【作者】 陈飞；

【导师】 徐章一；

【作者基本信息】 武汉理工大学 ， 物流管理， 2011， 硕士

【摘要】 随着市场竞争加剧,市场环境发生了深层次的变化,顾客定制化需求越来越强烈。在产品生命周期日益缩短和销售终端抢占市场份额的双重压力下,响应时间作为重要的核心竞争资源,已成为供应链强有力的竞争武器。为了促进供应链协同合作,保障时间竞争优势和改善供应链整体利益,供应链激励与约束机制尤为重要。本文以信息对称和信息非对称为条件,构建了基于响应时间的二阶供应链模型,并重点分析了核心企业对成员企业的激励与约束机制。本文首先对供应链中时间竞争和响应时间、供应链激励机制,以及现代激励与约束机制的研究现状进行了概述,阐述了本文的研究内容和结构框架。其次,在信息对称条件下,以需求对响应时间敏感的MTO二阶供应链(单制造商,单分销商)为研究对象,考虑双方处于Stackelberg主从博弈的结构(分销商为主导方),求出使得分散决策和集中决策下制造商、分销商及供应链期望收益最大的最优解,然后分销商引入利益共享契约激励机制进行协调,实现供应链整体最优目标。在此基础上,探讨了信息共享对基于响应时间的供应链激励机制的作用和机理。再次,在非对称信息条件下,以单制造商和单分销商组成的MTO二阶供应链为研究对象,考虑制造单位产品商生产成本和响应时间为非对称信息条件下分销商通过利益共享契约来激励制造商,实现供应链协调。在此基础上,分析了非对称信息条件下基于响应时间的供应链风险,探讨了非对称信息条件下基于响应时间的供应链约束机制。最后,概括了本文研究的主要结论,并展望了未来研究的方向和主要问题。更多还原

【Abstract】 As the challenging in the market becomes more and more heated, market environment has also had the profound changes. Customers have more options. Response time has become a strong competition weapon and even a core competition resource, when the product life cycle persists shorter increasingly and sale terminal preemption occupies the market share. In order to promote the supply chain collaboration and guarantee time competitive advantages, and improve supply chain overall interests, supply chain incentive and restraint mechanisms gets particularly important.Based on Information symmetry and information asymmetry, this paper constructs the response time of two-echelon supply chain model, and analyses incentive and restraint mechanisms of the core enterprise to member enterprises.In this paper, the supply chain of competition and response time, supply chain and incentive mechanism, and modern motivation and restraint mechanisms in the present situation will be analysed firstly. Then the research paper expounds the research content and logical mind。Then, in the symmetric information conditions, considering the two-echelon MTO supply chain(one manufacturer, one vendor),demand sensitive to response time,as the research object, and holding the two sides in the Stackelberg Model (vendor for leading party),we obtained the optimal solution under decentralized decision-making and centralized decision-making, then the vendor proposed Benefit-sharing Contract incentive mechanism to coordinate the overall objective of supply chain. Besides,we studied the sharing of information on the supply chain for the role of incentives.In the asymmetric information conditions, there is still a single manufactuer,one vendor of two-echelon MTO supply chain as the research object. We considered the manufacturers cost and response time under asymmetric information,and the vendor proposed Benefit-sharing Contract incentive mechanism to coordinate the overall objective of supply chain. Then, we analyzed the supply chain risk under asymmetric information based on response time, In response to these risks, we developed a constraint mechanism.Finally, the research of this paper was summed up, the lack of the research and the further research directions was pointed out.更多还原