团体贷款与中小企业融资

【作者】 杨宇；

【导师】 袁志刚；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 西方经济学， 2013， 硕士

【摘要】 中小企业在国民经济中的作用无须赘述,然而受制于银企信息非对称、企业规模较小、财务制度不健全和经营风险较大等因素,其融资问题长期以来是一个世界难题。对此,学术界提出了大力发展中小金融机构、拓展关系型信贷、推动直接融资等诸多举措；中小企业融资境况稍有改观,但仍难以令人满意。团体贷款自20世纪70年代由Yunus教授创立以来,因其骄人的还款率和扶贫表现受到世界瞩目。在我国,团体贷款首先以农户联保的形式引入到农村市场,随后中小企业联保贷款和网络联保贷款等纷纷出现。然而这些团体贷款的变种虽有所成果,却仍远未达到当初预期的效果。中小企业融资难可以简要抽象为由信息非对称及金融抑制导致的双重信贷配给问题。本文首先从经典的S-W信贷配给模型出发,结合我国当前的金融体系,探讨中小企业融资难的成因及学术界给出的一些解决方案。接下来介绍团体贷款相对于传统抵押贷款的优势,即由于其自身的连带责任、自我选择和横向监督等诸多机制,有助于缓解传统信贷中的逆向选择与道德风险,降低银行审查与执行成本,同时以社会资本代替了传统抵押物。并通过信息优势诱导正向分类配对以及连带责任的担保效果显示团体贷款对信贷市场效率的提升。长期以来,对团体贷款的研究集中在具体贷款机制及还款激励等方面,而疏于从贷款者角度出发。但与通常所假定的贷款者非盈利不同,企业联保贷款脱离了原本的扶贫范畴而具有逐利性,市场结构的变化也将极大影响贷款者行为模式与信贷市场上的一般均衡。本文从de Quidt的一般均衡模型出发,加入信贷市场完全程度这一因素,对不同市场结构下的信贷市场一般均衡进行了探讨,并显示垄断势力的存在将缩小贷款者提供团体贷款的可能性空间,同时产出分布的限制可能使得垄断贷款者只愿意提供个人贷款。2012年,浙江等地出现了严重的联保互保危机,一时市场上谈保色变,联保贷款模式饱受质疑。本文通过分析认为团体贷款模式被运用到中小企业信贷市场之后发生了严重的异质化,而正是这种异质化与企业和银行风险意识淡薄等因素导致了此次危机如此肆虐；并对企业联保贷款的健康运作给出了建议。最后对全文进行了总结,指出了本文的创新之处,并对本领域进一步研究的方向进行了展望。更多还原

【Abstract】 There is no need to emphasize the role of SMEs in economic development, however, due to asymmetric information, small scale, unsound financial system and high operating risk, financing for SMEs had always been a world-wide problem.Lots of solutions have been provided to alleviate this problem, such as develop small&medium financial institutions, promote relationship lending and direct financing, the situation has been improved, but still not satisfactory. Since group lending was created by professor Yunus in the1970s, it had attracted worldwide attention for its great performance in repayment rate and poverty alleviation. In China, group lending was first introduced into the rural area, ever since, SMEs joint guarantee credit and network joint guarantee credit had emerged. Although these transformations of group lending had achieved quite a lot, they were still far below people’s expectations.SMEs financing difficulty could be viewed as a dual credit rationing caused by financial repression and asymmetric information. This paper starts from the classical S-W credit rationing model, then combine it with China’s current financial systems, trying to analyze the reasons behind the financing difficulty and discuss some of the solutions provided so far. Then we introduce group lending’s advantages compared to traditional collateral based lending, that is, thanks to mechanisms like joint liability, self-selection and peer monitoring, etc, group lending could efficiently alleviate adverse selection as well as moral hazard problems which occurred in traditional lending techniques, reduce bank’s review&execution costs, and replace traditional collateral with social capital. We show that group lending can improve credit market efficiency through positive assortative matching and collateral effect of joint liability.Researches on group lending had long been focused on specific mechanisms or repayment incentives, and fail to consider from the lender’s perspective. While joint guarantee credit for SMEs has shifted away from poverty alleviation, changes in market structure will also alter lender’s behavior and the general market equilibrium. We start from de Quidt’s basic general equilibrium model and add credit market completeness to it, we show that the existence of monopoly power will decrease lender’s possibility of providing group lending, and output constraint might completely erase group lending from general equilibrium under a monopoly lender.In2012severe joint guarantee crisis occurred in Zhejiang province, and the group lending model was seriously questioned by the market. After thorough consideration we believe that while group lending was transplanted into the SMEs credit market,its mechanisms became heterogenized, and this heterogenization as well as both enterprises and banks’ lack of risk awareness contribute to the raging of this crisis. We then provide several suggestions for the well-being of SMEs joint guarantee credit.In the end we conclude the whole article, bring forward the innovations and offer some suggestions for further research of this area.更多还原