【作者】 王玮；

【导师】 朱柏铭；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 政治经济学， 2010， 硕士

【摘要】 本文讨论的主题是关于公共产品投票机制中的偏好显示问题,探讨在传统投票机制下公共产品偏好伪装的现象、成因及其后果,并在此基础上研究基于电子信息技术平台的投票机制能否有效改善公共产品的偏好伪装问题,主要分为两大部分内容：一是对公共产品偏好显示进行经济学分析,二是对电子投票机制进行设计,包括投票后台机制的设计和投票规则的设计,同时提出相应的实施条件与政策建议。我国传统投票机制下人们对公共产品极易产生偏好伪装现象,这是客观原因与主观因素共同导致的结果,客观原因包括：一是历史遗留问题,大多数民众始终保持对上层建筑的敬畏与无条件服从；二是信息不充分,传统投票机制下由于其时间、地域及信息载体等条件的限制,它所给选民提供的信息不够充分,使得投票主体无法做出真实的判断；三是信息不对称,传统投票机制中的委托代理形式使得代理人可以为追求自身利益而不惜违背委托人的意愿,而这一行为却无法被委托人发现。主观原因包括来自群体的压力与从众心理；自身素质低下以及人们为追求稀缺的社会资源不得不进行偏好伪装。正是由于各种原因导致的偏好伪装才使得公共产品供给的林达尔均衡无法实现,由此导致一系列社会后果,首先,投票结果与真实民意相违背,破坏了政府的可信度；其次,委托代理形式与一致同意规则共同创造了寻租与设租的空间,导致虚假与腐败；最后,偏好伪装条件下的投票结果最终导致社会福利的损失以及不合理的公共产品供给水平。为解决偏好伪装问题,首先要改进传统的委托代理机制,利用网络平台最大限度地推进公众有效参与,采用无需管理机构的电子投票协议实现投票者间的互相监督,以扁平化的代理机制代替目前的多层委托代理机制；其次要完善目前网络投票的偏好测量与显示机制,通过完善身份认证机制使获取真实偏好的同时兼顾效率与公平；最后要保障电子投票机制的可行性,维护投票平台的安全性、稳定性与公众的可操作性。更多还原

【Abstract】 This dissertation discusses the problems of preferences display in the voting mechanism for public goods,to explore the phenomenon, causes and consequences under the disguise of the preference for public goods in the traditional voting mechanism, and to study the voting mechanism based on the electronic and information technology platform which can effectively improve the masquerading problem of public goods preferences,it is mainly divided into two parts: First,economic analysis about disguised preferences for public goods, second,the design of electronic voting mechanisms, including the incentive mechanism design and the design of voting rules, while proposed the implementation conditions and policy recommendations.Traditional voting mechanism under the people’s preference for public goods can easily produce the phenomenon of camouflage is its objective reasons and factors in charge of a result, the objective reasons:First, a historical problem, most people always maintain a sense of awe and unconditional on the superstructure obedience; Second, information is not sufficient, the traditional voting mechanism, because of its time, place and information carriers such conditions, it has to provide voters with information that makes insufficient votes to determine the principal can not make true; third, asymmetric information, traditional voting mechanism in the form of principal-agent makes the agent can pursue their own interests at the expense against the wishes of the client, and this behavior can not be the principal discovery; subjective reasons, including pressure from groups and herd mentality; their low quality and people’s pursuit of scarce social resources had to camouflage preference. It is precisely because the preferences of a variety of reasons disguise that makes the supply of public goods, Lindahl equilibrium can not be achieved, which led to a series of social consequences, first of all, the voting results and public opinion contrary to the truth and undermine the credibility of the government; secondly, Principal-agent rules of the form and agreed to work together to create a space for rent-seeking and rent-setting, leading to a false and corrupt; Finally, disguised under the conditions of preference voting results eventually led to the loss of social welfare and unreasonable levels of public goods.To address the issue camouflage preference, first of all to improve the traditional principal-agent mechanism to maximize the use of network platform to promote effective public participation; Second, we should improve the voting preferences of the current network measurement and display mechanism to obtain the true preferences taking into account the efficiency and equity; Finally, the feasibility of mechanisms for protection of electronic voting, polling platform to maintain the security, stability and operability of the public.更多还原