上市公司CEO非常规更换影响因素及财富效应研究

【作者】 陈雪；

【导师】 李小军；

【作者基本信息】 云南财经大学 ， 企业管理， 2015， 硕士

【摘要】 随着我国证券市场的不断发展和壮大,近些年来,中国上市公司涌现了一大批CEO更换事件,其频繁发生引发了社会各界的高度关注。一个有效的公司治理机制应该能及时淘汰经营不力的CEO,而代之以更具有管理才能的经理人。我国的上市公司治理机制不够健全,委托代理问题严重,在运行过程中往往效率低下,呈现出强管理层、弱监管层的现象。导致管理层权力急剧膨胀,以至于CEO偏离股东利益的行为比比皆是。CEO更换既是对公司以往低劣业绩的矫正,也是对高管人员最为严厉的惩罚。本文选取2007-2014年间,发生CEO更换事件的沪深A股上市公司作为研究样本。根据证监会披露的CEO更换的原因,将其变更类型大致分为两类,一类为常规性更换,一类为非常规性更换。并以发生CEO非常规性更换的公司为主要研究样本,发生CEO常规性更换的公司为参照样本。本文首先实证研究了影响上市公司高管非常规更换的影响因素,然后采用事件研究法、独立样本T检验等方法,来检验上市公司CEO非常规更换是否会给市场带来显著的异常收益。然后利用多元线性回归方法,分别研究继任者来源、股权性质,对累计异常收益的影响。通过研究,本文得到以下结论:(1)CEO非常规更换与公司业绩显著负相关,公司业绩越差,越容易导致CEO非常规性更换,低劣的经营业绩是导致CEO非常规性更换的主要原因。(2)高管非常规更换与股权性质显著正相关,民营上市公司比国有上市公司更容易发生CEO非常规更换;高管非常规更换与第一大持股比例显著负相关,第一大股东持股比例越高,越不容易发生CEO非常规更换;高管非常规更换与高管持股比例显著负相关,高管持股比例越高,越不容易发生非常规性更换。(3)从总体上看,市场视CEO非常规更换为好消息,表现为正向异常收益,显著的提升了股东财富。(4)继任者来源、股权性质与市场反应显著正相关。相对于继任者来自公司内部,当继任者来自于公司外部时,市场反应更为良好;相对于国有企业,发生CEO非常规更换的公司为民营企业时,市场反应更为积极;特别是当发生CEO非常规更换的公司为民营企业且继任者来自于公司外部时,股东财富显著增加。本文的研究结果,为加强对CEO的激励约束等方面提供了理论依据和经验证据,为完善我国的公司治理机制提供了政策建议。针对我国上市公司治理机制方面存在的不足,本文认为可以从深化股权改革、进一步改善上市公司CEO的聘任机制、完善经理人市场等方面予以改进,同时还要尽快完善我国证券市场信息披露机制,保证中小股东的信息知情权,维护广大股东的利益。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the continuous development of China’s securities market and expanded, in recent years, Chinese listing Corporation emerged a large number of CEO replacement event, its frequent occurrence caused the high attention of social circles. An effective corporate governance mechanism should be able to eliminate poor management of CEO promptly, and the new managers who have more management instead of older. Our national listing Corporation governance mechanism is not perfect, there are many serious agency problems, the process of operation are inefficient, showing a strong management, weak supervision phenomenon. Leading the management power expanded rapidly, so that CEO’s behavior usually deviates from the interests of shareholders.For a long time, the replacement of CEO has been one of the most important decisions made by the board. Dismissed CEO is correct about the company’s past poor performance, the most severe punishment for senior management staff. In China, research on CEO replacement mainly concentrated in two aspects, one is the research on the reason of changing CEO, means which factor will influence the CEO replacement, second one is research the economic consequences after the CEO replacement, means whether it improves the performance of the company and enhance shareholder wealth effect. At present, there are many research results about CEO replacement be able to bring business performance improvement. However, about whether to promote shareholder wealth which means whether produced significant wealth effect research is rarely involved. This paper made a deeply research on this issue, in order to get valuable conclusions.This paper selects from 2007 to 2014, CEO replacement events occurred in Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares of listing Corporation will being the research sample. According to the reasons of CEO replacement from the CSRC disclosure, the type of replacement is broadly divided into two categories, one is conventional replacement, and another one is the unconventional replacement. And with the occurrence of CEO unconventional replacement in China will being the main research sample, the occurrence of CEO regular replacement of the company as reference sample. This paper first research the factors are affecting the effect of listing Corporation executives of unconventional replacement, then by using the method of research event, independent samples T test method to test the listing Corporation CEO nonconventional replacement market will bring significant abnormal profit. Then using multiple linear regression method, respectively, research source of successor, the ownership property, the influence on the cumulative abnormal profit.Through the research, this paper got the following conclusions:(1) CEO unconventional replacement and the performance of the company significantly negative correlation, the worse the performance of the company, more easy to cause the CEO unconventional replacement, poor business performance is the main reasons which cause CEO unconventional replacement.(2) The regular replacement and ownership property, ownership concentration is positively related. Private listing Corporation are more likely to occur CEO unconventional replacement than state-owned listing Corporation; the proportion of the first shareholder is higher, less occur to CEO unconventional replacement; the proportion of senior management shareholding is higher, less occur to unconventional replacement.(3) Based on the whole, the market see the CEO unconventional replacement is the good news, showed positive abnormal profit, significant enhancement of shareholder wealth. Significant positive correlation(4) source of successor, ownership property and market reaction are interrelated. Relative to the internal successors from the company, when a successor from outside the company, the market reaction is better; compared with the state-owned enterprises, unconventional replacement occurred in CEO company for the private enterprise, market reaction is more positive; especially when company CEO unconventional replacement for private enterprise and successor from outside the company, shareholders wealth increased significantly.The results of this research, and provide a theoretical basis and empirical evidence for strengthening the incentive and constraint of the CEO, and provides policy suggestions for completing our national corporate governance mechanism. The existing problems of Chinese listing Corporation governance mechanism, can deepen shareholding reform, further improve the listing Corporation CEO’s appointment and dismissal mechanism, the continuous development of our nation to improve the manager market etc. At the same time, as soon as possible to perfect the mechanism of information disclosure in Chinese securities market, ensure the small and medium shareholders information have right to know, so as to maintain the interests of our shareholders.更多还原