【作者】 陈娟娟；

【导师】 汪炜；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 金融学， 2012， 硕士

【摘要】 自从La Porta, Andrei Shleifer等人(1998)在研究捷克企业控股股东侵占小股东利益时提出隧道行为以来,很多学者从不同的角度对这一命题进行了研究。近年的分析指出控股股东的隧道行为具有方向性,即控股股东的隧道挖掘行为和隧道输入行为,分别对应控股股东侵占和向上市公司输入利益。对于我国的具体情况,国内学者的研究表明我国的资本市场呈现出上市公司股权集中度较高以及对中小投资者利益保护的法制建设相对落后等特征。这种现状导致了我国上市公司控股股东侵占上市公司利益的行为屡见不鲜。在具体的侵占方式选择上,由于关联交易具有隐蔽性好操作性强等特点成为众多上市公司控股股东的首选。我们称这种行为是关联交易型隧道行为,这也是本文的研究重点。本文的研究首先寻找控股股东实施隧道挖掘行为和隧道输入行为的股权比例分界点,在此基础上引入其他大股东持股比例以及控股股东两权分离度和产权属性进行多因素的回归分析。其次,本文采用2008年-2010年上市公司的数据,数据来源国泰安CSMar数据库。通过回归后发现,控股股东的股权比例在50%左右时,其实施隧道行为的概率较大；国有性质的控股股东实施隧道挖掘行为的概率要高于非国有性质的控股股东；其他大股东在监测和预防控股股东实施隧道行为方面并没有发挥出相应的作用。最后本文对如何防范和治理控股股东的隧道行为进行了探讨。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since La Porta. Andrei. Shleifer. et al(1998) proposed the concept of Tunneling when they analyzed the act that controlling shareholders occupied the interest of minority shareholders, many scholars studied the phenomenon from different angles. In recent years, analysts pointed out that the tunneling behavior of the controlling shareholder has a direction, the input and output tunneling behavior, corresponding to the controlling shareholders encroach and input the interests of listed companies.For our specific situation, China’s domestic scholars pointed out that China’s capital market is showing two characteristics. one is listed companies ownership concentration. The other is the backward of legal construction of the protection of the interests of minority investors. This situation led the act that the controlling shareholders occupy the interests of minority shareholders has became common behavior. In the specific way of occupation, considering the Related-Transaction is easy to hide and operable, many controlling shareholders choose to use it. We called the behavior as Related-Transaction Tunneling which is the research focus of this article.In this article, we first analyzed demarcation point of the controlling shareholders’ tunneling behavior. Then we added the property attributes, C/V and the proportion of other large shareholders. Then we used the data from CSMar database to run the regression analysis. The result of the regression showed that when the proportion of controlling shareholders reached about50%, the probability of Tunneling behavior is the largest. Secondly, we found that state-owned controlling shareholders acted more Tunneling behavior than non-state-owned. Thirdly, the result showed that other large shareholders didn’t play the relevant role in the detection and prevention of the controlling shareholder. At last, the paper discussed how to prevent and control the controlling shareholder Tunneling behavior.更多还原