节点文献
上市公司管理层讨论与分析与股权融资成本的关系研究
The Research on Relationship between MD&A and Cost of Equity Capital
【作者】 杨帆;
【导师】 陈旭东;
【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 , 会计学, 2013, 硕士
【副题名】以沪市制造业为例
【摘要】 在资本市场中,信息对于投资者的决策十分重要,它是连接公司和投资者的桥梁。投资者进行投资决策时需要参考上市公司披露的信息,对公司未来的经营发展做出判断和预测。那么信息披露的质量会直接影响资本市场的有效程度。真实、充分的信息披露有助于减少信息不对称性、维持稳定的交易环境和降低投资决策失败的概率,而虚假、有偏的信息披露会增加投资者的决策失误风险,降低投资者的投资热情,从而造成资本市场低迷,对整个经济环境将会产生重大的不利影响。因此研究信息披露质量对投资者而言十分重要。投资者往往希望获得全面、及时和真实的信息。但是管理层披露信息的动机又和投资者不同,这造成了不同的管理层披露信息的质量各异。有的管理层为了追求公司利益最大化和追逐个人利益,在某些情况下会选择性披露信息,或者披露虚假信息迷惑投资者。认识到信息价值的管理层会选择主动、充分地披露信息,吸引潜在投资者,为企业的长远发展打好提前量。鼠目寸光的管理层则会被动消极地对待信息披露,按照规定完成强制披露的部分就算完成任务,投资者对公司的看法对他们来说没有完成任务来的重要。面对财务报告众多的信息,投资者有时也无法判断何种信息对决策贡献最大。管理层讨论与分析被称为财务报告的“灵魂”。其价值之处在于,它包含了上市公司管理层对经营情况的分析和对未来发展的预测。高质量的管理层讨论与分析绝不是对财务报表的简单复述,而是提供增量信息,满足投资者获得历史信息和前瞻性信息的要求。因此,本文考察管理层讨论与分析的披露质量对投资者有非常重要的意义。但是,单独研究管理层讨论与分析的披露质量显然是不够的。我们需要找到一个载体,通过研究管理层讨论与分析的披露质量对这个载体的影响说明管理层讨论与分析对投资者的价值。我们知道,上市公司在资本市场中很典型的融资行为就是股权融资。上市公司在资本市场上为资本这种稀缺资源展开竞争。由于信息不对称的存在,投资者缺乏对上市公司内部情况的全面了解,为了弥补可能遭受的高风险,投资者会要求较高的投资回报率,从而提高上市公司的股权融资成本。如此,我们便可找到一个途径来降低股权融资成本:上市公司的管理层披露更多的管理层讨论与分析信息如公司的核心竞争力和发展前景,积极与投资者沟通,降低信息不对称性。此时投资者对自己做出的决策更有把握,会降低为补偿风险所要求的投资回报率,公司的融资机会也就增加,自然降低了股权融资成本。基于此观点,本文认为管理层讨论与分析披露质量可以对企业的股权融资成本产生显著的影响。本文的主线是首先研究管理层讨论与分析信息总体的披露质量,这也是对证监会的修改意见的实践结果的考察;然后筛选出具有股权融资条件的上市公司,考察他们的管理层讨论与分析披露质量是否对股权融资成本产生影响。如果产生显著的影响,那么投资者可以重点关注管理层讨论与分析,通过对不同子信息模块进行特征识别,重新认识和消化这些信息,进行更明智的决策。希望通过本文的研究,可以丰富此领域的研究成果和相关理论,帮助我国的资本市场健康发展。本文的理论分析如下:考虑到管理层讨论与分析披露制度在我国引进时间并不长,暂无可参考的范例供各公司使用。即使在同一行业,不同的上市公司的管理层讨论与分析披露质量也是有差别的。并且资本市场可以识别这种差别,做出市场反应。如果上市公司能够通过披露更多管理层讨论与分析信息,披露更多的和公司的核心竞争力和未来发展趋势相关的信息,提高信息透明度,那么投资者会更加青睐该公司,其投资意愿也会增强,从而降低了融资成本。根据以上分析,本文将从如下几章进行阐述:第一部分是本文的绪论。介绍文章的研究背景、研究目的、研究方法、文章结构以及本文的创新点。第二部分是本文的文献综述部分。此部分详细回顾了国内外关于管理层讨论与分析的研究成果,在比较了国内外学者不同的研究方向和研究方法后,对已有的国内外成果进行了评述。第三部分主要分析管理层讨论与分析的披露质量。本文从性质和内容两方面考虑,参考已有的评价方法,综合考虑内容和性质两个维度,建立我国上市公司管理层讨论与分析的披露质量评价体系,制定了评分标准,通过手工处理得到了我国沪市A股制造业200家公司2010年的管理层讨论与分析的各项指标,观察在现行政策条件下,我国上市公司管理层讨论与分析信息披露的情况。汇总人工搜集到的评价指标的各个项目的披露情况后,本文把其作为评价管理层讨论与分析的披露质量的指标。根据汇总结果从各个角度分析管理层讨论与分析的披露质量,发现我国上市公司管理层讨论与分析各部分信息披露质量参差不齐,不同性质和内容的信息披露程度不同,总体质量不高。第四部分是对我国上市公司管理层讨论与分析的披露质量和股权融资成本关系的实证检验。本文进行理论分析后,提出了三个假设。选取沪市上市公司制造业中符合股权再融资条件的公司作为样本,对相关假设进行检验,分析实证结果。实证部分一共有两部分回归,第一部分是管理层讨论与分析总体披露情况对股权融资成本的回归,第二部分是管理层讨论与分析的各个组成部分的披露情况对股权融资成本的回归。第五部分是对研究结论的解释以及政策建议,并指出本文的不足以及未来的研究趋势。本文的实证研究部分按照如下思路进行:首先,对管理层讨论与分析的披露质量和股权融资成本关系的相关文献进行分析,提出如下假设:对于具备股权再融资资格的上市公司而言,H1:管理层讨论与分析总体披露质量越高的公司,其股权融资成本越低;H2:管理层讨论与分析中经营状况披露质量越高的公司,其股权融资成本越低;H3:管理层讨论与分析中前瞻信息披露质量越高的公司,其股权融资成本越低。其次,本文考虑到所研究的股权融资成本具有估计性质,在众多模型中,选择剩余收益模型计算出我国上证制造业公司的股权融资成本,将汇总好的管理层讨论与分析的披露指数和通过模型计算得出的股权融资成本放入所涉及的回归模型中进行回归分析。我们发现制造业披露的管理层讨论与分析的总体质量对股权融资成本具有显著的影响。披露质量越高,上市公司进行股权再融资的资本成本越低。另外,我们还发现管理层讨论与分析中的关于经营状况的信息对股权融资成本呈显著负相关,经营状况信息披露的越充分,股权融资成本越低。财务状况、前瞻性信息和特殊事项部分的信息对股权融资成本的影响并不显著。最后,针对上述的研究结果,本文对不同类型的MD&A信息提出了改进建议,并且针对政策上的改善提出了自己的看法。
【Abstract】 In the capital market, information are very important to decision maker, it acts as the bridge connecting business and investors. When making investing decision, investors need the public disclosed information from the list corporation, to make judgment and forecast about the company’s future development. Thus the quality of information disclosure will influence the efficiency of capital market directly. Truly and sufficient information disclosure could reduce the information asymmetry and sustain a steady trading environment, and reduce the decision failing probability. False and bias information could enhance such probability, reduce investing enthusiasm, and even lead to the downturn of capital market and the whole economy. So research concerning information disclosure is very essential. Investors usually desire complete, timely and fairly information.However, motivation of information disclosure from management are different from investors, this leads to varies levels of information disclosure. Some disclose false and incomplete information to pursue the maximization of corporation benefit and individual benefit. Some actively disclose sufficient information to attract potential investors to benefit the future development. Short-sighted management simply regards disclosure as a task to be coped with.Facing the numerous amount of information, investor could easily get lost in it, failing to identify the most decision relevant part. Management analysis is the ghost of the financial reports. Management express their view about the past and the future of the business, this is the most valuable part of the report. It provides what the notes and financial statement couldn’t provide according the GAAP. They act better in the relevant and forecast aspects. Therefore, this essay investigates the importance of management analysis to the investors.However, a separate study in Management Discussion and Analysis of the level of disclosure is clearly not enough, we need to find a carrier, through the Researching it to reach the aim. We know that the typical financing behavior of listed companies in the capital market is the equity financing. Listed companies compete for the scarce resources in the capital markets. Due to the existence of asymmetric information, investors cannot acquire comprehensive and accurate understanding of the relevant information of listed companies, in order to avoid risks, they require a higher return on investment, this will increase the cost of equity financing of listed companies. So, if a listed company discloses more voluntary information, improve the transparency of information, disclose more information about the company’s core competitiveness and future prospects, investors will be able to have more confidence and will reduce the require of risk compensation, thus increasing the company’s financing opportunities, reduce the cost of equity financing.From this point of view, this paper argues that the sufficient Management Discussion and Analysis disclosure level can have an impact on the cost of equity financing. The main line of this article is to firstly study the Management Discussion and Analysis overall level of disclosure, which is to examine the result of CSRC amendments; secondly, choosing listed company with equity financing conditions and examining whether their Management Discussion and Analysis impact the cost of equity financing. If there is significant impact, investors can focus on the management discussion and analysis, the idea of the different sub-module feature should be recognized and digested to make more informed decisions. I hope this study can enrich this field of research and theory, to help the healthy development of China’s capital market.In this paper, the theoretical analysis as follows:As the MD&A is just introduced into our country, there is no mature sample. This essay argues that even within the same industry, management’s discussion and analysis level is very different. And capital markets can identify this difference and respond to it. If the listed company could disclose more company core competitiveness and future trends, improve the transparency of information, investors will be more willing to invest, and will reduce the risk compensation claims, and thus increase the company’s financing opportunities, reduce financing costs.According to the above theoretical analysis, this paper elaborate from the following chapters: The first part is the introduction, stating the research background, research objectives, research methods, essay structure and the innovation.The second part is the literature review section. This section detailed review the domestic and foreign research results on the Management Discussion and Analysis, comparing different research directions and research methods, commenting the existing results.The third part analyzes the level of disclosure of the Management Discussion and Analysis. Reference to an existing evaluation methods, considering the content and nature of the two dimensions, the establishment of the Management Discussion and Analysis of China’s listed companies, the level of disclosure evaluation system, the development of the scoring criteria by manual processing has been on both sides, from the nature and content of access to China’s Shanghai A shares manufacturing2002010Management Discussion and Analysis of the indicators observed in the current policy under the conditions of the listing of the Company’s management discussion and analysis of information disclosure, China. Summary manually collected evaluation disclosure, and as an indicator of the level of disclosure of the Evaluation Management Discussion and Analysis. According to the summary of results from every point of the level of disclosure of the Management Discussion and Analysis, management discussion and analysis of information disclosure of listed companies in China are low, varying degrees of different nature and content of information disclosure.The fourth part is the empirical test of the level of disclosure of the Management Discussion and Analysis of China’s listed companies on the impact of the cost of equity financing. Having made three assumptions. the paper selected the equity refinancing conditions in the manufacturing of Shanghai Stock Exchange listed companies as a sample, to test the underlying assumptions and analysis of empirical results.The fifth part is the interpretation of the conclusions of the study as well as policy recommendations, and pointed out that the lack of this article and future research trends.In this paper, the empirical research carried out in accordance with the following ideas:First, the management discussion and analysis of the level of disclosure and the cost of equity financing relationship literature analysis, made the following assumptions:For listed companies with equity refinancing eligibility, H1:Management Discussion and Analysis disclosure overall higher the quality of the company, the cost of equity financing, the lower; H2:Management Discussion and analysis of financial disclosures, the higher the quality, the lower cost of equity financing; H3: Management Discussion and Analysis in the forward-looking the higher the quality of information disclosure, lower the cost of equity financing.Secondly, taking into account the estimated cost of equity financing nature of the study, many models, the residual income model to calculate the cost of equity financing SSE manufacturing companies in China, the summary the good management discussion and analysis of disclosure index and equity financing costs calculated by the model into the regression model, the regression analysis. We found that the manufacturing disclosed in the Management Discussion and Analysis of the level of disclosure has a significant impact on the cost of equity financing. The higher the level of disclosure, the lower the cost of capital of listed companies equity refinancing. In addition, we also found that the Management Discussion and Analysis for the financial part of the cost of equity financing was a significant negative correlation, the financial information disclosed more fully, lower the cost of equity financing; portion of the disclosure of forward-looking information as possible, especially Risk Warning section full disclosure when investors more cautious about their attitude, thereby increasing the cost of equity financing. Business information section and special events part of the information on the cost of equity financing is not significant.Finally, for the above research results for different types of MD&A suggestions for improvement, and put forward their own views on policy improvements.In the short-term perspective, we study the MD&A disclosure of information’s effects on the short-term cost of equity financing. We use the MD&A of various indicators on the stock CAR econometric both cross-sectional data or panel data, we have found that MD&A investment and financing status information and stock CAR significantly negative related, will cause the cost of equity financing short-term rise; further study, we find it is future investment and financing conditions play a role, rather than historical investment and financing information.
【Key words】 MD&A listed companies; information disclosure; cost ofequity capital; evaluation system;