项目实施的不断深入,自2004年正式施行以来,代建制作为政府投资公共项目的重要管理模式在提高政府投资效率、抑制“三超”问题、防治腐败等方面发挥了重要作用。同时,因为信息的不对称、政府监管不到位、代建单位与政府委托人的利益目标不同等原因,代建单位为了追求自身利益而通过隐瞒自身真实实力信息中标、在代建制实施过程中采取隐瞒信息、偷工减料等机会主义行为,损害了政府投资项目的管理绩效以及政府和社会公众的利益,破坏了代建制市场的健康发展。如何有效地应对代建单位的机会主义行为、提高代建制的管理绩效成为值得研究的问题。首先,本文通过文献回顾,对当前学术界有关代建制和机会主义行为的相关研究进行了分析,界定了本文的研究范围和研究对象,并对项目治理的相关研究进行了综述;通过对委托代理理论、演化博弈理论进行重点论述,为本文的研究方法奠定了理论基础。其次,基于案例分析方法,通过对我国各省市代建制实施中的8个典型项目案例进行深入分析,识别出虚假中标、懈怠和合谋三种代建单位在代建制实际运作过程中的机会主义行为表现形式。然后,基于政府委托人和代建单位的委托代理关系,本文构建了代建单位存在机会主义行为和不存在机会主义行为时的收益模型,得出针对代建单位的最佳投资节余分成比。结果表明,提高投资节余分配比例能有效减少代建单位的机会主义行为,提高其努力水平。根据模型结构,本文从风险分担和代建管理费设计两个方面为政府委托人对代建单位的激励策略提出建议。最后,在充分考虑治理的动态性的基础上,构建了代建单位和政府委托人的演化博弈模型,对代建单位机会主义行为策略选择与政府委托人监督策略选择的动态机制进行了分析,得出影响博弈系统演化均衡解的关键因素。研究结果表明,建立合理的激励机制和监管机制可使博弈系统向(不采取机会主义行为、不监督)的策略演化,有利于政府委托人和代建单位之间互信互惠关系的建立,有利于代建制项目整体效益的提高和代建制模式优势的发挥。本文针对政府投资代建制项目中代建单位的机会主义行为,在对其产生机理和表现形式进行分析识别的基础上,运用委托代理理论和演化博弈理论从激励机制、监管机制两个治理途径进行了研究。希望本文的研究成果能为政府部门合理有效地治理代建单位的机会主义行为、提高代建制实施效果提供一定参考。更多还原

【Abstract】 Along with our country government investment system reform and the various provinces and cities of project implementation,the acting system formally implemented since 2004,the acting system as an important management model of government investment in public projects in improving the efficiency of government investment,curb "San Chao" problems,such as corruption has played an important role.However,due to the construction agency does not agree with the government’s target of the client and other reasons,in the contract in the process of practice,the construction agency in pursuit of self-interest and opportunism behavior,such as imposing withholding information,jerry has hurt the government investment project management performance and the government and the social public interests,destroy the healthy development of the agent market.How to effectively deal with construction unit of the opportunism behavior,improve the management performance of acting system become a problem worthy of study.First of all,on the basis of literature analysis and theoretical analysis in this paper,the formation mechanism of opportunism behavior of construction agencies were studied.Then,using the case study method,analysis eight cases of our country projects,identify the agent construction units in the process of actual operation forms of opportunistic behavior.Secondly,based on government departments and the construction agency of the principal-agent relationship,this paper constructs the construction agencys exist opportunistic behavior and when he does not exist opportunistic behavior model,analysis the principal unit of government incentive strategy choice.The results show that,improve the investment savings ratio can effectively reduce the opportunism behaviors of the construction unit,raise the level of its productive effort.Finally,this paper uses evolutionary game theory analysis model,on the basis of full consideration of the dynamic characteristics of governance,and studies the principal unit of government supervision enterprises strategy choice and strategy selection of interactive mechanism,and influence the key factors to the stability of the system evolution process were analyzed.The research results show that by designing a reasonable incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism can make the game system to(do not take opportunism behavior,not supervision)evolution of the strategy,promote government between clients and construction units to establish a good trust relationship of mutual benefit,improve the project overall revenue agent,agent mode advantage into full play.This article in view of the government investment agent opportunism behaviors of the enterprises in the project,the analysis of its mechanism and form recognition,on the basis of using the principal-agent theory and evolutionary game theory from the governance way such as incentive mechanism,supervision mechanism is studied.The research results of this paper may enterprises governance of government departments to reasonably and effectively opportunism behavior,improve the effect of acting system implementation to provide a certain reference.更多还原