【作者】 刘畅；

【导师】 Roger Raufer；

【作者基本信息】 南京大学 ， 国际关系， 2017， 硕士

【摘要】 人类活动被认为是当今全球气温升高的主要原因。《巴黎协定》目标"将全球平均气温较工业化前水平升高控制在2摄氏度之内,并为把升温控制在1.5摄氏度之内而努力"。作为继《京都议定书》之后在联合国气候变化框架公约(UNFCCC)下达成的第二份全球减排协定,《巴黎协定》规定各国将以自下而上式的"国家自主贡献"(INDC)的方式参与全球应对气候变化行动,而不再进行自上而下式的温室气体减排量的强制性分配。碳交易作为控制污染的经济手段之一,无疑将在后巴黎协定时期起到重要作用。在各国提交的国家自主贡献中,超过一半国家提及将利用或考虑利用市场交易作为实现减排的手段。清洁发展机制,简称 CDM(Clean Development Mechanism),是《京都议定书》中引入的灵活履约机制之一。核心内容是允许附件1缔约方(即发达国家)与非附件1(即发展中国家)进行项目级的减排量抵消额的转让与获得,在发展中国家实施温室气体减排项目。欧洲碳排放交易体系(EU—ETS)是当今世界上最大的碳排放交易市场。其建立起初是为了满足《京都议定书》要求,帮助其成员国履行减排承诺,获取运用总量交易机制减排温室气体的经验。中国预计将在2017年7月正式开启全国碳市场交易,其市场规模预计是欧盟碳市场的两倍。专家认为,碳排放监测核算/报告/核查体系(MRV)是确保碳市场的有效运行的核心。虽然有关碳核查体系的法规设计在文献中最常被提及,在碳排放监测核算/报告/核查体系中,笔者认为第三方监测核查机构的作用最为关键。对于企业而言,可以获得多少配额,不仅与正常生产经营活动相关,还与核查机构有直接关系。那么,这些核查是否技术上专业、是否态度上正确、是否时间上允许、是都存在使企业获得不合理配额的可能等。针对于对上述情形的担忧,作者在从2016年11月至2017年2月间对12家第三方监测企业进行了采访。通过这些采访,笔者得知了核查工作的实际执行情况和执行细节,填补了有关政策手段规定和实际履约情况之间的空白。由于中国自身的地域、经济、社会客观条件,建立统一的碳市场将会面临许多挑战。如若缺乏统一的管理条例,那么各地区在具体的实施过程中必将出现极大的差异,中国将难以形成有效的市场。实际履约对自愿性质的后巴黎协定环境极为重要。对中国,以及其他考虑建立碳交易体系的国家来说,相关政府部门需要认识到第三方检测在碳市场中的重要性。政府需要为第三方监测定制统一的管理条例,提供法律的保障,让第三方监测在独立的条件下进行。第三方监测企业通过技术监督和确保碳市场的有效运行。更多还原

【Abstract】 Adopted on 12 December 2015,the Paris Agreement has made an important step forward in the universal effort to combat climate change.It sets a long-term goal of limiting global warming to below two degrees Celsius compared at pre-industrial level,and committed parties to make efforts to limit it to 1.5 degrees Celsius.It also fundamentally changed the form of international climate governance from the "top-down" Kyoto Protocol style to a new "bottom-up" approach,which countries could set their own targets through"nationally determined contributions(NDCs)".The "intended" nationally determined contributions(INDCs)submitted before the Paris Conference of the Parties(COP)present a significant degree of diversity;however,90 INDCs explicitly seek access to some form of international carbon market mechanism.Released on 30 October 2015,the UNFCCC’s INDC Synthesis Report underlines that more than half of the INDCs planed to use,or were considering,using market mechanisms.The Kyoto Protocol allowed Annex I parties(such as the EU)to buy or trade Certified Emission Reductions(CERs)with non-Annex I developing countries,and it established three "flexibility"(i.e.,market-based)mechanisms to help achieve compliance in an economically efficient manner.These mechanisms introduced a quantity-based approach,and one of these,the Clean Development Mechanism(CDM)allowed constrained Annex I parties to buy or trade CERs with non-constrained developing countries(including China).In 2005,the European Union Emission Trading System(EU ETS)was the world’s first and(still currently)largest international emissions trading system.Operating in 31 countries(28 EU Member States plus Iceland,Liechtenstein and Norway),the system was proposed and justified as an approach for the EU and its member states to meet their Kyoto obligations.Despite its Kyoto Protocol focus,it remains independent in terms of implementation.The EU ETS covers approximately 11,000 power stations and major industrial sources,along with internal EU aviation activities within these countries.It accounts for approximately 45 percent of total EU greenhouse gas(GHG)emissions.China plans to launch a national carbon market in 2017,building on ten years of emissions trading experience,based upon both the Clean Development Mechanism and its seven pilot carbon markets.The size of China’s national ETS is expected to be twice the size of EU ETS,with an expected cap size of at least four billion tonnes.Carbon markets will undoubtedly be a key tool in the post-Paris mitigation effort.However,this proven cost-effective mechanism still faces multiple challenges during the process of implementation,especially in assuring the actual compliance of its individual targets.To ensure that projects and programmes meet clear standards,monitoring,reporting and verification(MRV)of this process are therefore of vital importance for effective enforcement measurement.Trading purposes,participants,trading rules,trading instruments,and incentives and punishments are detailed in laws and regulations.Under these circumstances,compliance means monitoring the operation of covered installations,ensuring that they operate consistent with the requirements,and then determining whether further inspection or enforcement is required.While the legislative design of these ETSs have been frequently addressed in the literature,the evaluation of executive activities is rarely mentioned.During the MRV compliance cycle,independent third parties are required to check covered entities and report the results to the government.The quality of these individual inspections is often neglected.In this thesis,the author addresses this question,evaluating the compliance and enforcement of these emission trading schemes through an analysis of third party verification behaviors.The author conducted interviews with multiple parties related to verification work in China,including third party verifiers,regulated entities included in China’s pilot and national schemes,and emission exchange centers.Through conversations,emails and site visits,interviewees provided first-handed and practical information about executive details during the implementation process.Their experience fulfilled the gap between administrative policies and actual compliance.Even though China’s national.emission trading will be operated in one country,the degree of diversity between cities and provinces still concerns the administration.In the pilot programs,for example,each pilot adopted different market designs and regulatory rules,searching for the optimal result of the pilot scheme.Learning from the EU ETS,coherent and centralized regulation guidelines need to be formed as assurance of actual compliance.Moreover,compliance should strictly adhere to the guidelines.Cases have shown that standards and requirements were loosened,especially in terms of third party verification entities selections.This situation poses a potential threat towards the accuracy and integrity of third party verification reports.In conclusion,actual compliance is of vital importance,especially under the voluntary nature of the Paris Agreement.Third parties play a significant role in terms of verifying emission reductions.In China and other countries considering establishing emission reduction schemes,it is essential that governments understand the role of third party verifications,and mobilize centralized regulation guidelines and legal protections to assure they are conducted in a professional manner,with the independence they are supposed to provide,and the technical support and regulatory oversight necessary to ensure a successful emissions trading scheme.更多还原