【作者】 周琳；

【导师】 何绍慰；

【作者基本信息】 河南大学 ， 金融硕士（专业学位）， 2016， 硕士

【摘要】 民营银行的创立和成长,能够解决中小企业融资难等一系列问题,是中国金融制度改革的重要一环。随着国家政策的支持和鼓励,不少上市公司正在积极筹划民营银行的建立。2014年3月,第一批五家民营银行试点经过中国银行业监督管理委员会的多次研究和论证,终于进入到实施阶段。五家试点选在了位于东部经济活跃的五家企业,并采取了风险自担、股东资质、股东监管、差异化经营和风险处置的五大差异化条件。2014年12月12日深圳前海微众银行的获准开业,开启了我国民营银行的新时代。1993年,我国首次提出建立存款保险基金,引发了对存款保险制度的探讨,经过22年的摸索,我国已经具备了相对完善的理论基础和优化的制度环境。2015年5月1日,我国的《存款保险条例》颁布并实施。当民营银行的新试点遇上存款保险的新制度,此时梳理民营银行在存款保险制度下的利与弊,探讨民营银行面临的道德风险,并加强防范和提出政策建议,对我国民营银行的健康发展和金融环境的稳定都有十分重要的意义。存款保险制度在给民营银行创造了较为公平竞争环境,但一定程度上增加了其道德风险的行为,主要体现在以下几个方面:第一、市场准入的道德风险。国家扶持政策的出台和存款保险制度的实施,激发了民营企业设立民营银行的欲望,监管当局由于信息不对称情况的存在,很难识别民营企业创办银行的真实目的,所以难免会在审核的环节出现偏差,使得一些质量较差的金融机构进入市场,增加了金融系统的不稳定因素。第二、民营银行经理人的道德风险。由于存款保险制度的实施,为储户的财产安全提供了一定的保障,这种安全性的增强有可能会导致民营银行盲目的追求高利润,从事一些高风险的活动。第三、民营银行股东的道德风险。民营企业设立,在一定程度上解决了自身及其附属企业的融资问题,但极易产生股东盲目甚至过度贷款的问题,进而影响民营银行健康有序的发展。民营银行的道德风险可能会违背存款保险制度设立的初衷,给民营银行的发展带来不利的因素,甚至可能影响到整个金融系统的稳定。因此,控制好民营银行的道德风险,保证存款保险制度的顺利实施,将存款保险制度的有效性发挥到最优都十分有必要。本文主要分为五个部分对民营银行道德风险的问题进行阐述和讨论:第一部分,提出问题和说明本文研究的意义,并在总结国内外文献综述的基础上提出本文的创新之处和不足;第二部分,分析了我国民营银行的特征,介绍了民营银行的发展现状,介绍了民营银行的发展趋势;第三部分,着重分析了存款保险制度的实施对民营银行发展的双重影响,随之介绍了民营银行道德风险的形成机制,说明了民营银行自身道德风险的特殊性;第四部分,介绍了国外完善存款保险制度的历程和防范民营银行道德风险的经验;第五部分,结合我国经济发展的具体情况,提出民营银行道德风险防范的策略思考。虽然中国的存款保险制度具体政策已经颁布和实施,但要结合本国经济发展“新常态”的经济形势,不仅完善存款保险制度本身,还需要完善风控体系和信息披露制度,加强与其相配套的外部环境制度的改善建立有效的市场退出机制。通过制度的完善和改变,我们就能将民营银行的道德风险降到最低,使其在一个公平的竞争环境下不断的发展壮大。更多还原

【Abstract】 The creation and growth of private banks can solve a series of problems, such as the financing difficulty of small and medium enterprises, which is an important part of the reform of China’s financial system. With the support and encouragement of the national policy, many listing corporation are actively planning the establishment of private banks. March 2014, the first batch of five private banks pilot through the number of research and demonstration by the China Banking Regulatory Commission, and finally entered the implementation phase. The five companies pilot located in the eastern part of the economic activity area, and took the risk of self Tam, shareholder qualification, shareholder supervision, differentiated management and risk management of the five different conditions. December 12, 2014 Qianhai Shenzhen micro public banks allowed to open, that means opened a new era of private banks in China. In 1993, China first proposed the establishment of deposit insurance funds, triggered a discussion on the deposit insurance system, after 22 years of exploration, China has a relatively complete theoretical basis and optimization of the system environment. In May 1, 2015, China’s deposit insurance regulations promulgated and implemented. When new private banks pilot met the deposit insurance system, discuss the advantages and disadvantages of private banks in the deposit insurance system, to explore the private banks face the risk of moral hazard and strengthen prevention and put forward policy recommendations, stability of the private bank in our country and for the healthy development of the financial environment has very important significance.Deposit insurance system to create a more fair competitive environment for private banks, but to a certain extent, an increase of its moral hazard behavior, mainly reflected in the following aspects: First, the moral hazard of market access. The introduction of national support policies and the implementation of the deposit insurance system, stimulate the private enterprises to set up private banks, regulatory authorities due to the existence of information asymmetry, difficult to identify private enterprises establish a bank’s real purpose, it’s hard to avoid deviation in the audit of the link, making some of the poor quality of the financial institutions to enter the market, increase the instability in the financial system. Second, private bank manager’s moral hazard. As a result of the implementation of the deposit insurance system, for depositors and property security provides security and the security enhancement may lead to private banks blind pursuit of high profits, to engage in high risk activities. Third, the moral risk of the private bank shareholders. In a certain extent, private enterprises to set up, solves the financing problem of itself and its affiliated enterprises, but easily generate shareholder blind or excessive loan problems, which affect the private banks, the healthy and orderly development.Private banking moral hazard may against the establishment of a deposit insurance system in mind, to the development of private banks bring unfavorable factors, may even affect the stability of the financial system as a whole. Therefore, moral risk control of private banks and to ensure the smooth implementation of the deposit insurance system, deposit insurance system of the effectiveness of the optimal are very necessary. This paper is divided into five parts of the moral hazard problem of private banks were presented and discussed : the first part, ask questions, and to illustrate the significance of this paper, and summarizes the basis of domestic and foreign literature review put forward the innovation of this paper and shortcomings; The second part, this paper analyzes the characteristics of private banks in China, introduces the development of private banks and the development trend of private banks in China; The third part, this paper focuses on the dual influence of the deposit insurance system on the development of private banks in China, and then introduces the formation mechanism of the moral hazard of private banks; In the fourth part, introduced the United States, Germany, Japan and other developed countries to improve the experience of the deposit insurance system process and prevent moral hazard; the fifth part, combined with the specific circumstances of the economic development of our country, put forward strategies of private banking moral hazard prevention. Although the deposit insurance system of our country specific policy has been promulgated and implemented, but with the economic situation in the economic development of our country "new normal", not only improve the deposit insurance system itself, also need to improve risk control system and information disclosure system, strengthen its matching the external institutional environment improvement to establish effective market exit mechanism. Through the system to improve and change, we can will the moral hazard of private banks down to minimum to make it constantly in a fair competition environment for the development of grow.更多还原