【作者】 张霞；

【导师】 陈志强；

【作者基本信息】 苏州大学 ， 会计学， 2016， 硕士

【摘要】 在绝大部分企业的资源配置手段中,投资行为发挥了至关重要的作用,它在对企业盈利、经营业绩产生影响的基础之上,最终还会对企业价值的最大化产生影响。国内的证券市场在近年来获得了快速发展,在此过程中也出现了许多问题,如投资不足和投资过度。部分专家表示,国内上市公司面临的投资不足问题明显广泛于投资过度。投资不足也成为影响我国上市公司健康发展的一个重要因素。所以,面对上市公司高管存在的投资不足行为,如何才能有效制约,这已成为亟待解决的重要问题。企业所有者为了减少代理人的相关成本,由此设计出了高管股权激励制度,根据本制度的设计目标,这一制度将被激励者的利益与公司整体利益结合起来,理论上应该能够促使企业高管提高投资效率,从而缓解代理问题导致的投资不足。但是实践结果到底如何,这是本文关心的第一个问题。此外,“一股独大”是我国上市公司最显著的所有权特征,从理论上来看,这一结构可加强企业所有者对高管的监督,由此获得一定比例的红利或者是资本利得,表现在投资领域就是大股东可以通过监督,减少高管的懒惰以及过度规避风险等行为,从而缓解投资不足;此外,大股东作为资金提供者,当企业面临财务困境时,大股东可能会注入资金帮助企业度过难关,从而缓解投资不足程度。但是从另一方面来看,因为大股东控制权的影响,小股东权益可能受损,大股东可能与管理层合谋从而侵害中小股东利益,表现在投资领域就是大股东可能会占用上市公司资金或者使用关联交易等动用上市公司资金,从而导致现金流减少,进而导致投资不足。由此,上市公司普遍采用的监督手段之一——大股东控制权,是否可有效抑制高管的自利行为,或者是否会成为侵害上市公司的手段,这是笔者需要重点关注的第二个关键问题。在此基础上,本文以2009-2014年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,考察了高管股权激励对企业投资不足的影响,并进一步探索大股东控制权在两者关系间的调节作用。在此基础上,考虑企业产权性质和市场化进程的影响,研究在不同产权性质和不同市场化进程的企业中,上述两个问题是否存在差异。探究结论表明,第一,非效率投资问题普遍存在于中国上市公司内,且投资不足明显广泛于投资过度,投资过度比投资不足更为严重;第二,我国上市公司的高管股权激励如预期一样能在一定程度上缓解投资不足问题;第三,大股东控制权对高管行为存在相应的监督和支持作用,在对比大股东控制权高、低的企业之后可以发现,如果大股东控制权较高,那么在企业投资不足方面,高管股权激励对投资不足的抑制作用将有所增强;第四,在考虑企业产权性质的基础之上,对比国有、非国有控股公司,最终发现非国有控股公司的高管股权激励,在投资不足方面具有更为显著的抑制作用,而国有控股公司的大股东在监督高管方面,作用更为显著。在考虑市场化进程的基础之上,对比市场化进程高低的公司后可以发现,高管股权激励对投资不足的抑制作用在不同市场化进程的公司中不存在非常显著的差别,而大股东的监督和支持作用对高管股权激励效应的强化作用在市场化进程较高的公司中作用更为显著。更多还原

【Abstract】 As one of the most important means of resource allocation of the companies, investment decisions directly affect the enterprises’ business performance and profitability, and affect the enterprises’ value maximization ultimately. In recent years, China’s securities market has developed rapidly, but there have been many worrying excessive or insufficient investment. Some scholars’ studies show that : Compared with overinvestment, underinvestment of Chinese listed companies is more common. Underinvestment has become one of the main factors that influence the healthy growth of listed companies in our country. Therefore, how to effectively restrict the underinvestment behavior of the listed company’s senior management has become a problem that needs to solve.Equities incentive for senior executives is an incentive system designed by the companies’ owners to reduce the agency cost on the basis of the goal of this system, the interests of the motivated person will be converged with the interests of the whole company. What is the fact, the theoretical and practical circles has not yet do some research deeply, this article intends to try in this aspect. So to explore whether executive equities incentive can effectively inhibit underinvestment or not is the first core issue needed to be solved in this paper.In addition, "a dominant" is the basic feature of the listed companies in our country. Theoretically, concentrated ownership structure can strengthen the supervision of the owners to management so that they can obtain the corresponding percentage of capital gains and dividends; but on the other hand, the shareholders with large share can violate the interests of shareholders with smaller share by use the control in their hand, in this case the value of the company must be affected. So, large shareholders’ control as a widely used means of supervision of listed companies can effectively restrain the self-interest behavior or become a way of violation of the listed company is the second key problem needed to be solved in this paper.On this basis, this article chooses the date of China’s A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2014 as research samples, and examines the mechanism of action of how executive equities’ incentive effect underinvestment, and to further explore the large shareholder control in a relationship between the adjustment. The results show that: firstly, there is the problem of investment efficiency of listed companies in our country, and overinvestment phenomenon is more serious than underinvestment, but underinvestment phenomenon is more common than overinvestment; secondly, the equities’ incentive of listed companies in China is as effective as expected to alleviate the underinvestment problem; thirdly, the large shareholders’ control has certain supervisory function to solve the enterprise investment shortage problem; fourth, after considering the nature of corporate equity, compared with state owned enterprises, the effect of the executive equities’ incentive of non-state owned enterprises is more useful, large shareholders control to supervise the management’s role is less obvious;after considering the market oriented process, there is not much difference of the effect of the executive equities’ incentive in high market oriented process and in low market oriented process,the effect of large shareholders control is more obvioue in high market oriented process.更多还原