【作者】 朱海峰；

【导师】 汪炜；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 金融学， 2011， 硕士

【摘要】 本文在已有研究基础上,探究终极控制权、公司治理与自由现金流过度投资的关系。文章采用预期投资模型获得过度投资和自由现金流,并以此为基础,采用优化的模型进一步研究了以下三个方面内容：(1)自由现金流与过度投资的关系；(2)不同控制权大小特征下两权分离对过度投资的影响；(3)终极控制权下公司相关治理因素对自由现金流过度投资的影响。在处理方法上,本文以公司两权分离程度和最终控制权大小分别作为最终控制人侵占上市公司的动力和能力,利用2004-2009年516家上市公司的3096个平衡面板数据进行实证研究,研究得到的主要结论有：(1)最终控股股东控制权与现金流权分离加剧了过度投资,且对过度投资的影响成倒U型；(2)最终控制人控制权较大时过度投资问题更严重。相对于控制权较小的情况,控制权较大时投资现金流敏感度无论是从数值还是显著度上为都较大。控制权较大时两权分离会显著增加过度投资,而在控制权较小时则不显著,此时的回归系数也明显小于控制权较大的情况；(3)独立董事制度未能有效抑制过度投资；(4)董事会规模在一定范围内增加有助于抑制过度投资,但其规模较大时若继续增大,反而会增加过度投资；(5)股权制衡对自由现金流过度投资没有起到有效抑制作用。据此,文章提出了相关建议：(1)加强两权分离的公司监管,特别是加强最终控制权较大的上市公司的监督,减少最终控股股东由于两权分离而对上市公司侵害的动机；(2)健全独立董事制度,增强独立董事的独立性和对工作的尽职度,适度控制董事会规模、优化董事会结构；(3)提高非控股大股东的持股比例,形成合理股权结构；(4)加强上市公司信息披露,减少代理问题。更多还原

【Abstract】 In this paper, we have researched the relations between the corporate governance and the over investment of free cash flows under ultimate control right. We got the over investment and free cash flows by Expected Investment Model. On this basis, we proposed the optimal model to research three aspects, as followings:(1) the relations between free cash flows and over investment; (2) the influences on the over investment by the divergence of "two rights" under the big and small control rights, respectively; (3) the influence on the over investment of free cash flows by the corporate governance factors under ultimate control right.About the methods, we see the degree of the divergence of control rights and cash flow rights, and the degree of ultimate control rights as the ultimate controllers’ force and capability to seize the corporate. There are 3096 panel data from 516 corporations between 2004 and 2009 in the empirical study. The main conclusions are:(1) divergence of ultimate controllers’ control rights and cash flow rights will make the over investment worse, and the trend of the influence is like inverted U; (2) The increase of the control rights of ultimate controller will add over investment. Contrary to the situation when the control right is small, the saliency of the sensitivity of free cash flows and over investment and the sensitivity itself are bigger when the control right is big. (3) The institution of independent director cannot decrease the over investment effectively; (4) the increase in the scale of board of the directors can add over investment; (5) multi-control and the property of the ultimate controller do not decrease over investment of free cash flows effectively.After all, we give some suggestions as followings:(1) Improve the supervision in the corporation, in which there exists the divergence of "two rights"; Reduce the motivating of the ultimate controller in seizing the corporate in case of the divergence of "two rights"; (2) Strengthen the institution of independent directors and improve the structure of the boarding of directors; (3) Increase the control rights of the un-control shareholders, and construct the appropriate equity structure; (4) Improve the information exposure and reduce the agency problem.更多还原