【作者】 李超；

【导师】 黎仁华；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 会计学， 2012， 硕士

【摘要】 高层管理者作为公司重要的经营决策者,在创造股东财富中扮演着重要角色。然而由于代理成本问题的存在,高层管理者与股东的利益并不总是完全一致。因此,运用各种手段激励高层管理者为股东利益而努力工作,减少代理成本问题是很重要的。除了工资、奖金、股票和期权补偿等激励形式外,企业通常会采用其他方式用于奖励公司的高层管理人员。而在职消费是除了货币薪酬之外最广泛的一种激励方式。与其他补偿方式相比,在职消费有两个主要特征：首先,它不以现金形式支付,而是通过其他途径向高级管理层提供更多的利益,如良好的办公条件、舒适的旅行机会等等,从而激励管理层更加努力工作,创造股东财富；其次,在职消费不是建立在书面合同的基础上,因此,对其实施监督需要付出较高的成本。如果监督高管在职消费需要付出过高的信息成本,在职消费就可能会被滥用,从而造成代理成本的增加。总之,在职消费是激励高管人员努力为股东利益工作的一种手段,同时是一种较高的代理成本。在职消费作为高管人员薪酬的组成部分,由于自身特殊属性——隐蔽性、难以准确衡量,初始研究大都仅限于理论层面的阐述,实证研究相对而言很有限。随着公司治理相关研究的逐渐发展,高管人员在职消费越发成为学术界关注的热点问题,众学者对该领域的实证研究日益增多。近几年“天价吊灯”、“天价酒”等事件的出现,也更加引起了社会各界的普遍关注。目前为止,相关的实证研究大都基于公司治理角度,主要研究分析管理人员货币薪酬、高管控制权、薪酬管制、股利政策、企业绩效等与在职消费的关系。而对与公司股权特征与在职消费行为的研究散见于上述研究内容之中,或是单独列示研究股权特征的某一方面,如公司股权性质、大股东持股比例、负债融资、股权制衡与经理人在职消费的关系。上市公司高管的在职消费除了受上述货币薪酬、高管控制权、大股东持股比例等因素的影响之外,法人股持股比例、国有股持股比例以及股权分置改革都可能会影响其在职消费。另外,通过文献回顾发现,我国大多学者对在职消费的计量主要是利用年度财务报表附注中的明细项目。较少学者采用“管理费用”作为衡量在职消费的指标。本文借鉴夏冬林和李晓强(2004)、陈冬华和陈信元等(2005)、罗宏(2008)做法,把可能与企业高管在职消费相关的费用支出分为八大类,通过查阅上市公司年度报表附注中“支付的其他与经营活动相关的现金”明细项目,手工收集八类费用之和。同时为消除公司规模对研究结果的影响,更好的进行横向比较,最后把得到的八项费用之和除以本年主营业务收入,以此比值衡量公司高管在职消费程度。本文在国内外学者对这一领域研究的基础上,以深圳证券交易所上市公司为研究对象,选取2009-2010年上市公司为初始研究样本,主要研究公司股权特征与高管人员在职消费的相关性。选取的特征变量主要包括股权性质、股权集中度、两权分离度、管理层持股比例、国有股持股比例以及流通股持股比例。研究时采用规范与实证相结合的分析方法,在参考国内外学者已有的理论成果基础上,展开对本文研究设计的思考,通过借鉴前人采用的变量和研究模型,利用多元线性回归方式分析检验提出的研究假设。首先针对股权特征和在职消费相关变量进行描述性统计分析,然后进行回归检验分析。为更准确研究各变量与在职消费间的关系,在回归检验时参照以往学者的做法(姜付秀、伊志宏等,2009),采取逐步引入主要解释变量法。另外,本为在对全样本进行回归分析之后,将全样本按照企业性质进行分组回归检验,以便研究股权特征与高管在职消费的关系在不同产权性质下是否会发生变化。本文的研究共分为六章,各章内容如下：第一章为导论,主要阐述了本文的选题背景、选题意义,研究思路及框架、研究方法。第二章为文献综述及其理论分析,主要对国内外已有的股权特征和在职消费的相关研究成果进行系统梳理和回顾,界定相关定义,论述理论基础。第三章为研究假设,在借鉴现有研究成果的基础上进行思考,提出本文的研究假设。第四章为研究设计,主要是提出文章的研究变量和研究模型。第五章为实证结果分析,主要是对中国上市公司股权特征、在职消费水平进行描述性统计分析,通过对建立的研究模型进行回归分析,验证提出的假设,同时对研究结果做出合理的解释。第六章为研究结论,主要是对本文的研究进行总结,提出建议。本文的主要结论如下：(1)管理层持股比例与在职消费之间存在显著的负相关关系,即管理层持股比例能抑制高管在职消费；(2)第一大股东持股比例与上市公司高管人员在职消费水平呈显著的负向相关性,即第一大股东持股比例越高,上市公司高管人员的在职消费程度越低;第二到第十大股东持股比例之和与在职消费存在显著正相关关系；(3)流通股持股比例与在职消费显著负相关,即流通股持股比例越大,上市公司高管在职消费水平越低。在对全样本按照企业性质分组进行多元回归后发现,股权特征与在职消费的关系在不同产权性质下产生了变化：首先,国有企业管理层持股比例与对在职消费存在显著的负的影响,二者的相关性相对于非国有企业而言更加明显；其次,在国有企业中,控制权与所有权的分离能控抑制高管的在职消费,在非国有企业中没有此相关性；另外,在非国有企业中,流通股持股比例与在职消费存在显著的负相关性,二者的相关性相对于国有企业而言更加明显。此外,本文得到了一个有趣的现象：在非国有企业中,国有股持股比例与在职消费呈现出显著的正相关关系,即随着国有股持股比例的增加,上市公司高管人员的在职消费水平会随之提高。而在国有企业中,二者却呈现出负相关,虽然二者并不存在显著性,但是可以看出,在国有股持股比例与在职消费的关系上,国有企业与非国有企业存在显著的差异性。最后,无论国有企业组还是非国有企业组,本文均未发现第一大股东持股比例对在职消费具有显著的负的影响,即第一大股东持股比例越大,上市公司高管人员的在职消费越低。管理层在职消费是一把双刃剑。一方面,过度在职消费会造成代理成本的增加,隐藏着管理层滥用管理权力的危机,有可能将公司的资产用于自身消费,如休假旅游、获取额外津贴等,从而侵害股东财富和公司价值。另一方面,当由于政府制度、媒体监督等原因产生在职消费时,适度的在职消费能激励管理者努力工作去创造股东财富,提高公司价值。因此,应全面的看待管理层在职消费问题,在制定相关法律法规时,也应准确把握其双刃剑的特质。通过健全薪酬管理体制、建立合理预算、制定完善相关法规、实行管理层股权激励机制、构建股权相互制衡体系、加强流通股股东影响力等方式,从公司内部与外部两个层面同时加强对上市公司管理层在职消费的监督与控制。为完善公司治理机制、公司实施股权激励政策等提供一定的理论基础和指导意义。本文的贡献主要体现在以下方面：第一次系统地将上市公司股权特征和在职消费联系起来,集中研究股权特征对在职消费的影响。国内外对在职消费的实证研究大都以公司治理角度出发,集中于股权制衡,高管薪酬、管理层权力层面等,而对上市公司股权特征与在职消费的研究散见于其中,缺乏系统性、集中性。由此,萌生了创作本文的灵感,希望可以补充现有文献的不足。第二点是拓展了股权特征与在职消费的研究方向。鉴于我国特有的制度环境,目前,国内学者对股权特征与在职消费的研究仅限于股权性质、股权制衡、大股东持股等对高管在职消费行为的研究。本为在众学者对这一领域研究基础上重点讨论了国有股、流通股不同持股比例对上市公司高管人员在职消费的影响。更多还原

【Abstract】 Top level managers, being the most important decision makers of firms, play a heavy role in the creation of wealth for shareholders.However, due to wide spread agency cost problem, the interests of the top managers and the shareholder are not necessarily well aligned. Therefore, it is important to use all sorts of means to motivate the top managers to reduce the agency cost problem, and work hard for the interest of the shareholder. There are many means that firms can reward their senior management personnel, besides salaries, bonuses stocks and options. And on-the-job consumption is one of the most widely used forms of non-monetary compensations. Compared with other compensation mode, perks have two major characteristics. First of all, perks are not paid out to top managers in the form of cash. However, perks can still increase the benefits of being in the top management hierarchy, such as better office conditions, comfortable travel opportunities, and so on, and therefore can motivate managers to work hard. Second, on-the-job consumption is often not based on written contracts, therefore has high monitoring cost. Further, the information cost of monitoring perk consumptions is usually very high. Under these circumstances, the consumptions of perks can be abused and agency cost increases. In short, perks are a means of motivating managers to work hard for the interest of the shareholders while at the same time they are associated with a high level of agency cost.Consumption as managerial compensation components, due to its special properties--hidden nature, difficult to measure accurately, initial empirical studies are mostly confined to the theoretical level of the relatively limited. With the corporate governance research is gradually developing, the consumptions of perks are becoming the hot issue of the academic community. In last few years, social all circles pay widespread attention to the" high price chandelier" and "price of wine" So far, the relevant empirical study of perks mostly based on corporate governance theory, it analysis the relationship between management personnel salary, managerial power, compensation regulation, dividend policy, corporate performance and the perks of managers. And the analysis about the relationship between company characteristics of shareholders and on-the-job consumption can be seen in the above contents, or is separately listed on equity feature a certain aspect, such as the ownership nature, holding proportion of large shareholders, debt financing, equity balance and on-the-job consumption relationship manager.Perquisite consumption is double-edged sword. On the one hand, over-the-job consumption makes the increase of agency costs, and has management of the crisis.It is possible to use of company resources for their own consumption, such as vacation travel、additional allowance and so on. On the other hand, when the job consumption due to the system of government, media monitoring and other reasons, the appropriate in-service consumer can motivate manager to work hard to create shareholder wealth, is likely to enhance corporate value. Therefore, a comprehensive view of management in-service consumer issues in the development of relevant laws and regulations should be an accurate grasp of the characteristics of its double-edged sword.On the basis of the study in this field, we use the data of the Chinese A-share listed companies in Shenzhen from2009-2010and take empirical research on the relationship between the ownership structure and the perks of managers. This paper analyzes the governance effect of share ratio in circulation, share ratio of state shareholder on managerial over-investment. The results show that the largest shareholder can constrict the amount of perquisite consumption of managers. The more balance of stock ownership, the larger perquisite consumption. And compared to other companies, companies with more management shareholders incur more cost of perks for management incentive. Moreover, it is found that the separation degree do not have distinctive effect on the perquisite consumption of managers.This article is divided into six chapter, the contents of each chapter are as follows:Chapter1is the introduction. It mainly introduces the background and significance of this research, and then presents ideas and frameworks, research methods and features of this article.Chapter2is the literature review and theoretical analysis. This part firstly introduces domestic and foreign research results. And then defines some basic concepts in this article, elaborates on principal-agent theory.Chapter3is the research hypothesis. On the basis of above study, we put forward the hypothesis of this article.Chapter4is research design. This paper uses the data of the Chinese A-share listed companies in Shenzhen from2009-2010. Subsequently, according to the hypothesis, this paper constructs regression models, and variables are defined.Chapter5is empirical results and analysis. It mainly makes descriptive statistics on full sample and makes multiple regression analysis. And then, in order to ensure the reliability of conclusions of the study, the paper made a robust test.Chapter6is research findings and inspiration.Innovations and scholarly contribution of the paper is mainly reflected in the following areas:This study is the first time to systematically research on the characteristics of shareholders and in-service consumer link, focus on the relationship between the ownership structure and the perks of managers, which complement the existing gaps in the documentary. The empirical research on-the-job consumption of the domestic and foreign mostly focuses on the corporate governance perspective, focusing on executive compensation, equity structure, managerial power. While the analysis about the relationship between company characteristics of shareholders and on-the-job consumption can only be seen in the above contents, it is lack of systematic, concentrated.The second point is to expand the research-service consumer perspective. This paper analyzes the governance effect of share ratio in circulation, share ratio of state shareholder on managerial over-investment. Moreover, this paper is based on the different nature of our enterprises to distinguish between different ownership, the management features and service consumption, the impact of better governance in our country to provide reference service consumption.更多还原