【作者】 李艳；

【导师】 王丹舟；

【作者基本信息】 暨南大学 ， 会计学， 2013， 硕士

【摘要】 随着全球经济一体化以及企业自身改革的深化，面对日益激烈的市场竞争，如何超越竞争对手获得长远发展成为越来越多企业关注的焦点。谁掌握了最新的科技谁就掌握了发展的主动权，因此，越来越多的企业开始进行科技创新，并大力进行相关R&D投入以提高企业自身的自主创新能力。在现代企业制度下，公司的股东趋向于通过企业科技创新以及相关的R&D投入来实现企业长期的发展，追求科技创新的高回报，最终实现企业价值最大化的目标。但是，在现代企业中，普遍存在着两权分离的委托代理问题，作为代理人的管理者会因为科技创新活动的高投入和长周期带来的风险而规避R&D活动，与企业股东形成不一致的利益函数，长远来看最终损害企业利益，不利于企业经济的增长与进步。代理理论认为，对企业管理者进行长期的持股激励，可以有效的减少企业代理成本的产生，实现企业股东与管理者利益函数的趋同，最终获得企业的长远发展以及绩效的改善。本文以2009年到2011年我国高新技术企业代表的创业板上市公司为研究对象，通过文献和理论分析，提出研究假设，建立回归模型，试图研究有关企业高管持股激励、R&D投入与企业绩效三者之间的相互关系。通过本文研究发现，在我国创业板上市公司中，高管持股激励与企业R&D投入之间存在显著正向关系；高管持股激励对R&D投入与企业绩效有正向的调节作用，给予企业高管适当的股份进行激励，有利于提高管理者参与工作的积极性以及相关活动的创造性，最终实现管理者与股东利益趋同的目标，从而，可以减少管理者对于短期风险的顾虑，更多的考虑提升企业长远发展的R&D活动，加大R&D投入的强度，实现企业在科技创新中的可持续发展以及绩效的提升，在激烈的竞争中处于有利地位。更多还原

【Abstract】 As the global economic integration and deepening of the reform of enterprise itself, in theface of increasingly fierce market competition, how to surpass competitors to obtain long-termdevelopment has become the focus of more and more enterprises. Whoever masters the latesttechnology is to gain the initiative in the development; therefore, more and more enterprisesbegin to scientific and technological innovation, and vigorously to the related R&D spending.Under the modern enterprise system, the company’s shareholders tend to through theenterprise technological innovation and the R&D input to achieve long-term development ofenterprise, the pursuit of scientific and technological innovation of the high returns, andeventually realize the goal of enterprise value maximization. Is common, however, in modernenterprises, two rights separation of the principal-agent problems, as agent of the manager willbe because of the high science and technology innovation activities of the risks of investmentand long period and avoiding R&D activities, with the enterprise shareholder form the interestsof the function, eventually harm the interests of the enterprise, is not conducive to economicgrowth and progress. Agent theory, to the long-term shareholding incentive of managers, caneffectively reduce agency cost, enterprises realize the interests of shareholders and managersfunction convergence, finally obtain the long-term development of the enterprise as well as theimprovement of performance.Based on high and new technology enterprise in our country from2009to2011,representatives of the gem listed companies as the research object, through literature andtheoretical analysis, put forward the research hypothesis and establish regression model, trying toresearch about corporate executives shareholding motivation, the relationship between R&Dinvestment and enterprise performance. Through this paper, the study found the gem listedcompanies in China, executives shareholding incentive and enterprise there exists significantpositive relationship between R&D input, executives shareholding in larger enterprises, R&Dinvestment and enterprise performance were positively correlated relationship, executiveownership incentives conducive to the increase of corporate R&D input, and improve andimprove enterprise performance.更多还原