【作者】 张芳；

【导师】 刘祚祥；

【作者基本信息】 长沙理工大学 ， 应用经济学， 2015， 硕士

【摘要】 巩固农业基础、实现农业现代化,一直是中国现代化建设的重要目标和重点任务。党的十六大以来,中央不断完善强农惠农富农政策,大幅增加农业投入,深化农村改革,有力推动了传统农业向现代农业转变。但是现有的以债券合约为基础的农村金融体系难以促进农业现代化转变。为进一步提高农村金融服务水平,夯实农业农村发展基础,2010年中央一号文件明确提出建立农业产业发展基金。本文以农业产业投资基金为研究对象,提出了一个基于投资者、基金管理人与农业企业家的农业产业投融资合约分析框架。通过拓展Tirole基本模型,重点突出基金管理人在吸引投资以及甄别项目过程中所发挥的核心作用,并通过构建学习曲线模型,论证了基金管理人企业家能力的内生性,以此将企业家行为纳入金融合约的分析,表明企业家行为能改善信息不对称,最终降低交易成本,提高经济效率。在农业产业投资基金的运营过程中,存在着双重的逆向选择和道德风险,分别存在于募资阶段和投资阶段。本文以金融合约理论为基础,通过博弈论与信息经济学论证了农业产业投资基金的合约结构。在募资阶段,基金管理人企业家能力是规避逆向选择的重要信号,且可以通过薪酬契约指标对其进行观测；而该阶段的道德风险可以通过设计以基金管理人过往业绩和市场声誉为指标的激励机制来加以防范。在投资阶段,本文认为可转换债券和有限合伙制分别是农业产业投资基金规避逆向选择和防范道德风险的制度安排。综合而言,农业产业投资基金是为农业现代化过程中成长性企业提供股权融资的一种新的金融合约安排,它既是资金盈余单位的代理人,又是资金赤字单位的委托人,在农业企业家的企业家行为选择上面发挥着至关重要的资金融通作用。农业产业投资基金不但能够降低农业企业家的融资成本,提高农户企业家行为选择的概率,而且能够为农户的创业及其企业管理提供稀缺的人力资本,从而降低了农业企业市场化的成本,促进农业现代化发展。更多还原

【Abstract】 It has been an important objective and priority in Chinese modernization that consolidating the foundation of agriculture and realizing the agricultural modernization. Since the 16th National Congress of Communist Party of China, the central has been completing policies to support agriculture, greatly increasing fund for agriculture, deepening the rural reform, all of these promote the transformation from traditional agriculture to modern agriculture, powerfully. However, it is difficult to push forward the agricultural modernization that exists in rural finance system based on indenture. To enhance the level of rural financial service and consolidate the foundation of agricultural development, the central document No.l in 2010 proposed that the government should play a positive role in setting up investment fund in agricultural industry.This paper presents an analytical framework of investment and financing contract in agricultural industry, which based on investors, fund managers and entrepreneurs, and studies the investment fund in agricultural industry. This paper extends Tirole’s basic model to highlight the fund management’s key role in the process of attracting investment fund and screening project. The paper demonstrate the endogenousness of a fund managers’ entrepreneurship by building a learning curve model, then put entrepreneur behavior into financial contract analysis, which shows that entrepreneur behavior can improve information asymmetry, eventually, reduce transaction costs and increase economic efficiency.During the operation of investment fund in agricultural industry, there is double adverse selection and moral hazard exists in financing stage and investment stage. This paper is based on the theory of financial contract, demonstrating the contract structure of investment fund in agricultural industry with game theory and information economics. It shows that fund managers’ entrepreneurship is an important signal to avoid adverse selection at financing stage and it can be observed with remuneration contracts. By designing incentive mechanism which uses fund managers’ past performance and reputation in the market as indexes moral hazard at this stage can be avoided. In the investment stage, it is believed that the convertible securities and limited partnership are institutional arrangements of investment fund in agricultural industry to avoid adverse selection and moral hazard.To sum up, investment fund in agricultural industry is a new financial contract which supplies equity financing for developing firms during agricultural modernization,it is an agent of capital surplus units, but also a principal of capital deficit units. The investment fund plays a vital role in financing of agricultural entrepreneur’s behavior select. Not only can investment fund in agricultural industry reduce the financing cost of agricultural entrepreneur, and prove the probability of peasant entrepreneur’s behavior select, but also can provide peasant entrepreneur the human capital to start and manage the business, thereby reducing the cost agricultural enterprise marketization, and promoting the development of agricultural modernization.更多还原