【作者】 李毅；

【导师】 董奕；

【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 ， 企业管理， 2016， 硕士

【摘要】 信息不对称理论和委托代理理论一直是管理学领域的理论支柱,是企业中委托代理问题的理论基石。国内外学者从管理者薪酬体系角度给予解决矛盾的视角,股权激励从上世纪90年代开始在国外研究领域掀起一阵研究浪潮。虽然我国资本市场远不如美国这样的发达国家,但随着近年来资本市场的发展和监管体系的不断完善,股权激励作为重要的公司治理措施受到理论界和实务界的大力关注,许多研究将其作为高管薪酬体系的一部分,对其与企业价值之间的关系进行研究,而较少从融资成本和投资获益的视角研究,本文尝试从后者视角出发,进行探索式定性研究。本研究主要从激励视角出发,立足信息不对称和委托代理理论,观察上市公司高管持股与股票收益率之间的关系,以及大股东股权集中度、最终控制权性质对二者关系的调节作用。将上市公司的公司治理措施置于动态的资本市场中来理解,以更好的帮助上市公司了解这两者之间的关系,从而能够更加准确地估计融资成本,这也有助于上市公司利用这种关系研究进行保值升值的投资活动,在理论和实践中都有重要的意义。通过对国内外研究进行文献回顾梳理相关信息,本文在信息不对称理论和委托代理理论的分析基础上,提出了研究假设,选取2003年至2015年中国A股上市公司作为研究对象,采用Fama和French(1992;1993)的数据处理方法,建立研究模型,对上市公司高管持股与股票收益率之间的关系展开实证研究,并通过描述性统计分析、相关性分析、多元回归分析、稳健性检验等多方位展示研究中的实证论证过程,以求得到更为真实可靠的研究结果。实证结果表明,上市公司高管持股对股票收益率存在较为显著的正向影响,但并不是持股比例越高这种影响就越显著,此外,上市公司中大股东的股权集中度对两者之间的关系存在显著的负向调节作用,大股东持股比例越高,上市公司高管持股比例与股票收益率之间的关系就越弱,反之则越强;与国有企业相比,高管持股与股票收益率之间的正向关系在非国有上市公司中较为显著。并且,在正文结尾处,针对本文实证研究结果,对研究结论、政策性建议以及研究不足与展望进行了总结。更多还原

【Abstract】 Asymmetric information theory and principal-agent theory have been the pillar in the field of management theory, and they are the cornerstone of principal-agent problems in enterprises. Scholars at home and abroad prefer to solving the contradiction from the perspective of executive compensation system. And since the 1990 s, equity incentive tide a study lifts in the field of study abroad. Although capital market in China is much less than the developed countries, such as the U.S., but with the development of capital markets in recent years and the continuous improvement of the regulatory system, equity incentive is of great teoretical and practical circles attention as an important measure of corporate governance. And a lot of researchers regard it as a part of the executive compensation system, studying the relationship between equity incentive and enterprise value, and less studying the equity incentive from the perspective of the cost of financing and investment benefit. This paper tries to explore qualitative research from the latter perspective.This article mainly embarks from the incentive view, based on asymmetric information and principal-agent theory, studying the relationship between a listed company’s executives’ shareholding and the stock returns, and studying the large shareholders’ equity concentration and ultimate control properties how to affect the relationship above. Putting the corporate governance measures of listed companies in dynamic capital markets to understand, it is helpful to better know the relationship above, so that listed companies can more accurately estimate the cost of financing, and they can use the research on the relationship to make value appreciation through investment activities. It has important meanings in theory and in practice.Through to reading the domestic and foreign literature reviews, based on the analysis of the asymmetry information theory and the principal-agent theory, this author puts forward the research hypothesis, selects datas from 2003 to 2015 of China’s A-share listed companies, using the data processing method of both Fama and French(1992; 1993), and sets up the research model to do empirical study on the relationship between the listed company’s executives shareholding and the stock returns, then displays the empirical argumentation through the descriptive statistics analysis, correlation analysis, multiple regression analysis and so on, in order to get more reliable results.And the empirical results show that, the listed company’s executives sharesholding indeed has a significant positive impact to the stock returns, but not its stake the higher, the impact is more significant. In addition, the large shareholders ownership of listed companies has the significant negative role to the relationship above, that is, the higher the major shareholders holdings, the relationship between the executive shareholdings and stock returns is weaker, the stronger conversely. Compared with the state-owned enterprises, the positive relationship between executives’ shareholding and stock returns in non-state-owned listed companies is more significant.Finally, in the text at the end, based on the empirical results, the research conclusions and policy suggestions, weakness of this research and prospect are summarized.更多还原