【作者】 陈莉；

【导师】 黄平；

【作者基本信息】 安徽大学 ， 企业管理， 2015， 硕士

【摘要】 2007年,美国爆发次贷危机波及各行各业,愈演愈烈,直至引发全球金融危机,此次危机中显露出许多让人们深思的问题。例如公司治理不完善、经营风险较大、监管不到位、风险控制失误和激励约束机制失衡等问题。在这次危机中,华尔街金融公司大多面临巨额亏损甚至破产的困境,但是频繁曝出金融大佬拿着巨额薪酬丑闻。从美国华尔街金融机构美林证券的巨额分红和雷曼兄弟的金色降落伞现象,到中国平安保险董事长马明哲年薪超过6000万及次年“零薪酬”等事件,金融行业“天价薪酬”现象同时引起社会公众和学者们的关注。美联储对金融行业高管薪酬进行监督,如果发现薪酬制定导致企业过度追求高风险业务,美联储有权干预。在中国金融行业一直存在巨大的薪酬“鸿沟”和“高管干一天,员工干三个月”等现象,在近几年两会工作报告中“收入差距和收入分配均衡”一直是讨论的热点。本文基于国内外“限薪令”背景下,从新兴的管理权力理论出发,对选取的2006-2013年沪深两股38家金融上市公司相关数据进行回归分析,研究我国金融业上市公司的高管权力与高管薪酬之间的关系,并检验在职消费是高管货币薪酬替代品还是互补品。最后,在对检验限薪令的经济效果基础上,针对性提出一些的指导意见。本文主要内容有以下几个部分：第一部分为绪论。首先提出了本文研究的意义与目的,通过梳理国内外研究现状搭建研究逻辑构架,概括并提炼出全文研究内容和研究方法,最后指出本文研究创新与不足。第二部分为相关概念和相关理论基础。较为系统、全面地阐述了本文所涉及到的相关概念和重要理论,为后续研究提供了理论基础。第三部分为我国金融上市公司高管薪酬现状进行分析。首先利用Excel表格,制作各种图表、表格；其次通过对表和图进行比较,进一步研究国内外薪酬结构；最后,根据研究发现的国内薪酬结构不合理之处提出解释说明。第四部分为实证检验。本文选取2006-2013年沪深两市金融上市公司为研究样本,通过选定样本数据和衡量指标,构建多元线性回归模型。运用SPSS和Eviews软件对高管权力对高管薪酬的影响进行实证检验,并对检验结果进行归纳总结。第五部分为结论。在本文理论梳理和实证研究结果基础上,概括总结出本文的研究结论,结合实际问题提出一定合理性的建议,并对未来研究提出展望。本文研究得出如下结论：(1)管理层利用权力不仅对高管显性的货币薪酬、隐形的在职消费产生影响,还对高管与普通员工间的薪酬差距产生重大的影响。(2)显性的货币薪酬和隐形的在职消费之间存在替代关系。在严格的薪酬管制条件下,显性货币薪酬受到严格的管制,隐形的薪酬成为高管替代补偿的方式。(3)管理层利用权力对业绩进行干涉,导致高管货币薪酬与业绩变化具有非对称性关系。即业绩上升时薪酬的增加幅度高于业绩下降时薪酬的减少幅度。(4)限薪令实施对高管追求货币薪酬和在职消费,增强薪酬与经营绩效敏感度。更多还原

【Abstract】 In 2007, the outbreak of the subprime crisis spread to all walks of life, intensified, and the global financial crisis, the crisis revealed many problems make people ponder. Such as imperfect corporate governance, business risk, regulation is not in place. In this crisis, Wall Street financial firms are facing huge losses or even bankruptcy, but frequently to expose financial bosses take a huge pay scandal. Wall Street financial institutions from the United States of bonuses to merrill lynch and lehman brothers’ golden parachute phenomenon, to China’s ping an insurance, chairman of Mr Ma salary of more than 60 million and the following year events such as "zero compensation", the financial industry "sky-high compensation" phenomenon at the same time the attention of social public and the scholars. The federal reserve to supervise financial industry executive pay, if it is found that compensation lead to excessive pursuit of risky business, the fed has the right to interfere. There is a huge compensation in China’s financial industry has been "great gap", "executive dry day, employees do three months" wait for a phenomenon, in recent years both work report "the disparity of income distribution and balance" has always been the hot spot of the discussion.In this paper, based on the background of "salary limit at home and abroad, from the management of the emerging power theory, the selection of Shanghai and Shenzhen two strands of 38 in 2006-2013 financial data regression analysis of listed companies, listed companies of China’s financial industry by the research of the relationship between the executive power and executive pay and inspection on-the-job consumption is executive pay money substitutes or complements. Finally, in the inspection of pay, based on the economic effect of specific guidance. In this paper, the main contents are the following several parts:The first part is the introduction. First the purpose and the significance of this study, by analyzing the research status at home and abroad, provides the logical architecture, summarize and extract the full text research contents and research methods, finally pointed out in this paper, research and innovation and deficiency.The second part is the related concepts and basic theory. Relating to a systematic comprehensive expounded in this paper, the related concepts and important theory, provides a theoretical basis for the subsequent research.The third part is the analysis about the present situation of financial executive compensation of listed companies in our country. First use of excel spreadsheet, making all kinds of charts, tables, secondly through comparative study on the table and figure pay structures at home and abroad, in the end, according to research found that domestic compensation structure is not reasonable of explanation is put forward.The fourth part is the empirical test. This article selects 2006-2013, the Shanghai and Shenzhen two city financial listed companies as research samples, through the selected sample data and measure, build multivariate linear regression model. Using the SPSS and EVIEWS software on executive power to empirically test the influence of executive compensation, and the test results are summarized.The fifth part conclusion. In this paper, based on the theoretical and empirical research results summarized in this paper, the research conclusion, and put forward some reasonable Suggestions combined with the actual problem, and proposes the outlook for the future research.In this paper, we study the following conclusions:(1) using the management power is not only for executive dominant influence monetary compensation, stealth on-the-job consumption, also the pay gap between executives and ordinary workers have a significant impact. (2) the dominant currency substitution relationship between compensation and invisible on-the-job consumption are. Under the condition of strict compensation control, dominant monetary compensation is strictly regulated, invisible remuneration as executives instead of compensation. (3) management performance to make use of power interference, monetary compensation and performance of executives that resulted from that change with asymmetrical relationship. The performance rises above the performance pay is reduced to reduce compensation. (4) pay for implementation of executives seeking monetary compensation and on-the-job consumption, as well as to narrow the gap in pay, etc, have certain inhibitory effect.更多还原