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我国两型社会建设中的博弈探析

【作者】 王敬文

【导师】 焦必方;

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 , 国民经济学, 2010, 硕士

【摘要】 自从我国中央政府提出“加快建设资源节约型、环境友好型社会”(简称两型社会)的政策口号以来,科学发展的理念日渐深入人心,政府治理污染的投入不断加大,公众的环保意识不断加强,追求科学发展的社会风气也日渐形成,我国保护环境资源的工作取得了不错的成绩。然而,随着我国两型社会建设的不断深入,各种利益主体之间的矛盾也开始不断凸显,政策与对策之间的博弈日渐加剧,两型社会进程所遇到的阻力也不断加重。因此,对两型社会建设中的利益主体之间的博弈行为进行研究,对于理解我国当前两型社会建设所遇到的问题的原因并进一步加快两型社会建设进程具有重大的现实和理论意义。本文采用经济学和博弈论的理论模型,对两型社会建设中的四大利益主体,即企业、公众、地方政府和中央政府相互之间的博弈行为进行分析,探求影响各利益主体策略选择的各种因素,进而通过政策建议以修正各利益主体的收益期望目标,促使各利益主体的行为选择更符合我国两型社会建设的要求,以实现加快我国两型社会建设的目的。通过研究,本文得出的观点认为,加强政府管制,是我国两型社会建设的必然选择;政府应当采用科学合理的管制方法和手段,采取限制排污、鼓励环保的双重措施,引导企业节能环保;同时,应加强公众利益表达机制建设,增强公众的博弈力量,通过进一步鼓励公众对企业污染举报来弥补政府监管力量的不足,通过加强公众对政府行为的监督来修正政府失灵;最后,在肯定了政府主导型的两型社会建设模式下,应该加快建立中央政府与地方政府之间的更科学合理的管理体系,完善更加重视环保的政绩考核体系,引导地方政府自主地积极贯彻中央的两型社会建设政策。总之,我国的两型社会建设是一个综合性的工程,社会、政治或者经济体系的任何一个环节的失误都可能导致我国两型社会的目标旁落。只有把科学发展观指导思想真正贯彻落实到社会经济生活的各个方面,建立科学完善的机制体系,才能妥善处理好各方面的利益,最终实现整个社会的全面、协调、可持续发展。

【Abstract】 Since China’s Central Government proposed the slogan of "to speed up the construction of a resource-saving and environment-friendly society" (or two types of society for short), the concept of scientific development increasingly has been enjoying popular support, government’s investment in pollution control continued to increase, public awareness of environmental protection continued to strengthen, the pursuit of scientific-development society has become more and more popular, and China’s great effort of environmental protection and resources conversation has made a good performance. However, with the process of the two types of social construction in China becoming deepening, the conflicts between various stakeholders have also begun to highlight, the games between policies and anti-policies increasingly intensified. The resistance encountered by the two types of social construction also continues to grow. Therefore, study of the game behavior between the stakeholders will provide great practical and theoretical significance for further speeding up the construction process in our country.In this paper, with the theoretical economics and game theory model, I analyze the behavior of the four major stakeholders in the construction practice, namely, corporate, public, local government and the central government, explore the factors of impacting their behaviors, and then through policy recommendations to correct their revenue goal to make sure their behavior choices in line with our requirements, then to achieve the purpose of speeding up our construction process.Through the research, this paper gives the view that strengthening government control is China’s inevitable choice in the practice of two types of social construction. Government should adopt scientific and rational control methods to limit emissions or encourage environmental protection; at the same time, government should strengthen the public interest expression mechanisms, and enhance the game forces of public. By encouraging the public to report on industrial pollution to make up for inadequate government regulation forces, and by the public supervision of government’s action to correct the government failure problems; Finally, more rational management system between central and local government should established, and more attention on environmental performance should be added in the political evaluation system, to encourage local governments to actively implement the central government’s energy-saving and environmental protection policies, while the government-led construction model should also be approbated.In short, China’s two types of social construction is a comprehensive engineering. Any failure in the link of social, political or economic system may lead to deviation from our goals. Therefore, only to implement the concept of the scientific development in all aspects of our social and economic life, and to build properly mechanisms to handle the interests of all stakeholders, then we will ultimately get a comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable development in our country.

  • 【网络出版投稿人】 复旦大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2011年 03期
  • 【分类号】D616
  • 【被引频次】2
  • 【下载频次】385
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