【作者】 刘莉；

【导师】 谢贞发；

【作者基本信息】 厦门大学 ， 财政学， 2014， 硕士

【摘要】 自我国改革开放以来,财政的纵向分权导致了地方政府的横向竞争,其模式从财政包干制的辖区割据的地方保护主义模式转化为争夺税基的“竞”模式。为了进一步探讨财政分权纵向演化引发的地方政府横向竞争变化的机制,我们借助企业所得税这一资本大税种,观测1994年分税制后企业所得税税制集权调整,对地方政府利用企业所得税进行税收竞争行为的变化。本文采用1998-2012年的省级面板数据,利用空间权重和系统GMM动态计量方法,对地方政府间企业所得税税负反应函数的变化进行识别。我们发现,我国省级政府利用企业所得税进行的税收竞争程度,在分税制后的4次企业所得税集权改革时点上均有下降。2002年源于企业所得税收入分成和征管权的向上集中,2006年源于“新办企业”的新定义对企业所得税税收优惠的限制。2008年两税合并造成的整体企业所得税理论上税负的下降,以及对税收优惠和征管的统一规范,对地方政府的税收竞争行为影响程度最高。直到2009年企业所得税的征收权略微下放,地方政府间的税收竞争程度停止下降。本文也对东、中、西部进行了同样的检验,发现东、中、西部省份都存在着明显的税收竞争行为。对于东部省份,在2006、2008、2009年的企业所得税税负反应函数并未受到企业所得税税制调整的影响。中部省份的企业所得税税收竞争行为则在历次企业所得税改革中受到最大的冲击。而西部省份的税负反应函数则反应最弱。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since the reform and opening of China over the past decades, transition of decentralization induces local governments to favor economic growth and the strategic competition. This competition appeared regional protectionism under tax-contracted system, but evolved capture for tax base after the tax sharing reform. The objective of this paper is to discuss the mechanism between the local governments’strategic interaction and the evolution of decentralization. We use enterprises income tax which is close to capital competition, to test the change of the behavior of local governments on tax competition, due to the enterprise income tax reform over last decade.In this paper, we provide a spatial-econometric analysis of the change of local enterprises tax rate by using the cross-province panel data for1998to2012from China. We have found a strong evidence of tax competition appearing tax mimicking among local government. Higher enterprise income tax rates in other provinces lead to higher tax rates in its own community. The size of this effect diminished significantly at the first four tax reform, which points outs the tax competition among local governments has weakened. Due to centralization reform both in tax income and collection in2002, and the definition of new enterprise in2006, the usage of tax preference as a strategic tool was limited. The impact of tax reform is much more pronounced in2008. In contrast, the tax competition stopped to weaken since a reverse tax reform of decentralization in2009.We also investigate the incidence of the enterprise income tax reform in east, middle, western part of China. The evidence shows that only the tax reform in2002and2003influence the degree of tax competition in the east part. Whereas, the tax reform affects the degree strongly in middle part at each tax reform. In west part, none of the tax reform shows significant influence on tax competition among local governments.更多还原