【作者】 徐莉；

【导师】 吴勇敏；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 法律（专业学位）， 2012， 硕士

【摘要】 公司机会规则作为英美法系公司法中的一项重要规则,其主要内容是禁止公司董事、高级管理人员篡夺公司机会。我国在2005新《公司法》中正式确立了该规则,以期更好的保护公司利益,但与此法条相配套的其他适用规则仍处于空白的状态,亟待进一步的研究与完善。反观司法实务界,由于风险投资在我国的快速发展,其为了规避风险而进行分散投资、参与公司管理的特点,使公司机会问题在这一领域显得尤为突出。如果严格适用我国《公司法》149条关于公司机会规则的规定,则很可能使风险投资公司派驻的董事、高级管理人员面临巨大的被诉风险,这将严重挫伤他们的积极性,对我国风险投资乃至整体经济发展都会造成非常不利的影响。为此,笔者试图通过引入公司合同理论使这一特定领域中的公司机会问题能够跳出公司法的框架,以合同的方式使风险投资公司与目标公司之间的利益达到平衡,使这一领域的公司机会问题得到妥善解决。本文分为绪论、正文、结论三个部分,其中正文部分结构如下：第一部分是对公司机会理论的概述,主要介绍了该规则的历史发展及法理基础。第二部分论述了风险投资背景下公司机会问题的特殊性与复杂性,从风险投资的特点出发,分析了风险投资与公司之间的特殊关系,进而阐明风险投资背景下公司机会问题的冲突性与正当性。第三部分是对公司机会适用标准的分析,全面阐述了当下较为流行的几个公司机会认定标准,然后进一步分析了这些标准在风险投资背景下存在的缺陷,然后论述了公司机会的排除标准。第四部分则论述了公司合同理论在公司机会问题上的适用,从公司合同理论出发,对理论上与实践中合同能否排除忠实义务进行论述,进而对合同方法解决公司机会问题进行全面的可行性分析。第五部分是本文的重点也是创新之处,在前面四部分理论探讨的基础上,对合同解决公司机会问题提出具体的设计,主要包括合同的主体与形式,合同的内容及合同失灵后的法律救济三个部分。更多还原

【Abstract】 As an important rule in the Anglo-American legal system, the main content of the "Corporate Opportunity" rule is to prohibit the directors and senior managers usurping the corporate opportunity. In order to provide better protection to the company, in2005,"Corporation Law of People’s Republic of China" established this rule formally.However the matching applicable rules to it in China is still in a blank state,which needs further study and improvement. On the other hand, if we take a look to the judicial practice, the venture capital in China is under rapid development. To share the risk, the venture capital firms usually choose to invest many different projects and participate in management. All this features make the corporate opportunity problem more prominent in this particular field. If strictly applying the "Corporate Opportunity" rules established by the "Corporation Law", it is very possible that the directors and senior managers accredited by the venture capital firm will be faced with huge risk of being alleged, and this would seriously dampen their enthusiasm and also bring adverse effect to the venture capital field even the whole economy. Considering this, the dissertation tries to introduce the corporate contract theory to help the corporate opportunity problem in the venture capital field jump out of Corporate Law’s frame, and make the balance between the venture capital firm and the target corporate, as a result, this particular problem gets appropriate resolution.This dissertation can be divided into three main part:preface, text and conclusion. And the structure of the text is as follows:The first part is about the "Corporate Opportunity" theory, mainly introducing the historical development and legal foundation of this theory.The second part discusses the particularity and complexity of the corporate opportunity in the field of venture capital. Begin with the characteristics of venture capital, it analyses the special relation between the venture capital firm and the target corporate, and then clarify the conflict and justification of this problem in the field of venture capital.The third part is about the identification standard of the corporate opportunity. In this part, the dissertation introduces several popular identification standards at present, and analyses the flaws of this standards. In the end of this part, it also discusses the exclusion criteria of corporate opportunity.The fourth part dissertates the application of "Corporate Contract" theory in the corporate opportunity problem. It discusses if the Duty of Loyalty can be excluded by the contract,and then analyses the feasibility of this method applied in the corporate opportunity problem.The fifth part is the highlight of this dissertation. On the basis of former analysis, this part carries out concrete design of the contract, including the subject, the form,the content and the legal relief.更多还原