【作者】 王岩；

【导师】 杨薇臻；

【作者基本信息】 东北师范大学 ， 企业管理， 2016， 硕士

【摘要】 近年,随着我国经济快速发展,政策性银行在我国金融体系中发挥着越来越重要的作用。但由于政策性银行发展起步较晚,薪酬体系不够完善,激励方式僵化单一,导致了一线员工工作满意度下降、工作积极性不高、离职现象增多等一系列问题。究其原因主要是政策性银行薪酬激励体系低效,无法吸引人才、凝聚人才、留住人才。因此,如何建立符合市场运作规律的政策性银行一线员工薪酬激励体系,保证一线员工的工作积极性和归属感,便成了目前政策性银行亟需解决的问题。本研究旨在通过对我国政策性银行一线员工薪酬激励现状进行分析,找出问题的根源,提出解决的方案。本研究共分六章。第一章是绪论部分,提出了研究的意义和背景。第二章阐述了薪酬与激励相关理论。第三章着重介绍了政策性银行的基本概况、主要特征以及一线员工薪酬体系现状,并在阅读和分析大量有关政策性银行员工薪酬激励方面资料的基础上,对政策性银行一线员工现有薪酬激励效果进行了分析。第四章通过运用文献研究法、案例分析法、比较研究法等分析手法深入剖析了政策性银行一线员工薪酬激励方面存在的问题及形成的原因,主要是政策性银行薪酬管理理念落后,薪酬制度与职位考核脱节以及缺乏岗位分析和专业薪酬管理人员。第五章针对存在的问题,提出了优化和完善政策性银行一线员工薪酬激励体系的改进思路和具体对策,希望通过完善薪酬体系,优化绩效考评目标,丰富激励机制等具体措施为政策性银行一线员工设计一套符合市场规律和政策性银行发展要求的薪酬激励方案。第六章总结了研究发现的问题。研究的结论是,政策性银行一线员工薪酬激励低效问题确实存在,政策性银行现有的薪酬体系构成也存在较大缺陷,并且缺乏有效的长期激励措施。通过研究政策性银行一线员工薪酬激励问题,可以拓宽薪酬激励理论的研究视阈,进一步丰富和验证薪酬激励理论,使薪酬激励在政策性和市场性之间找到最佳平衡点,既符合国家政策特有属性的要求,又能适应市场竞争规律,吸引人才,激发潜能,达到激励的目的。同时,研究提出的优化方案具有很强的操作性,能够为政策性银行有效发展和我国金融体制改革提供一点借鉴。更多还原

【Abstract】 In recent years,with the rapid economic development in China,policy banks are playing an important role in Chinese financial system.However,due to the late foundation of policy banks,the compensation system is not perfect,the incentives are rigid and single,which lead to serious consequences,such as job satisfaction decreased,enthusiasm descend and resignation ratio increased.It is undeniable that compensation incentive issue is a major factor,which cannot attract and keep the talents.Therefore,it is a huge issue at current situation to set up a reasonable compensation incentive of frontline staff,in accordance with market operating rules,to ensure their work enthusiasm and sense of belonging.The study aims to explore the cause,propose the solution by analyzing the compensation incentive of frontline staff in policy banks.There are six chapters in total.The first chapter is the introduction,explains research meaning and background.The second chapter expounds the related theory about compensation and incentive.The third chapter introduces the overview and feature of policy banks,presents the current situation of compensation incentive.Besides reading lots of information,the study focuses the effect of compensation incentive in policy banks The fourth chapter by using literature research method,comparative research method,case analysis method,expounds the cause of compensation incentive of frontline staff in policy banks,which are mainly the outdated management concept,the disjoint union between compensation system and job evaluation,lack of position analysis and professional incentive manager.The fifth chapter brings forward the improvement ideas and specific measures to optimize the compensation incentive of frontline staff in policy banks,hope that can improve the compensation system,optimize the performance evaluation target,enhance incentive mechanism.In the end,to design a set of salary incentive scheme towards the front-line staff,in accordance with the requirements of market rules and policy banks development.The sixth chapter is the conclusion.It is true that the compensation incentive of frontline staff in policy banks is inefficient,and there is a big flaw existed in salary system,lack of long term incentives.It can widen the research sphere of compensation incentive theory,to further enrich and validate the theory,make the best balance between the policy and the marketability by studying the compensation incentive of frontline staff in policy banks.All of these should both comply with the requirements of specific attribute of national policy,and can adapt to market competition rule,attract talent,inspire potential,achieve the purpose of incentive.Meanwhile the study puts forward the operational scheme,which is useful for the development of policy banks and financial system reform in China.更多还原