【作者】 肖静；

【导师】 吴大军；

【作者基本信息】 东北财经大学 ， 会计学， 2012， 硕士

【摘要】 由于股东与管理层之间的代理冲突、股东与债权人之间的信息不对称以及管理层自身特质的影响,使得上市公司的投资决策并非完全有效,具体表现为过度投资和投资不足,会计稳健性由于能够及时地确认投资损失,促使上市公司采用稳健的会计信息,同时也能通过降低股东与债权人之间的契约成本来缓解投资不足,因而有助于改善投资效率。但是,近年来,以FASB为首的会计学界开始质疑会计稳健性的积极作用,认为会计稳健性低估了企业净资产,从而导致投资者放弃一些本该投资的项目,进而加剧投资不足的发生,国内也有学者表明,我国上市公司的会计稳健性其实只是上市公司“洗大澡”、进行盈余管理造成的。本文以此为背景,采用2007—2010年我国A股上市公司的数据作为样本观测值,验证会计稳健性对我国上市公司非效率投资行为的影响。研究结果表明,2007—2010年间,我国上市公司的会计政策总体上是稳健的,并且有助于改善投资效率。从全样本分析的结果来看,会计稳健性能够缓解上市公司的非效率投资行为,进一步将非效率投资分为过度投资组和投资不足组的结果表明,我国上市公司的会计稳健性有助于抑制过度投资和投资不足行为的发生,但是从结果的显著性来看,只有投资不足组的结果是显著的,其抑制过度投资的作用并不显著,而从实际控制人的性质来看,实际控制人为国有的上市公司,会计稳健性的投资效用相对较弱,具体表现为,实际控制人为国有的上市公司,其会计稳健性抑制过度投资的效果不如非国有上市公司,且其会计稳健性缓解投资不足的效果也不如非国有的上市公司,但这一结论并不显著。稳健性测试没有支持本文提出的有关会计稳健性有助于抑制过度投资的假设,究其原因,可能是由于我国上市公司的高管权力过大,影响了会计稳健性作用的发挥。更多还原

【Abstract】 Public companies’ investment decisions are not fully effective due to the existence of agency problems between shareholders and management and asymmetric information between shareholders and creditors, which is harmful to the enterprise value. Since accounting conservatism can prompt public companies to adopt conservative accounting policies, the investment losses can be recognized timely.. Besides, under-investment can also be relieved through reducing lending cost. However, in recent years, some researchers in accounting field has began to doubt the positive role of accounting conservatism, they claims that accounting conservatism has underestimated the net assets of the enterprise, which leads investors to give up some good projects, thus increasing the occurrence of under-investment. Therefore, this paper is about to verify what influence can accounting conservatism make to non-efficient investment.The results show that from2007to2010, accounting conservatism exists in China’s public companies and can somewhat significantly help to improve investment efficiency, further more, when dividing the non-efficient investment into over-investment and under-investment, it indicates that accounting conservatism can help to control the both, but only the under-investment group is significant. I also examined that investment utility on non-state-owned public companies are stronger than the state-owned but not significant. The results of controlled variables show that the power of managers in China’s capital market is too big, which may be the reason that accounting conservatism can not reduce over-investment significantly.更多还原