【作者】 李平；

【导师】 洪小夏；

【作者基本信息】 上海师范大学 ， 中共党史， 2011， 硕士

【摘要】 本文重点研究刘邓大军挺进大别山的原因、性质和效果,阐述了一些与目前中国学界和政界主流观点不同的看法。按照战争的规律和形势的发展,人民解放军在解放战争中,由保卫解放区的内线作战转为进攻国民党统治区的外线作战,是顺理成章的事情。但是这种转变需要具备一定的条件,一般是在双方力量对比由敌强我弱转变为敌弱我强之后,而且一般会采用渐进式推进的方式。但1947年8月刘邓大军挺进大别山的时机和方式却是打破常规的。在粉碎了国民党军对各解放区的全面进攻之后,处于国民党重点进攻中的陕北和山东解放区面临着巨大的压力。中共中央在此时命令刘邓大军无后方千里跃进大别山的原因,是为了吸引国民党军队回援,用“围魏救赵”的方式,扯散国民党对陕北的重点进攻,从而缓解陕北的经济困难。陈谢大军由原定调入陕北、直接解围,改为转兵豫西的决策,也是因为担心陕北贫瘠缺粮,无力支撑陈谢这新的八万大军。因此刘邓大军挺进大别山并不是国共双方力量转换后的战略进攻行为,而是在战略防御阶段,采取以攻代守的战略反攻行为。从效果来看,刘邓大军进入大别山后,事实上并没有调动多少进攻解放区的国民党军队,反而引来了白崇禧指挥的桂系精锐部队这个新敌人的大举进攻,预期调动敌人回援、为陕北解围的目的没有达到,陕北反而陷入更大的困境。由于远离后方作战,面临许多无法克服的困难,加上国民党不断调动军队“清剿”,在进入大别山仅三个月后,刘、邓被迫分兵,留在大别山的部队也只能实行“避战”政策,用游击作战的方式与国民党军周旋,无法有效组织大规模歼灭战。随后,留在大别山的部队也撤出了大别山,并未实现在大别山“站住脚”、重建根据地的战略目标。在这个进出大别山的过程中,刘邓大军减员过半,“元气”大伤,由内战初期人数众多、“九战九捷”的一支劲旅,变成一支缺乏攻坚能力的弱旅。巨大的代价换来并不理想的效果,难免使人对挺进大别山决策的正确性产生质疑。本文分为五章:第一章绪论,介绍本文研究主题和研究意义,研究现状,方法、创新和结构等。第二章梳理刘邓大军挺进大别山的曲折决策过程。第三章分析刘邓大军千里跃进大别山的原因,其中对陕北经济困难情况做了较为详细的阐述。第四章简要概括刘邓大军挺进大别山及撤离大别山的全过程。第五章结语,简要概括全文主要观点,包括分析刘邓大军挺进大别山的原因、性质和效果。更多还原

【Abstract】 This article focuses on the cause and effect of the Liu-Deng advance to the Dabie Mountains, described a different view with the current mainstream view . In accordance with the laws of war and the development of the situation, the PLA got into the Kuomintang areas and win the war should be the logical thing. But the transition requires certain conditions, the general balance of power in both parties should be changed, and generally promote the use of progressive approach. However, the timing and the way of Liu and Deng advance to the Dabie Mountains in 1947 broke the routine. After he KMT‘s all-out offensive attack against the liberated areas had been crushed ,the liberated areas in northern Shaanxi and Shandong were facing tremendous pressure. CMC commanded at this time that Liu and Deng advanced to zhongyuan, the only purpose was to scatter the attacks of the KMT. Therefore, Liu and Deng advancing to zhongyuan did not mean the forces converted both strategic offensive behavior, but in the strategic defensive phase, the adoption of a strategic counter-offensive on behalf of the defensive behavior. From the effects , Liu and Deng into the Dabie Mountains, the fact the number of attacks did not mobilize the liberated areas of the Kuomintang troops, has drawn the elite forces Gui large-scale attack this new enemy, the enemy is expected to return to mobilize aid, The purpose is not achieved in Northern siege, but into greater difficulties in Northern. Operations away from the rear, facing many difficulties could not be overcomed, with the KMT continued to mobilize the military "encirclement and suppression", after just three months into the Dabie Mountains, Liu led the First column to turn out of the Dabie Mountains. The other three columns in the Dabie Mountains could only implement guerrilla warfare . Following the first column, the remaining columns quickly transferred out of the Dabie Mountains. In the reconstruction process of the Dabie Mountains, they did not achieve the "foothold"objective. While the other peoples army had a relatively large increase in combat which had been in the organization on a larger scale warfare, ,Liu and Deng were the only one fighting troop in dropped instead of rising in the War of Liberation. A huge price did not get the desired results, inevitably made the correctness of this decision into question.This article is divided into five parts:The first part is the introduction, the main problem is to study about the significance of this article, literature review, and innovation. The second part is Liu and Deng advance the causes of the Dabie Mountains, mainly related to the decision-making process and the difficulties of food in Northern. The third part is Liu and Deng advance the process of the Dabie Mountains, including Southwest campaigns and advancing the process of the Dabie Mountains and the initial expansion in the Dabie Mountains. The fourth part is transferred out of the Dabie Mountains Dabie Mountains and the anti-crush.更多还原