【作者】 王海燕；

【导师】 刘媛媛；

【作者基本信息】 东北财经大学 ， 财务管理， 2013， 硕士

【摘要】 随着国有企业市场化进程的逐渐完善和内部管理效率的提升,近年来,我国国有企业改革取得了显著成效。国有企业在我国经济领域中占有重要地位,维持国有企业稳定和提升国有企业的增长效率对于经济的稳定和国家的繁荣具有不可替代的作用,国有企业的健康发展一直是社会各界关注的焦点之一。当前,我国国有企业在取得稳定发展的同时也面临着一些内部管理上的问题,特别是自2008年金融危机以来,我国经济受到了重创,在国有企业中,一方面存在管理层利用自身所掌握的权力进行高额的在职消费,另一方面企业投资效率也较为低下,过度投资和投资不足问题并存。适度的在职消费能够激励管理层更好地工作,而在职消费过度则会适得其反。企业管理层的过度在职消费和非效率性投资均会对企业价值和公司业绩造成损害,那么,在职消费的手段是什么?在职消费和非效率投资两者之间是否存在一定的关系?在职消费会不会对企业的过度投资或投资不足产生抑制作用或者加剧企业的过度投资或投资不足程度呢?本文将通过实证研究来分析这一问题。本文选取了2007～2011年我国国有上市公司财务报表及其附注中披露的信息,研究了国有企业中的管理层权力、在职消费及其与企业投资效率之间的关系。通过实证分析得出了以下几点结论：(1)管理层权力越大的国有企业中,在职消费水平越高。区别国有企业的不同控制权级别发现,央企和地方政府控制的国有企业的在职消费水平明显高于其他国有企业。(2)国有企业的管理层权力与过度投资存在正向关系,管理层权力与投资不足负相关。管理层权力越大,过度投资程度越高,投资不足程度越低。区分国有企业不同控制权性质发现,央企管理层权力所导致的过度投资程度要低于其他国有企业,而地方政府控制的国有企业的管理层权力所引起的过度投资程度则显著高于其他国有企业。(3)将在职消费与过度投资联系起来分析发现,国有企业中,在职消费与过度投资正相关。区分控制权发现,央企在职消费导致的过度投资程度要低于其他国有企业。(4)本文研究还发现,在职消费对于抑制投资不足程度具有一定的正面影响,在职消费的提高能够降低国有企业的投资不足程度,同时企业的自由现金流越高,在职消费越有助于降低企业的投资不足程度。区分控制权性质发现,央企的投资不足程度要低于其他国有企业,地方政府控制的国有企业的投资不足程度要高于其他国有企业。最后,结合实证研究结果,本文为国有企业提出以下建议：(1)要关注并适当抑制管理层权力。企业管理层权力很大时,权力可能会成为管理层攫取控制权收益的重要手段,虽然近年来国有企业的管理层权力有所降低,但是仍需重视企业管理层过度在职消费的治理问题。(2)要关注过度投资企业的在职消费行为。研究显示,在职消费与过度投资存在明显的正向关系,管理层在职消费水平的提高会加剧企业的过度投资行为,同时,获取在职消费也可能会成为管理层进行过度投资的目的之一(3)适当发挥投资不足企业中管理层权力和在职消费的激励作用。本文的研究发现管理层权力、在职消费与投资不足之间成负相关关系,说明国有企业的管理层权力和在职消费对于抑制国有企业的投资不足具有一定的作用,针对现有国有企业中投资不足比过度投资的企业更多的现象,对于投资不足企业,可以通过给予管理层更多的权力和适当进行在职消费以鼓励管理层更积极地投资,以降低国有企业的投资不足程度。更多还原

【Abstract】 In recent years, with the advancement of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) marketization and promotion of internal management efficiency, the reform of SOEs in China has made remarkable achievements. SOEs occupies an important position in our economy, maintains the stability and promotes the efficiency of the SOEs have an irreplaceable role to economic stability and prosperity of the country. The healthy development of SOEs has been one of the focuses of attention from all walks of life.Currently, with the steady development of SOEs, at the same times, our country also faced some problem on the internal management, especially since the2008financial crisis. It damaged our economy. In the SOEs, on the one hand, there is the management of using its power to enjoy high perks, on the other hand, corporate investment efficiency is relatively low, have both overinvestment and underinvestment problem. Moderate perks can incentive the management to work better, while overconsumption could backfire. Both the excessive perks and inefficient investment from the management will have damage to the enterprise value and company performance. So, perks means what? Whether there is a certain relationship between perks and the efficiency of investment? Will perks help to ease the SOEs overinvestment and underinvestment or otherwise? This article will use the empirical research to analyze those problems.This article selects the disclosed financial statements and notes of the listed SOES, from2007to2011. We studied the management power, perks and the investment efficiency of the SOEs. Through the empirical analysis, the following conclusions are drawn:(1) In the SOEs, the more the management power, the greater the level of perks; Differentiate the different control level of SOEs, central enterprises and local government controlled enterprises’perks level is significantly higher than other SOEs. (2)There are positive relationship between management power and overinvestment, while the relationship between management power and underinvestment is negative. The greater the managers power, the higher the overinvestment, the lower the underinvestment; Differentiate the different control level of SOEs, central enterprises have the lower overinvestment caused by the management power, while the local government controlled enterprises have the higher overinvestment caused by the management power.(3)Between perks and overinvestment, we found that perks is positively associated with overinvestment in the SOEs. Distinguish between control, we found the central enterprises has the lower overinvestment caused by perks than other SOEs.(4)This study also found that perks helps to lower the underinvestment of SOEs. Improvement of perks can reduce the degree of underinvestment of SOEs. while the higher the free cash flow of the underinvestment enterprises, perks can better help to reduce the underinvestment; Distinguish between control, we found that central enterprises have the lower underinvestment, while the local government controlled enterprises have the highest level of underinvestment.Finally, combined with the empirical research results, this paper put forward the following suggestions for the SOEs:(1)Firstly, we should focus on and restrain management power appropriately. When management power is high, it may become an important means of management to grab control gains. Although in recent years, the management power of SOEs decreases, we still need to attach importance to the governance of excessive perks problems of.(2)Attention to the perks behavior of the overinvestment enterprises. Research suggests that there is an obvious positive correlation between perks and overinvestment, the improvement of perks level from management will increase enterprises’ overinvestment behavior. At the same time, access to perks may also become one of the purposes of overinvestment.(3)Appropriate use of management power and perks to underinvestment enterprises. In this research, we found that both management power and perks have negative relationship to underinvestment. That means they have good effect to the enterprises’ underinvestment. In views that there are more underinvestment enterprises in existing SOEs, we can give more power and appropriate perks to management to encourage more active investment of management, in order to reduce the degree of underinvestment of SOEs.更多还原