【作者】 李晨；

【导师】 干杏娣；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 金融学， 2014， 硕士

【摘要】 2005年起中国证监会发布了《上市公司股权激励管理办法(试行)》等一系列关于规范股权激励的文件。随着相关法律法规的日益完善以及中国证券市场环境的逐步成熟,中国A股市场上市公司针对管理层的股权激励已迈入迅速发展期。自2006年至2011年底,沪深两市已有约315家上市公司披露过股权激励方案。研究我国上市公司管理层股权激励有效性对我国资本市场有着重要意义。中国建立证券市场之初时的上市公司绝大多数是国有企业通过发行股票转变而来,但随着市场经济的深化发展和政府监管机构的职能转变,规模不断扩大的私营公司也可以通过上市来募集资金,发展壮大。中小板、创业板的设立也极大地丰富了我国的资本市场结构。此外,新兴行业的崛起对传统企业也产生了不小冲击。因此,对我国股权激励的研究必不可少地要对不同上市公司进行比较分析。目前,我国A股上市公司采取的股权激励类型主要包括股票期权、限制性股票和股票增值权三种,其中以股票期权激励方式占多数。本文将把所研究的上市公司分为“国有控股与非国有控股”、“传统产业与新兴产业”、“主板、中小板与创业板”三部分,并仅就股票期权这一种股权激励方式对其有效性分别进行比较研究。本文采集样本上市公司公开披露的公告及其他相关统计信息,以EVA回报率和净资产收益率(ROE)一同作为衡量公司价值的指标,把“EVA回报率差值”和“加权扣除ROE差值”作为衡量激励有效性的被解释变量,把“预期收益强度”和“激励比例”作为解释变量,通过建立适当的计量模型进行实证检验,以验证管理层股票期权激励在我国不同上市公司中的有效性。本文实证研究结果表明,股权激励对国有控股与非国有控股上市公司的价值提升作用均不显著。股票期权激励比例对创业板上市公司的成长能力(公司总体价值的增长效率)具有显著正相关。预期收益强度对新兴行业上市公司的成长能力(公司总体价值的增长效率)和盈利能力(公司对股东权益的利用效率)均具有显著正相关。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since 2005, CSRC Released a series of documents which regulate the equity incentives such as Administrative Measures For Equity Incentives of Listed Companies (Trial). With the perfection of related laws and regulations and Chinese Stock market, the equity incentive for the management of China’s A-share market has stepped into a fast growing era. From 2006 to the end of 2011, about 315 listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen have revealed their plans of equity incentive. Thus, it is significant to research on the effectiveness of the management of equity incentive in China’s capital market.At the initial stage of building China’s stock market, the majority of the state-owned companies became listed companies by distributing stocks. However, with the development of market economy and the transformation of functions of government supervision organizations, those expanding private companies can raise funds by being listed on the market and develop very quickly. The establishment of small and medium-size enterprise market and growth market has highly enriched the structure of China’s capital market. In addition, new industries have strongly impacted the traditional ones. Therefore, it is necessary to compare and analyze the differences between all the listed companies when doing this research.Current main types of the equity incentive of China’s A-share market vary from stock option, restricted stock to stock appreciation rights, among which equity incentive is the most popular one. This essay categorizes the listed companies into 3 groups, state-owned holding listed companies and non-state-owned holding listed companies, traditional and new industry, and main market, small, medium-size and growth enterprise market and focuses on the comparative study on the effectiveness of stock option.Samples including announcement of the listed companies and other related information as well as EVA and ROE are used as standards to measure the value of companies. "the difference between the EVA return of sample firms and industry average"and"the difference between the ROE return of sample firms and industry average"are used as explained variables to evaluate the effectiveness of incentive, while "the expected return intensity" and"the proportion of equity incentive"are chosen as explanatory variable. We try to build up an appropriate econometric model to verify the effectiveness of the management stock option incentive in China’s different types of listed companies.The conclusion of this research shows that equity incentive is neither effective to add value to state-owned holding listed companies nor to non-state-owned holding listed companies. For listed companies in growth enterprise market, equity incentive is apparently proportional to the companies’ growth rate (the growth rate of company’s total value). For listed companies from new industry, the expected return intensity is obviously proportional both to the development (the growth rate of company’s total value) and profitability (the utilization efficiency of shareholders).更多还原