【作者】 胡雯瑾；

【导师】 陈宏民；

【作者基本信息】 上海交通大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2007， 硕士

【摘要】 21世纪新经济时代产业竞争越来越激烈。我们研究发现一些以服务为主的产业中,企业之间的竞争已经不再是个体公司之间的竞争,而是类似商业生态系统之间的对抗。比如传媒产业就是具有双边平台特征的产业,由双边平台(Two-sided Platforms)和双边用户(End Users)组成。不同于传统的厂商——消费者单边市场,传媒平台企业既要吸引读者观众加入平台,又要吸引广告商还有内容提供商,如影视制作公司、供稿作者加入到平台,在平台的协调下,双边(三边)用户实现交互作用——买卖交易或交流等。平台厂商除了关注整体价格水平外,还要关注对多边用户制定不同价格结构对多边用户交互作用的影响。从传媒市场来说,读者对传媒的需求会受广告和平台内容数量、质量的影响;同时,广告商选择传媒平台时也会受平台拥有的读者数量的影响。传媒平台,报纸、杂志、广播、电视等主要通过广告盈利的传媒通常对两边市场设定倾斜性的定价,即选择对广告商的成本加成(广告费用)高于对于消费者的成本加成(报纸、杂志购买价格,广播电视收听收看的信号费年费)的定价结构。对传媒来说,其发行量或者收视率是吸引广告商的重要条件。而要保证众多数量的受众,必须要通过高质量的内容吸引受众。本文基于已有的研究,试图通过实证研究,以广告支持的传媒为例,探究具有双边平台特征的产业中,交叉网络外部性对价格结构、平台利润的影响,试图回答以下问题:1)广告支持的双边市场是否存在交叉网络外部性?2)在读者不同付费方式情况下,平台两边用户之间的交叉网络外部效应呈现什么特征?3)读者对广告内容是否存在偏好?4)针对广告偏好型和厌恶型读者,媒体平台双边市场的不对称性有何不同?本文选取美国杂志业的数据进行分析。将杂志划分为多个细分市场下的双寡头竞争格局,重点研究杂志作为双边平台企业时,杂志在一边市场吸引到的用户(受众和广告商)数量与该边的定价和另一边市场用户数量之间的关系。研究表明:1)面对不同的杂志类型,读者受众对广告的偏好和厌恶存在差异,说明了正负交叉网络外部性的存在是广告支持型双边市场的重要特征;2)杂志在广告商市场的占有率主要由读者年订阅量决定,其次是总发行量;3)在读者市场的订阅付费方式情况下,双边市场的价格结构倾斜程度最大,即杂志将更多的让利给读者,从而吸引更多的受众,从而要求广告商支付更高的价格;零售付费方式情况下,双边市场的价格倾斜程度最小;4)平台通过补贴读者,从广告中获利。更多还原

【Abstract】 The industry competition in 21 century is becoming severe. Under some research, we found that the competition between some industry with large proportion of service and third industry is not simply in single companies but like rivalry between business ecosystem. For an example, media industry is the general two-sided industry with two-sided platform features. The two-sided industry is composed of two-sided platforms and two-sided end users. Different from traditional manufacturers whose consumers are on one side, media platform should both attract viewers or readers to join the platform and drive advertisers and content suppliers to join the platform. With the cooperate operation of platform, end users in two or three sides implement the interaction as buying and selling trade or information exchange. Besides focusing on the total price, platform also focus on the price structure on both sides’interaction and end users transaction behavior.From the view of media market, readers’demand will be influenced by advertisements’and contents’quantity while the demand of advertisers are also influenced by the other side readers or viewers side. Those advertise mainly supported media platform such as newspaper magazine, broadcast and television station generally set up skewed pricing. They choose to set higher price (advertise rate per page) for advertisers and lower or even below cost or zero price for consumers such as cover price of newspapers and magazines and annual information fee of cable casting and cable TV. The circulation or audience rating is the key factor to attract advertisers to advertise in the platform. And to keep the certain amount of audience on the side of platform must use high quality content information.This paper tried to implement empirical research to point out the network effect and price structure on two sided end users using the example of advertisement supported media industry. First, select several sub-markets to make out bi-oligarch competition pattern in standardized American magazine market. Second, stress on the relationship of audience quantity attracted by two-sided platform enterprises and price structure on two sides. This paper try to solve these four questions: 1) Does high cross network effect exist between advertise supported two sided market? 2) What is the different of the two side network effect in subscription fee and single copy fee? 3) Does advertisement favorers exist? 4)Is there any dissymmetry price structure difference between anti-advertisement and advertisement favorers?Use panel data to point out in statistic method and descriptive method the different advertisement favorers or anti-advertisement positive or negative cross net externality of audience towards advertisement on different magazine styles. 1)The advertise supported media possess two-sided market feature. Then mark off efficient information advertisement media and non-efficient information advertisement media. 2)Also concluded that magazine market share on advertisers side is mainly determined by audience subscription more than adding single copy. 3) The greatest skewed price is in subscription paying way and the smallest dissymmetry price structure is in single copy buying method. This is mainly because platform using skewed pricing on audience side as lower price or below cost pricing to benefit the reader will attract more readers on the side and get more profit from advertiser. 4) The main profit comes from advertisement side. The advertise profit can subsidize the content cost.更多还原