【作者】 郭磊；

【导师】 辛清泉；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， 会计学， 2013， 硕士

【摘要】 作为一种重要的内部治理机制，董事会结构及其治理效应一直受到了公司治理学术研究的重点关注。在经验研究方面，以前的研究更多的关注董事会规模、独立董事比例、董事会性别等特征及其经济后果。本学位论文从一个新的视角，即非控股股东是否在董事会派驻董事以及派驻董事比例，考察了董事会这一特征对国有上市公司代理成本的影响。非控股股东持有公司股权，因而其有激励关心企业绩效，甚至直接参与企业经营管理。在董事会中派驻董事，是实现非控股股东利益的一条重要途径。在公司运营实践中，大部分重大经营决策都是在董事会中进行的，非控股股东如果在董事会中派驻董事，一方面可以更好的了解公司经营管理的相关信息，为非控股股东的决策（干预或退出）提供帮助；另一方面，代表非控股股东利益的董事能够在董事会中充分传达和交流非控股股东的利益诉求，是制衡和协调控股股东和非控股股东利益冲突的重要机制。如此，不同于独立董事，非控股股东派驻的董事有更强的激励在董事会中扮演积极的角色。另外，非控股股东派驻的董事可能更为独立于控股股东和公司高管，其选拔和产生均来自在股东大会上握有实质投票权的其他大股东，而独立董事的选拔在很大程度上则是由控股股东或公司最高管理人员决定。因此，从这一角度上讲，非控股股东派驻董事对于控股股东和公司高管的监督能力可能更强。本文使用2003-2010年国有上市公司数据，从国有企业总经理变更和股利政策两个角度研究了董事会这种重要的内部机制对公司治理效率的影响。研究结果表明，非控股股东在董事会中派驻董事显著增强了经理变更对企业业绩的敏感性，并且，非控股股东在董事会中派驻董事比例越高，经理变更对企业业绩的敏感性越强。研究还发现，独立董事比例、董事会规模、非控股股东持股比例并不影响经理变更对企业业绩的敏感性。另外，本文还发现，非控股股东在董事会中派驻董事显著提高了现金股利发放的概率，同时，派驻比例越高，股利支付率越高。本文从新的视角丰富了对董事会治理功能的现有文献。多年来，中国的国有企业存在“政府一股独大”和“内部人控制”双重特征，如何有效设计和完善公司治理结构，以降低国有企业中广泛存在的代理成本，受到社会各界持续关注。本文的经验证据对于进一步完善国有企业治理结构、降低国有企业代理成本有一定的参考价值。更多还原

【Abstract】 As an important internal corporate governance mechanism, the board structure andits governance effects have been the focus of academic research in corporate governance.Previous studies in empirical research more concerned about the size of the board, theproportion of independent directors, the board gender characteristics and its economicconsequences. This dissertation studies the effect of the board characteristics to theagency costs of state-owned listed companies.Because of holding the equity, the non-controlling shareholders have an incentive tocare about corporate performance, and even directly involved in business management.Stationed in the board of directors is an important way to achieve the interests ofnon-controlling shareholders. In the operating practices of the company, most of themajor business decisions are made on the board of directors, so the directors accredited bynon-controlling shareholders on the one hand can understand company’s management andmake some advises to board, on the other hand, they can fully convey the interests ofnon-controlling shareholders, and they can balance and coordinate the conflict of interestsbetween controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders. So, unlike theindependent directors, the directors accredited by non-controlling shareholders havestronger incentives to play an active role in the board of directors. In addition, they aremay be more independent in compare with the controlling shareholders and the companyexecutives, because their selection and produce are from the hold the substance of thevoting rights of other shareholders in general meeting. Therefore, from this perspective,the directors accredited by non-controlling shareholders for the supervision of thecontrolling shareholders and corporate executives may be stronger.Based on the state-owned listed companies during2003and2010, we find thatdirectors accredited by non-controlling shareholders may play important roles incoordinating the conflict of interest among controlling shareholders and non-controllingshareholders. Directors accredited by non-controlling shareholders significantly improvethe association between CEO turnover and poor performance. Moreover, the higher ratioof directors accredited by non-controlling shareholders in the boardroom, the strongerassociation between CEO turnover and poor performance is. In contrast, no evidenceshows that board size, the ratio of independent directors, and the percentage of shareowned by non-controlling shareholders significantly improve the association between CEO turnover and poor performance. At the same time, we also find that directorsaccredited by non-controlling shareholders significantly influence the formulation ofdividend policy. Moreover, the higher ratio of directors accredited by non-controllingshareholders in the boardroom, the higher dividend payout ratio is. The paper contributesthe literature on governance mechanism of board of directors from a new perspective.Over the years, China’s state-owned companies are characterized by “dominance ofthe governance” and “internal control”. So how to effectively design and improve thecorporate governance structure in order to reduce the widespread agency costs instate-owned enterprises is attracted wide attention. The empirical evidence of this paperhave a certain reference value in further improving the governance structure ofstate-owned companies, and reducing the agency costs of state-owned companies.更多还原