关于中韩公司并购法律限制性规则比较研究

【作者】 李旭；

【导师】 孙晓屏；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 民商法学， 2011， 硕士

【摘要】 中国自1978年改革开放,1993年走上社会主义市场经济道路以来,目前已经成长为世界第二经济大国,中国企业通过不断推进跨国并购,在世界并购舞台上已经逐渐成为主角。韩国从1997年金融危机以后,放松企业并购方面的各种规制,公司并购进展也较为迅速。在此过程中,许多外资公司和投机资本并购韩国企业,同时也发生了国富流失的问题。中韩两国,自1992年建交以来在政治、经济、文化等各个领域的交流与合作取得了令人可喜的成果。目前,中国已成为韩国的首位投资国家和贸易国家,韩国也成为中国的第三位贸易伙伴,并且两国正致力于双边贸易区磋商。在此潮流下,今后两国公司之间的并购也会迅猛增加。因此研究分析中韩公司并购法律规范的限制性规制,具有较大的现实意义和实用价值。在中韩公司并购法律规范上,对于公司并购法律行为的限制性规制的核心问题包括：针对收购人的收购行为进行的持股权益披露制度与要约收购制度、针对收购人的要约收购行为而目标公司所采取的反收购措施规制、针对外资并购进行的限制性规制与国家安全审查制度、对因公司并购而发生的经营者集中规制等。对于这些限制性规制,中韩两国均借鉴美国、欧洲和日本等发达国家的法律,在规制的内容和结构上,其规制的核心内容大致一致。但是,在法律的细致内容和具体适用程序上,因两国的法律背景与经济状况的不同而存在一些差异。从整体并购法律的框架和内容来看,中国相关法律规范在各个层次上都比较丰富,政府对公司并购行为进行比较严格的监管。韩国则没有专门规制公司并购的单独法律；对要约收购的规制不利于确保交易的稳定性以及保护中小股东的利益；在反收购规制方面,有关并购法律对反收购的价值取向、滥用问题以及具体反收购措施的适用问题均没有明文规定；对经营者集中的规制难以确保经营者集中当事公司交易的稳定性以及审查的正确性。对此,中韩两国均需要以自律规定形式制定《公司并购指南》,供企业的并购业务和司法机构的审理并购案件参考,随时反映在实践中的各种并购问题。在韩国要约收购规范方面,为了保护中小股东和投资者的合法权益,需要借鉴在中国要约收购规制法律上的事前申报制度和专家聘请制度。在反收购措施方面,两国均需要明确规定反收购措施决策权,并且为了防止敌意收购,需要考虑进行毒丸计划的合法化。在经营者集中审查方面,与中国、美国、欧盟一样,韩国需要采取事前申报制度和两阶段审查制度,以确保经营者集中当事公司交易的稳定性以及审查的正确性。本文从实践的角度出发,以现行的中韩并购法律和政策为基础,就两国公司并购法律的限制性规制进行综合分析,并通过上述分析找出中韩公司并购法律制度和实践上的不同之处及彼此可以借鉴的要素,从而使两国公司并购制度在立法和实践上更加趋于完善。本文共分为五章：第一章,分析了中韩公司并购法律规范的基础,并提出了两国公司并购法律规范的核心问题。具体阐述了中韩公司并购法律框架和特点,提出了两国公司并购法律规范的限制性规制的核心问题。第二章,研究分析了对收购人的收购行为的限制性规制。重点分析了中韩持股权益披露制度和要约收购制度的具体内容,并对两国相关制度进行了比较。第三章,研究分析了在公司收购中反收购措施限制性规制。具体阐述了反收购立法模式与价值取向,重点分析了主要反收购措施的内容以及中韩两国在法律和实践上的适用,并对两国反收购措施适用状况进行了比较。第四章,研究分析了经营者集中审查制度。具体阐述了中韩经营者集中审查制度的具体程序和内容,并对两国经营者集中审查制度进行了比较。第五章,阐述了中韩两国公司并购法律限制性规制的问题,并对完善两国并购法律规制提出了建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since the year of 1978 after the opening reformation in China, and after the start of social democratic economy market in 1993, China has now become the 2nd largest economic country in the world. Thru non-stop enforce of multinational M&A, Chinese enterprises have become the leading role in multinational M&A field in the world.After the economy crisis in 1997 in Korea, the rule for enterprises M&A has been loosen, the progress for enterprises M&A has also speeded up. During this process, a lot of foreign capital and capital M&A Korean enterprises faced the issue of loss of national assets.Since the establishment of diplomatic relation for China and Korea in 1992, the intercommunication and cooperation in the field of politics, economics and cultural.. etc reached a satisfactory result. Currently, China has become the largest investing and trading country in Korea. Korea is also the 3rd largest trading associate for China. Meanwhile, the two countries are committed to FTA (Free Trade Agreement). Under this kind of tideway, M&A between the two countries in the future will grow quickly. Hence, the control and limitation for Chinese-Korean enterprises M&A regulatory and law have a greater practical meaning and value.In the M&A regulatory of Chinese-Korean enterprises, the main issues regarding the control and limitation of the M&A regulatory include:imposition of the ’5% rule’ and takeover bid rule on takeover action for acquiring corporation; target enterprises impose antitakeover measures regulatory on acquiring corporation’s takeover bid action; imposition of the limitation rule and the national security review rule for foreign capital M&A; imposition of operator concentration rule due to enterprises M&A. Regarding of these limitation rule, both China and Korea refer to US, Europe, Japan and other developed countries’regulation. In most part, the main content and structure of the regulation are similar. However, in the details and the specific procedure of the regulation are still different due to the differences of the regulatory background and the economic condition.From the structure and content of the entire M&A regulation, Chinese relative regulation is more enriched in every aspects, government is also stricter on M&A action. It is hard to determine whether the antitakeover measures precautions are illegal or not. In Korea, there is no separated regulation for enterprises M&A, hence, the buying regulation is not favored to insure the trading stability and to protect the rights for the shareholder. Regarding of the antitakeover measures, there are no actual regulation for the value tropism, issues and precaution for antitakeover measures. In the operators’centralization regulation, it is difficult to ensure the trading stability and the accuracy of the examination. For this, Chinese and Korea should constitute "the guideline for enterprises’ M&A" as a self-discipline format. To provide instruction and references for enterprises’M&A and to feedback all kinds of issues that may face during the practice at anytime. Regarding of the buying regulation in Korea, in order to protect shareholders’and investors’legal rights, Korea should refer to Chinese regulation on buying law. In the aspect of antitakeover measures, in order to prevent intended M&A, it should have specific law for antitakeover measure and should consider to legalize the practice of poison pill’s plan. In the aspects of operators’centralizing the examination, China, America and EU are all the same, and Korea should also adopt pre-declare regulation and two-phase examination system in order to insure the trading stability of the operators and the accuracy of the examination.The thesis began from a practical perspective, based on the current status of Chinese-Korean M&A regulation and policy. It integral analyzes the control and limitation rule of the M&A regulation in the two countries. By the above described analysis, it finds the differences of the M&A regulation and practices between the two countries and the area where they can learn from each other in order to consummate the M&A regulation and practices in both countries. The thesis is divided into 5 chapters:Chapter one, the chapter analyzes the foundation of Chinese-Korean enterprises’ M&A regulations’control and brought forward the core issues of the M&A regulation criterion in enterprises in both countries. The chapter specifically describes the structure and main content of the Chinese-Korean M&A regulation and also brought forward the core issues of M&A regulation and limitation rule.Chapter two, the chapter investigates and analyzes the control and limitation rule of the buyers’behavior. It specifically describes the holding rights exposition and buying regulation of China and Korea. The chapter emphasizes the analysis of the main content of the holding rights exposition and buying regulation and compares the relative regulations in both countries.Chapter three, the chapter investigates and analyzes the control and limitation rule of the antitakeover measures in Enterprises’M&A. It specifically describes the antitakeover measures’lawmaking model and value tropism. It emphasizes the application of the regulation practices in both China and Korea. It also compares the antitakeover measures status in both countries.Chapter four, the chapter investigates and analyzes the operator’s centralizing examination rule. It specifically describes the specific procedure and content of the operator’s centralizing examination rule in China and Korea. Meanwhile, the chapter also compares the differences between the operator’s centralizing examination rule in the two countries.Chapter five, it states the issues of the control and limitation rule of the Chinese-Korean enterprises’s M&A regulation, it also states the suggestions of consummating the Chinese-Korean M&A regulations.更多还原