【作者】 段欣；

【导师】 杨胜刚；

【作者基本信息】 湖南大学 ， MBA， 2009， 硕士

【摘要】 在商业银行中,有效的薪酬激励能够改善银行的资本充足率,提高资产质量,增强盈利能力,也能为银行培育人力资源。同时达到提高银行现实竞争力和潜在竞争力的效果。薪酬激励是指通过薪酬制度的设计和实施对员工进行奖惩达到激励约束目标的一种激励方式。而薪酬设计如果科学合理,可以高效难调动员工工作热情,起到激励作用。客户经理的薪酬机制对商业银行而言意义深远,而设计客户经理的薪酬机制本质上是解决商业银行与客户经理之间的代理问题。相对于商业银行的其它基本活动,客户经理的工作有其内在的特殊性:一方面,客户经理并不在商业银行内部工作,而是在他们各自负责的区域内同客户接触。因而,除非花费奇高的观测成本,客户经理很难观测到客户经理的努力程度。另一方面,除客户经理的努力外,销售业绩还受诸多不确定的市场因素之影响,譬如区域的潜在需求、客户的心理因素、竞争者的战略,以及商业银行的广告策略等。因而,客户经理并不能直接根据销售业绩来推断客户经理的努力程度,这就给客户经理予机会主义行为之机,即出现败德行为(Moral Hazard)。本文首先对薪酬的相关理论进行了概述,对薪酬的构成与作用进行了探讨。然后主要分析了美国、德国和日本的薪酬体系,并对他们的先进经验进行了总结。随后,分析了中国光大银行广州分行客户经理薪酬机制的现状,对目前客户经理薪酬管理办法进行了详细介绍,在此基础上,实证分析了客户经理薪酬水平与我行相关业绩指标的关系,发现目前光大银行广州分行客户经理薪酬水平只同存贷款额的提高有联系,而同银行的其它业绩指标的关系不明显。进而我们认为中国光大银行客户经理薪酬机制安排中存在缺乏长期激励、考核体系不合理等问题。最后,我们设计出光大银行客户经理薪酬机制优化方案,对客户经理的基本工资、绩效工资与福利进行了优化设计,并提出了一些相关的配套措施。更多还原

【Abstract】 In commercial banks, effective incentive compensation can improve the bank’s capital adequacy ratio, improving asset quality, increase profitability, but also cultivate human resources and enhance the potential competitiveness at the same time. Compensation Incentive is the remuneration system to encourage and restrain incentives through the design and implementation. Scientific and rational design of compensation system can mobilize employee enthusiasm.Customer manager salary mechanism of commercial banks is essentially a settlement of the agency problem between commercial banks and customer managerse managers. Relative to other basic activities of commercial banks, customer manager’s job has its own inherent specificity:on the one hand, customer manager does not work at the commercial bank, but in their respective area of responsibility within the contact with customers. So, unless the increasing the cost of observing,it is difficult to observe a customer manager’s effort. On the other hand, in addition to the efforts of customer manager, the sales performance is also affected by many uncertain factors affecting the market, such as the potential demand for the region, clients’psychological factors, competitors’strategies, as well as commercial banks’advertising strategies. Thus, the customer manager’effort can not be inferred directly from the sales which leads to moral hazard.This article firstly overview the relevant compensation theory, discusses the composition and role of salaries. Then mainly analyzes the United States, Germany and Japan’s compensation system and summarizes their advanced experience. Subsequently, this article analyzes the Guangzhou Branch of China Everbright Bank’s customer manager’s compensation mechanism, and described the status of the current customer manager compensation management approach in detail.Then we empirically analyzes the relationship between customer manager’s salary levels and performance indicators of the the Guangzhou Branch of China Everbright Bank. We find that the current customer manager salary can only affect the index of deposit and loan. Thus we believe that the manager’s salary mechanism of China Everbright Bank is lack of long-term incentive function. And the examination system is irrational. Finally, we design a compensation mechanism for Everbright Bank customer manager optimization solutions,including customer manager base salary, performance salary and benefits. At last we put forward a number of related supporting suggestions.更多还原