【作者】 刘欠宁；

【导师】 刘亚相； 刘迎洲；

【作者基本信息】 西北农林科技大学 ， 应用数学， 2009， 硕士

【摘要】 本研究在博弈论的框架下,以猪饲料的营销为例。首先,根据分析饲料企业所面临的现实困境的原因一提出一个营销思想:饲料商在养殖户集中地区设立一个平台(暂称“托猪所”),饲料商可以对长期购买自己饲料的养殖户提供一定的技术咨询,免费防疫等服务。甚至可以允许养殖户自愿将猪放到“托猪所”由专门的技术人员指导喂养,同时和猪肉商订立合同,定点定时收购猪肉,这样不但保证了猪肉的质量,还给养殖户提供了技术支持,保证了其收益。同时,还可以发挥价值链的规模效应,而且可以保证饲料商在整个价值链中的主导地位。其次,根据分析饲料企业所面临的现实困境的原因二,本研究将讨论饲料商、养猪户、消费者构成的异质产品三级供应链中,饲料商、养猪户的定价问题以及消费者决定猪肉需求的问题。其决策过程为:饲料商首先给定饲料价格,养猪户根据饲料价格决定猪肉价格,消费者再根据猪肉价格决定需求量;利用效用函数,便可确定在给定的猪肉价格下,使得消费者效用达到最大化的猪肉需求量,养猪户根据此需求量信息来决定在饲料价格给定时使自身利润最大化的猪肉价格,并将猪肉价格信息反馈给饲料商,饲料商再确定使自身利润最大化的饲料价格,从而构成重复动态博弈过程,即Stackelberg博弈。根据博弈论中的理性人假设,在整个系统中各局中人都从各自的利益出发,追求其自身利益的最大化,而政府则可从整个系统的利益最大化出发,协调各方的行为。最后分析了饲料商—养猪场供应链中牛鞭效应。研究了在有、无激励的情况下对供应链企业信息共享问题进行博弈分析,说明激励对促进企业间信息共享的重要作用,以此给出了激励存在时的企业间信息共享博弈的一般模型,并进一步探讨促进企业间信息共享的几种激励模式。基于需求信息的不确定情况对饲料商—养猪场供应链系统进行了研究,分析了搜集不确定需求信息的费用,得出了养猪场与饲料商共享这种不确定的需求信息的条件。更多还原

【Abstract】 This thesis studied the merchandising of pig feed in context of game theory. Firstly, on the basis of the first reason of corners which businessman of feed faced, the thesis put forward an idea of merchandising: the businessman of pig feed set up hoggery and provide technic consultation. It can make a contract with the businessman of pork to ensure purchase on time. So it can guarantee the quality of pork, the income of hoggery and itself. At the same time, scale avail of the supply chain can be brought into play and the leading status of the businessman of forage in the whole supply chain can be guaranteed.Secondly, the thesis analyzed the second reason of corners which businessman of feed face. Next I put forward the pricing decision of a three class supply chain with a single businessman of feed , hoggery and consumer . The process is: in the first instance the businessman of feed give the price of forage, then hoggery gives the price of pork on the basis of the price of feed, lastly, consumer decides its demand for pork on the basis of the price of pork. The demand for pork can found on the basis of the maximum avail which need to use the function of the consumer’s avail. The hoggery gives the price of pork on this demand when the price of forage has been given, and feed back the price of pork to the businessman of forage. Then the businessman of feed decides the price of forage which can guarantee it can obtain the maximum profit. So this process forms a repetitious dynamic game, namely Stackelberg game.Finally, the thesis discussed the“butterfly domino offect”in the supply chain with a single businessman of feed and hoggery. The paper presents a game analysis onthis issue under incentive mechanismor without. By explaining the significant role of information sharing , it works out a game model for enterprise supply chain management and several other incentive models of promoting information sharing. Then the thesis discussed the supply chain with a single businessman of feed and hoggery and supposes the demand information is stochastic. The thesis analyzed the cost to collect this stochastic information, and conclude the condition that hoggery would like to share this stochastic information with businessman of feed.更多还原