【作者】 杨波；

【导师】 张昕竹；

【作者基本信息】 江西财经大学 ， 产业经济学， 2012， 硕士

【摘要】 三网融合能够为通信企业和广电企业带来更多的市场,能够为消费者带来质优、价廉的信息化服务,也能够避免重复建设、降低管理成本、提高资源利用水平。同时,三网融合也给VOIP、IPTV等增值业务的管制带来了难题。首先,本文回顾了我国电信业、互联网业和广播电视业的管制体制,并分析了我国目前通信行业与广播电视行业存在的问题,如缺乏相关立法、部门保护严重、多重角色冲突、运营体制差异很大、多头管理,管理权限分散等。其次,本文根据我国电信业、互联网业和广播电视业的产业特性和制度特征,简化了模型,抽象出了网络效应、转移成本变量,并且将该变量融入到Hotelling模型中。本文还从市场准入的角度出发,在一定的假设条件下,将模型区分为广电企业进入通信行业、通信企业进入广电行业以及广电企业与通信企业相互准入。三大模型还考虑了企业是否存在搭售行为,模型又演变出了八大模型。再次,本文得出了一些重要结论。第一、本文认为广电企业进入通信行业和通信企业进入广电行业这两种模式都是不适合我国三网融合战略,所以我国不能采用这两种模式来推进网融合,而我国三网融合应该使用广电企业与通信企业相互准入模式；第二、根据模型的结论,本文还认为在广电企业与通信企业相互准入,且广电企业与通信企业均采取搭售行为时,通信企业的搭售行为产生的均衡价格大于广电企业的搭售行为产生的均衡价格,通信企业的搭售行为产生的市场份额大于广电企业的搭售行为产生的市场份额。因此,企业的搭售行为符合后芝加哥学派——搭售可能产生排斥和限制竞争。由于企业搭售行为所产生的生产者剩余小于企业采取不搭售行为时所产生的生产者剩余,所以广电企业与通信企业将采取不搭售行为。也就是说,三网融合时代并不存在芝加哥学派和后芝加哥学派关于搭售行为是否会产生排斥和限制竞争的争论；第三、在广电企业与通信企业相互准入时,如果网络效应与转移成本足够大,企业采取不搭售行为的社会福利水平大于企业搭售行为时的社会福利水平。最后,本文在以上结论的基础上提出了一些反垄断政策和管制政策建议,例如,放松通信行业和广播电视业的进入管制、放松企业搭售行为管制以及加快推进适合我国三网融合的法律建设。更多还原

【Abstract】 Triple-play can bring more markets for communication companies and broadcasting companies, can bring more high quality and cheap information service for consumers, can also avoid repeated construction, reduce the cost of the management, and improve the level of resource utilization. At the same time, triple-play can also bring difficult problems for the regulation of VOIP, IPTV and so on value added service.First of all, in the paper, we review regulation system of China telecommunication industry, internet industry and broadcast and television industry, and analyse existing problems of communication industry and radio&television industry. For example, the lack of related legislation, department protection seriously, multiple role conflict, operating system differences, multiple management, decentralized responsibility and so on.Secondly, according to the industrial characteristics and system features of telecommunication industry, internet industry and broadcast and television industry, the paper simplifies model,abstracts network effect, switching cost variable, and makes the variable put into Hotelling model. From the perspective of market access and some certain assumptions, the paper distinguishes the model into broadcasting firm into communication industry, communication firm into broadcasting industry and broadcasting and communication firm mutual access. According to tying behavior, the three models can evolve into eight models.Thirdly, the paper obtains some important conclutions.First and foremost, the paper thinks broadcasting firm into communication industry, communication firm into broadcasting industry can not be suitable for strategy of China’s triple-play. Therefore, China can not adopt the strategy to promote triple-play. China should adopt the pattern of broadcasting and communication firm mutual access. What’s more, according to the conclution of model, the paper shows when broadcasting and communication firm enter mutually and the two firms adopt tying behavior, the equilibrium price of communication firm is greater than the equilibrium price of broadcasting firm and the market share of communication firm is greater than the market share of broadcasting firm.Therefore, tying behavior conforms to the Chicago school and may produce the exclusion and resitrict competition. Since producer surplus of tying behavior can be less than producer surplus of no tying behavior, broadcasting and communication firm will not adopt tying behavior. That is to say,triple-play times doesn’t exist the debate whether tying behavior of firm may produce the exclusion and resitrict competition between Chicago school and post Chicago school.Lastly,when broadcasting and communication firm enter mutually, and network effects and switching costs are greater enough, social welfare of no tying behavior can be greater than social welfare of tying behavior.Finally, according to the above conclutions, the paper puts forward to some suggestions about antitrust and regulation policies. For example, loosening regulation of entering into broadcasting industry and communication industry, loosening the regulation of tying behavior of firms, and speeding up the construction triple-play’s law.更多还原